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ABSTRACT
This work is a safety study based in a cultural and interpretive theoretical 
framework and in which organisational actors* own safety sensemaking is the focus 
of research attention.
By the utilisation of ethnographic fieldwork I have explored into the organisational 
safety structures and safety sensemaking processes in an industrial plant. In this 
plant, both shared, differentiated and fragmented safety definitions are found to 
exist, even though the organisational frontstage appearance presents the 
organisation as "smooth” and streamlined when safety is concerned. Backstage, 
though, a multiplicity of localised and situated safety constructs exist which may or 
may not be in line with officially acknowledged frontstage ones and which seldom 
are heard in open organisational circumstances.
It is suggested that the frontstage safety culture is closely tied to a positive 
organisational self-perception, and that safety is a dominant organisational theme 
that promotes organisational unity. Because of this, it is important to sustain the 
shared frontstage safety culture without noticeable "flaws”, and a distinct separation 
is found to exist between frontstage and backstage safety constructs under normal 
organisational circumstances. As a rule, backstage ones are kept within their proper 
"quarters" and do not embarrass the espoused and shared safety culture definitions 
of the organisational frontstage.
An apparently "strong" and unitary safety culture emerges from this situation. But 
as this culture is based in the separation of organisational front- and backstages, the 
polyphony of safety voices does not reach into the organisational open and is 
seldom acknowledged in organisational safety learning processes. This situation 
has consequences for safety learning and development as the knowledge base for 
safety learning thus is narrowed and includes frontstage safety definitions only.
My main conclusions and "recommendations” for safety improvement have three 
addresses: the organisation in question, the safety community in general, and future
safety research. For all these purposes, I call for an acknowledgment of the 
multiple voices of localised and situated safety which I believe represent vital -  
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SAFETY AS A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT
1.1. Introduction.
My theme of research is to investigate into the concept of worker safety.
The theoretical perspectives I will utilise in my safety research are not the ones to 
be commonly found in safety research literature. As a prelude to my work, I will 
give a brief sketch of my motivation for becoming engaged in safety studies. This 
"tale" will hopefully illustrate why I choose to consider safety through the analytical 
perspectives I have settled for:
In 19921 became employed at a small college which at that time predominantly was 
an engineering college. This college had national responsibilities in teaching and 
doing research with a focus on safety aspects. Safety was to become the trade mark 
of the college, and all students were to be knowledgeable about various safety 
aspects of work life by the time of their graduation. This organisational policy was 
a challenge to me as one of the organisation theory lecturers, as I was to provide 
organisational safety knowledge to my students, and as I did not have the faintest 
clue as to what this was all about. (I later found that a college is not exempted from 
the organisational tendency of discrepancy between espoused theories and theories- 
in-use (Argyris and Schon 1978): No one really expected me to care much about 
safety, as safety was defined to be an engineering issue, and organisation theory 
was not perceived to be of much relevance within this technical world view. On the 
contrary, organisation theory might even be counterproductive to the credibility and 
market value of safety teaching and research with its analytical perspectives and its 
lack of straightforward answers. But when I discovered these organisational 
preferences, I was already hooked on organisational safety research.)
1
To construct my own safety knowledge, I started to read safety literature, I attended 
safety conferences and meetings, I visited national safety experts at universities, and 
I had a placement period at a local industrial plant to get an impression of how 
safety was handled in the "real world". What soon became evident to me was that 
organisational perspectives were next to invisible in the safety research I came 
across. The focus seemed to be upon risk analysis, key safety figures, technical 
solutions for safety improvement, psychological aspects of individual motivation 
and learning - and at times something fuzzy called "safety culture". In numerous 
company presentations of their safety work it was referred to the "safety culture" of 
the company as a main tool of improving safety, and in applied research this was 
accentuated likewise: Not infrequently I found a call for and sometimes also 
prescriptions for the creation of a "positive safety culture".
Based in my interest in organisation theory, I became frustrated by what seemed to 
me a somewhat superficial and tool-oriented way of utilising the concept of 
organisational culture. The culture concept was seemingly brought forward as an 
almost magical issue which was used rhetorically in both safety discussions and 
safety research. As did Cooper (1998), I wanted to question the common utilisation 
of the concept and to fill it with substance rather than with thin air. I felt that the 
concept of culture was being "ruined" in the rather fluid ways it was being handled, 
and I disliked this since I had a strong notion that a cultural framework had the 
potential for illuminating how organisations cope with worker safety. Gherardi and 
Nicolini (2000a) echo this view of mine when they comment upon how the term 
“safety culture” often is used in such a vague and reductive sense that it threatens 
the concept’s potential. As a result of these concerns, it became my research 
intention to attempt to realise what I considered to be the culture concept’s true 
potential in safety research.
This research work then is thus motivated by what I perceive as a need to broaden 
and reframe the perspective of safety research by basing investigative endeavours in 
a cultural research paradigm. And in case it may look like I am the only one who 
has been occupied with such thoughts about safety: This is by no means the 
situation. My work finds its place within a tradition -  if yet small but growing - of
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safety research in which cultural, contextual and perceptional approaches to safety 
studies are incorporated (e.g. Gherardi et al. 1998a; Gherardi et al. 1998b; 
Thompson et al. 1998; Waring and Glendon 1998; Rundmo 1997; Williamson et al. 
1997; Hofmann et al. 1995; Janssens et al. 1995; DeJoy 1994; Guest et al. 1994; 
Hovden 1991). The social production of safety conditions seen within the 
perspective of a cultural approach is a theme of study that is met with increasing 
interest among scholars (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a).
1.2. The structure of my work.
I have chosen to do a study of the safety work in a Norwegian industrial plant. My 
work is structured as follows: Section A describes the basic assumptions and 
frameworks of my research. In chapter 1,1 look at safety in organisations from a 
theoretical perspective, outlining and discussing different perspectives which sets 
the scope for my theoretical endeavours. The purpose of my study will also be 
outlined in chapter 1. Chapter 2 is where my research methodology is discussed.
In section B I  turn to my fieldwork site, MAIE. In the sole chapter of the section -  
chapter 3 - 1  introduce the plant, and I give an overview of the nature of work 
hazards. Lastly, I give an account of how I carried out my data collection and 
interpretative work.
Section C is where my main data material appears. In chapter 4, safety history is 
described as seen through the eyes of organisational members. The role of the 
historical accounts in present-day safety perceptions is emphasised, and the 
existence of a distinct safety identity is discussed. Chapter 5 is the one in which I 
present the bulk of my data material. Guided by the formal structure of the safety 
work, I describe organisational members* interpretations of the different aspects of 
the organisational safety work. I end the chapter with a discussion of the formal 
safety structure and organisational meaning construction.
The last part of my work, section D, consists of three chapters, and this is where my 
main analysis takes place. Chapter 6 deals with the safety ideology, and in chapter
3
7 1 analyse the safety culture as a shared, differentiated and fragmented culture. In 
chapter 8 ,1 establish what I consider to be my main local knowledge by focussing 
my conclusions around five issues: Safety as multiple interpretations, front- and 
backstage safety, safety culture and identity as dominant organisational traits, safety 
learning and development and, finally, MAIE as a “strong” safety culture. In my 
final “recommendations” and remarks, I discuss my findings from three 
perspectives: What implications they may have for MAIE, for organisational safety 
in general and for further safety research.
The backbone of this thesis is the multiple safety perceptions that have been 
revealed to me by organisational members in the course of this work. Thus, my 
data material will have a prominent role in the forthcoming thesis. I will produce 
thick descriptions (Geertz 1993b) of the safety reality as seen from organisational 
members* points of view, and I will analyse these perceptions from different 
theoretical angles. It is my belief that this data-focussed approach will enable me to 
depict and comprehend MAIE as a safety organisation in ways that shed light upon 
multiple facets of the safety reality.
1.3. Risk and safety as societal concepts.
According to Habermas (quoted in R0vik 1998), science and technology constitute 
Western societies' dominant ideology, and the concept of an almighty God is being 
replaced by that of science and rationality as a belief system in which we put our 
faith for human progress. This societal "state" - called the era of Modernity - may 
be described as a product of the Enlightenment and focusses on rational scientific 
knowledge to explain and further develop human society (Carter and Jackson 1993). 
Based in this societal analysis, it is not a coincidence that the body of safety 
research is growing and that the concepts of risk and safety are becoming prominent 
features within societal debate and ideology - at least in the industrialised countries 
in the Western part of the world. To control risk and to achieve safety have become 
predominant societal themes. Beck (1997) argues that risk has become a root 
metaphor of our Western society, and consequently, issues regarding risk perception
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and preventive safety measures have achieved a dominant position in societal and 
individual thought.
According to Beck (ibid.), though, modem society with its belief in everdeveloping 
projects of scientific progress has experienced events that makes evident the limits 
of scientific control over human circumstances. Catastrophes like Bhopal, 
Tsjemobyl, and Estonia remind us about this. And gradually occurring catastrophes 
like deforestation, climate changes, acid rain, etc. are grave warnings of industrial 
societies' neglect of the environment that human beings depend upon for a 
continued existence. Modernity’s ideology of progressive development based upon 
scientific control has become questioned by large segments of people, and contrary 
to what was the case 30 years ago when modernity critique took place in small and 
"outcast” groupings, doubts of the future societal prospects can be heard over a 
broad scale. A questioning of larger and smaller scale disasters in spite of - and 
even because of - scientific progress and rational knowledge has entered the 
legitimate agenda of public concern and debate, and multiple perceptions of risk 
have surfaced as a widespread societal phenomena.
Beck (ibid.) claims that the illusions of Modernity have become shattered and are 
being replaced by a reduced faith in the possibilities of science to create the ultimate 
nirvana. But instead of a fundamental critique that strives to substitute Modernity 
by radical means, Western man and woman are occupied with how best to avoid the 
inevitable negative consequences of the modem way of life. Resulting from this, 
risk analyses, safety equipment, safety systems, etc. flourish both in work 
organisations and in society at large, and a growing risk and safety market has 
become a niche of entrepreneurship both in business and science. A world view 
which is strongly influenced by risk and safety deliberations can daily be witnessed 
in Western media as postmodern Risk Society manifests itself and the balance 
between risk and safety is tried to be held in check.
The gradual development of risk awareness and the fact that it primarily is an issue 
of broad concern in the Western part of the world indicate that "risk" is constituted 
in a political and social process. What is perceived as risks and what is not
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perceived as risks are political questions based in social constructions and not 
objective facts derived from valuefree scientific knowledge, and each specific social 
setting develops its own definitions of risk and safety (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a; 
Douglas 1992). According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), emerging risk 
perceptions either become accepted and ranked on the societal risk agenda or are 
refused admittance to the agenda through a political process. To achieve a 
prominent ranking, risk perceptions need to be promoted by powerful agencies and 
individuals that are competent political actors. If this is not the case, risk 
perceptions continue to be minority perceptions only and may be labelled as 
irrelevant.
The emergence of risk perceptions and the development of safety systems at 
societal level are analogous to the ways risk and safety conceptualisations are 
developed in work organisations. The organisational risk and safety situation 
becomes manifested through a political process which is influenced by both 
external and internal factors. National regulations will contain prescriptions for risk 
and safety handling, and within this framework, organisations will construct their 
own risk pictures and their approaches to safety work. Organisational actors will to 
differing degrees be able to get their risk and safety definitions accepted as "the" 
organisational risk and safety issues. As a result, it is probable that some groups' 
and individuals' risk and safety perceptions will be labelled as relevant and 
important and others' will be labelled as irrelevant.
1.4. Safety in the rational and modern organisation.
Czamiawska-Joerges (1993) talks about rationality as the main metaphor of 
organisations: It is towards the state of rational action that organisations 
continuously strive. She discusses rationality as a dominant organisational value 
which most often is taken-for-granted and thus unquestioned by organisational 
members. The recipe for organisational success is believed to lie in rational action, 
but what may be lacking, is the competence to act according to this knowledge. 
Based in this belief system, it ought to be no surprise that safety as an organisational 
phenomenon is considered an area that may be successfully handled by rational and
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logical problem solving methods. In accordance with this perspective, the 
overwhelming bulk of safety literature has a descriptive and applied character, 
promoting different methodologies for the improvement of organisational safety. 
The suggested methods differ in their emphasis, and they may concentrate their 
safety advice around technical, housekeeping, managerial, motivational, training 
related, or what is termed cultural issues (e.g. Dufort and Infante-Rivard 1998; 
Krause 1994; Krause and Sloat 1993; Wilpert and Qvale (eds.) 1993, Blockley (ed.) 
1992; Tungland 1992; Saksvik 1992; Clementsen and Haukelid 1991; Krause et al. 
1990; Rundmo 1989; Nicolaysen and Svarva 1986). This “technical” and 
normative route to safety (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a) seems to be highly 
predominant in the existing safety literature. I find it of small relevance for my 
study theme to go into an extensive reviewing of this safety literature as the cited 
works - and others within the same tradition - have had no great impact on my work 
due to my choice of a different approach to organisational safety issues.
Krause et al. (1990) may be cited as an example of a way of thinking about work 
safety which is not uncommon within this tradition. They develop what is called 
"The Behaviour-Based Safety Process" in a model where assessment and 
implementation are focussed. Included in the assessment stage is behavioural 
analysis of accident reports, assessment reports, statistical analysis of injury data, 
the establishment of steering committees for decision-making and information and 
the selection and instruction of trainers. The implementation stage contains the 
construction of inventories of critical behaviours and training programmes, the 
systematic utilisation of observed data, information schemes and several other 
implementation strategies (ibid., p. 54).
What is to be noted here -  as in a other models for accident prevention - is that the 
focus is on data collection, an analysis of accidents and their perceived causes and a 
programme for information and training. The design of bureaucratic safety systems 
is a dominant trait in much applied safety literature (Gherardi et al. 1998a), and 
such systems will often consist of written procedures for work behaviour, reporting 
procedures for accidents and unwanted events and other safety routines. A 
“checklist logic” is the dominant safety perspective (Gherardi and Nicolini
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2000a: 13), and it can be argued that bureaucratic systems (Weber 1947) are key 
aspects in the development of organisational safety activities for the promotion of 
safety effectiveness.
It is believed that through systematic work routines, the utilisation of specific 
procedures for accident data collection and accident investigation - all in 
combination with proper information and training -, it is possible to forestall work 
accidents to take place. And in order to integrate what in safety programmes 
commonly is called the "human dimension", issues of motivation, communication 
and worker participation are often included in safety improvement models. A 
dominant organisational belief seems to be that safety issues can be planned and 
implemented in rational and predictable ways if training and information systems 
are functioning and employee motivation is present. “Good” safety is looked upon 
as compliance with safety regulations, and this “bureaucratic vision of safety” 
(Gherardi and Nicolini 2000b:343) initiates continuous refinements of the existing 
safety behaviour models as well as it causes a focus upon rale compliance rather 
than safe behaviour (Lawton 1998). Nonconformity with the prescribed logic - 
"irrational action" - will in this framework be accounted for as deviant human 
behaviour (Schutz 1967) which can be corrected by increased competence, 
improved planning, more information, higher worker motivation, etc.
Within this framework of thought, safety is seen as confined to its "enclosure" of 
safety programmes as a problem area which successfully can be "attacked" by 
appropriate problem solving tools. This safety world view is in line with an 
organisational perspective which considers organisational reality to be streamlined 
and logical and which believes in controllable organisational processes. Seen 
within this perspective, the existing models of safety improvement are reasonable 
and relevant. Even though it is also admitted that safety work is demanding, this 
does not seem to be so because of any perceived default of the existing safety 
improvement tools as the safety models are considered to be logical and seemingly 
not open to much reflection and doubt. If employees worked according to 
procedures, if they were sufficiently perceptive of training and information systems, 
and if they were active in the utilisation of safety reporting systems, then
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organisational safety efforts would be successful, it may be claimed by managers 
and safety experts alike.
It is my intention to study organisational safety from perspectives that view 
organisations as less streamlined and less rational than that which is displayed here. 
Therefore I must turn to other research traditions where I can find theoretical 
support for my forthcoming safety analysis.
1.5. Post-modern - and other - critique of the rational and modern concepts of 
organisation and its consequences for my research.
Some of the critical voices of organisations as rational and streamlined entities are 
termed post-modernists (e.g. Hassard and Parker et al. 1993; Reed and Hughes et al. 
1992; Hassard and Pym et al. 1990). What I perceive as a general focus point of 
post-modernism is a fundamental critique of a "grand narrative” concerning society 
and organisations in which rationality rules and most issues are smooth and simple - 
or could be if conditions were not messed up by irrational human actions.
Post-modernism thus contests what is seen as images of conformist, plain and 
unified organisations. Morgan (1990) opposes what he perceives as traditional 
research's belief in organisational instrumentality and linear processes, and Harvey 
(1989; quoted in Brown 1992) echoes this when he talks about the rational 
paradigm's belief in absolute truths and planning of ideal situations under 
standardised conditions of knowledge and production. Burrell (1989; quoted in 
Alvesson and Berg 1992) states that post-modernists share a mistrust of the notions 
of rationality, truth and progress. According to Czamiawska (1997), a quest for 
coherent theory has led to the neglect of organisational paradoxes, and the dominant 
"rational madness" (Doray 1988; quoted in Brown 1992) of organisation theory thus 
has to be opposed as unity and integration is not what typifies organisations, but 
rather ambiguity, confusion, dynamic processes, differentiation, and complexity. 
Brooks (1997) claims that the only truth to be found in organisational life is 
interpretations and social constructions of reality. Seen from a post-modernist 
perspective, then, the continuous research attempts to "force" organisational life
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into pre-conveived analytical categories of unity, rational order and integration 
might be termed "intellectual imperialism" (Reed 1993).
Merton (1968) has long ago pointed to the dangers of bureaucratic systems 
becoming goals in themselves rather than being means of organisational 
effectiveness, and Brunsson (1989,1985) questions the functions of many logically 
and rationally perceived organisational tools. He suggests that many of these might 
be looked upon as ritual activities in order to sustain the stronghold of rationality as 
a main organisatonal metaphor. "The politics of rationality" - the continuous 
endeavours to support rationality's central position -  is carried out by organisational 
routines where meetings, planning, statistical measurements, etc. become symbols 
of the rational order (Czamiawska-Joerges 1993).
If organisational processes are less streamlined, less predictable and less rational 
than often is considered, then organisational research has to utilise perspectives that 
are better suited to catch the complexity than more traditional approaches.
Research attention has to be transferred from simplicity and consensus to 
complexity, plurality, and possible controversy (Reed 1993). Ambiguity has to be 
accepted as intrinsic characteristics of what happens in organisations (Brooks 
1997), and incommensurability and “non-logical” actions will have to be 
investigated. The refusal of modernist research to see the complexities of 
organisations and to be open to aspects that do not "fit" into the "proper" framework 
of thought (Linstead et al. 1996) has to be overcome. To the contrary, what has to 
be valued in research seen from this perspective is the cacaphony of organisational 
voices that exist in any organisation.
Organisational processes have to become central issues of research concern. The 
frequently elusive flow of organisational processes with their interactions, actions, 
discussions, etc., constitutes an "order" in the organisation that may stand in 
opposition to - or be equivalent with - the formal order of the organisation as 
espoused in procedures, regulations, and organisational visions. A focus on the 
informal as well as the formal organisation will be a consequence of this 
perspective of organisational research.
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"Grand narratives" and stringent theories are looked upon with great scepticism 
within the post-modernist tradition. But post-modernists’ insistence to focus upon 
the fragmented state of organisations may be looked upon as the creation of yet 
another "grand narrative" - a paradigm in opposition to the rational one, but still a 
paradigm that claims to incorporate general truths, and thus essentially not so very 
different from the paradigm of science that post-modernism criticises. When 
considering this potential contradiction of post-modernist critique, I see that the 
danger of becoming a "neo-imperialist" is not an unlikely possibility for ardent 
post-modernists. Included in much post-modernist critique, though, is a 
consciousness of becoming new "empire constructurs", and reflection about own 
theoretical stances is emphasised. This awareness will hopefully prevent 
researchers that are influenced by post-modernist thought from constructing new 
organisational "grand narratives". The research will instead be concentrated on the 
creation of "local" and "multiple narratives" based on the knowledge it is possible to 
establish from specific organisational situations. Such research may be quite 
frustrating both for researchers and an audience who are socialised into the 
scientific world of clarity and causal explanations, and the post-modern paradigm 
will naturally become the target of criticism due to its radical departure from basic 
principles in the dominant scientific discourse.
The post-modernist evaluation of the possibilities to gain organisational 
understanding bothers me. I have so much "scientific belief' engrained in me that I 
believe in the possibility of being able at least partly to "understand" organisations. 
If I were to look upon my research efforts as primarily the collecting of small bits 
and pieces of organisational "snapshots" without the possibility to find links 
between organisational phenomena, then I would not see much sense in doing this 
work. I believe I will be able to establish some organisational knowledge, but what 
I am aware of, though, is that the knowledge I produce has its limitations. Post­
modernist thought has convinced me to try to avoid overcertainty in my 
forthcoming organisational interpretations. I will probably not succeed in this 
without failure and struggle as I am socialised into a tradition where clear answers 
are held in high esteem, though.
Actors' own categorisations of their organisational realities will have to be of 
imperative importance in my research, and this perception of research - emic 
research in opposition to etic research with its focus on pre-conceived theoretical 
concepts and categories - will necessarily create a research process that is different 
from more traditional research processes. Only in a "bottom-up" and emic way of 
doing research will I be able to catch the polyphonic organisational life that post­
modernists emphasise so much.
I will furthermore have to abandon my ambitions of being able to interpret an 
organisational totality and be satisfied to produce knowledge within fields of the 
organisational reality. It feels somewhat painful to state this work objective as it 
feels much less glamourous than having the ambition of a holistic understanding of 
organisational phenomena. "My" organisational knowledge will be less simple, less 
streamlined and less "practical" (Alvesson 1993) than traditional safety research, 
but this somewhat fragmented approach will create space for processes that cannot 
easily be categorised and compartmentalised and which under different research 
paradigms probably would be excluded from research considerations.
I see the practical utility of my research in the way I will include ambiguity, lack of 
coherence and clear answers. It is my conviction that it would be of practical use 
for organisations to include similar concepts in their safety efforts in order to 
understand their safety realities in diversified ways. Alvesson and Berg (1992:177) 
talk about the provision of "... knowledge foundations for a comprehensive and 
perceptive understanding of conditions, situations and mechanisms which influence 
and can influence actors in organisations". Such understanding will enable 
organisations to act on the basis of wide organisational knowledge, and although 
complex knowledge may be difficult to relate to, I believe that the potential for 
improved safety action lies inherent in varied and comprehensive knowledge.
It is my conviction that much existing safety research tend to be too 
“straightforward” and narrow and is thus not able to cope with the complexity of 
organisational safety. I suspect that many everyday events which are vital for 
worker safety are not given sufficient consideration in traditional safety model
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thought. For instance, worker behaviour that ignores existing safety regulations is 
frequently merely classified as "wrong" behaviour, and it seems to be believed that 
with further information and training, such behaviour can be avoided in future. It 
seems also to be assumed that employees will not let themselves be influenced by 
"improper" phenomena as personal feelings, individual perceptions, nonconform 
opinions, organisational dissatisfaction, etc. in their safety performance. There is 
not much room within existing safety literature for a further exploration into what 
might constitute the causes of "deviant" behaviour and safety rule neglect, and there 
is seemingly no room for the inclusion of the multiple safety constructs which 
probably exist in organisations. This lack of reality definitions to supplement the 
official one(s) is in my view a very questionable aspect of safety research both from 
a safety improvement and an ethical point of view, as the multiplicity of 
organisational safety definitions concerns the well-being of organisational actors in 
a significant way.
I appreciate that it is an organisationally demanding task to consider safety 
questions in the sense that I have outlined, and I do not argue for the obliteration of 
systematic and "rational" safety programmes and systems. Many fatal accidents 
and serious health damages undoubtedbly have been avoided due to such safety 
efforts. What I argue for, though, is a widening of the scope of safety thought to 
include more elements of organisational life than it seems to do at present. 
Employees have to become accepted as organisational actors with often differing 
safety perceptions of "what it is all about". The acknowledgement of a multiplicity 
of subjective safety rationalities is needed in order to reach organisational safety 
goals.
1.6. A summary of the purpose of my study.
As a consequence of my cited theoretical deliberations, I want to base an 
exploratory study of worker safety in a framework of thought that extends that of a 
rational analytic approach to organisations. It is my intention to do a safety analysis 
which focusses around organisational actors’ own perceptions of their safety reality. 
Through this emphasis on multiple interpretations it will become possible to
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establish and analyse an organisational safety reality which takes into account a 
complex web of visible, hidden, "rational" and "irrational" safety representations 
and enactments.
This safety plurality will be analysed and conclusions will be drawn as to what 
seems to constitute basic traits of a specific industrial plant's safety organisation. 
“Local knowledge” (Geertz 1993a) will thus be at the centre of my attention, and 
“local theory” -  heuristically developed rules of practice which people use to make 
sense of their work situation (Bartunek and Louis 1996) -  will become visible.
The construction of generic theory is not the objective of my study. Like Brooks 
(1997), I do not seek to offer the answer, but rather give some insights in a 
complex world. Geertz (1993b:28 -  29) tells the story about an Englishman who is 
in India and has been told that the world rests on a platform which rests on the back 
of an elephant which in turn rests on the back of a turtle. When he asks what the 
turtle rests on, the answer is: “Ah, Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down”. 
As I set out to do a study that acknowledges multiplicity and organisational 
complexity, I suspect that this work of mine will be a continuous search for ever 
new insights -  for turtle upon turtle upon turtle without ever being sure about which 
is the bottom one.
I have no illusion as to find the “full truth” about worker safety, but what is an 
objective and a main goal is to try out whether my theoretical framework for 
studying organisational safety enables me to come forward with issues concerning 
safety and safety organising that rarely are being considered in safety research 
literature. It is my hope that my chosen approach will prove to be beneficial for the 
development of new aspects of safety knowledge and further improvement of 
worker safety.
1.7. Safety as mundane processes.
Garfinkel (1967) argues for the necessity of taking the mundane and the common 
into strong consideration in organisational research. He points to what he considers
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a frequent research neglect of everyday affairs and a devaluation of actors' own 
interpretations of work life events. Organisational members’ main construction of 
meaning takes place during everyday events, Garfinkel argues. Colville et al. 
(1999) state that mundanity in organisations always has been the aim of 
management since it promotes periodic stability and organisational consolidation. 
With reference to Peters and Waterman’s (1982) bestselling book, they claim that 
organisational excellence is about “searching for and exploiting mundanity” (p. 
136). Seen from the perspective of safety research, Garfinkel's as well as Colville et 
al.'s arguments lead to a focus upon mundane work practices and safety routines 
and organisational actors' reflections upon these.
A focus on work practice and workers' points of view is also emphasised by 
Alvesson (1993). He asks for an on-the-job perspective and expresses worry that 
symbolic events are overly emphasised in cultural research. According to Turner 
(1992), the taken-for-granted actions of work life are manifestations of knowledge 
that may or may not be part of people's cognitions, and a focus on daily actions is 
thus imperative in order to investigate into how people make meaning in 
organisations. Wright (1994) as well as McNulty (1994) also emphasise a daily and 
mundane focus when discussing people's interpretive processes. Czamiawska- 
Joerges (1993) claims that organisational culture is primarily created and 
maintained in mundane work actions, and Leidner (1993) echoes this view when he 
states that work identities are shaped by people’s specific work tasks.
A discussion of practice and its inherent tacit knowledge -  which becomes 
manifested in situations when rules governing performance are “forgotten” because 
they are taken for granted (Gherardi et al. 1998a) -  is elaborated by Schon (1991) 
and Smircich and Stubbart (1985). It is argued that practitioners usually have more 
knowledge concerning their work situations than they verbalise, and routinised 
actions in particular are embedded in much intuitive knowledge. Frequently, 
internalised rules of the thumb are utilised rather than conscious deliberations and 
selections of action modes (Etzioni 1987). Holland and Quinn (1993) talk about the 
importance of folk theory -  informal commonsensical deliberations developed into 
a cognitive schema through experience and social interaction -  as a supplement to
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or in opposition to the expert and more official schema for behaviour in 
organisations.
When following these lines of thought, it becomes vital to investigate safety from a 
daily and mundane point of view as organisational members' safety interpretations 
and safety improvement suggestions primarily will take place during work tasks and 
ordinary safety routines. The safety culture "in work" needs to be emphasised in a 
safety culture analysis which hopes to capture the culture beyond its official and 
often spectacular surface.
1.8. A need for a specific theoretical framework for safety research?
This is a question of significant interest when venturing into safety research. I will 
answer it nonhesitantly with a "no", although I at many stages during my research 
process has been less certain than I am now.
My doubts have been grounded in the emergence of specific frameworks and 
conceptualisations for the study and application of safety in organisations (e.g. 
Cooper 1998; Glendon and McKenna 1995; Wilpert and Qvale (eds.) 1993; 
Blockley (ed.) 1992; Krause et al., 1990). Such specific safety models and research 
tools seemed to be productive for safety analysis at first glimpse, but by second 
glimpse I found that they lacked what I consider vital perspectives of organisational 
analysis. Within the "tool chest" of the general theories and concepts I have already 
outlined -  and those to come - 1 find more helpful theoretical perspectives and 
conceptualisations to do an analysis of organisational safety than I have found in the 
more specific safety literature.
Consequently, I do not think there is any need for the elaboration of safety related 
theoretical concepts as e.g. "safety culture" which some researchers argue the 
necessity of (Hovden 1991). Since there is no reason to believe that safety culture 
is fundamentally dissimilar to other organisational cultural phenomena, an 
investigation into safety culture will have to be founded in the concepts and 
approaches of general culture analysis. I follow Kunda (1992) when he questions
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the continuous creation of new concepts "for the same old story" (p. 242) which he 
argues frequently is done in organisational research. The challenge for me is the 
productive utilisation of already existing perspectives of organisational research. If 
I am able to analyse organisational safety within the theoretical frameworks I have 
chosen, I will be in no need of any specific safety approach in my analysis.
1.9. Safety as social constructs.
1.9.1. Organisational actors' safety sensemaking processes.
Several researchers have developed theories about how people make sense of what 
takes place in their organisations and how they construct their own social realities 
(e.g. Weick 1995; Silverman 1970; Berger and Luckmann 1967; Schutz 1967; 
Goffman 1959).
Through cognitive processes, organisational members attribute meaning to events - 
they interpret and they author, they discover and they create meaning according to 
Weick (1995). Morgan (in 1990) focusses on individuals' actions as rational events 
within their interpretation of their social reality, and he states that constant 
negotiations and renegotiations with others form the basis for their perceptions and 
actions. Porac et al. (1989) argue that individuals interpret their worlds by linking 
new cues with well-learned cognitive structures, and Isabella (1990) points to the 
constructs' perpetual changes as new situations arise and new questions are being 
asked. Geertz (1973; quoted in Weick 1979) says that “man is an animal suspended 
in webs of significance he himself has spun” (p. 135) and thus points to the paradox 
of humanly created meaning structures becoming mental “prisons” for the same 
humans who created them in the first place.
Weick (1995) states that sensemaking and organising have much in common by 
being processes in which order is imposed and simplification, comprehension and 
connection are offered, while Reed (1992) points to how interpretations, 
negotiations and interactions either sustain the precarious and unstable sense of
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organisational reality or work to transform the organisational situation by new 
interpretations and innovative interactions.
Within an organisation there will exist different frameworks for organisational 
meaning construction. Through cognitively developed schemas -  mental maps or 
frames of reference which consciously or unconsciously guide individuals' 
categorisations and interpretations of events (Isabella 1990; Stubbart and 
Ramaprasad 1990; Harris 1996) -  different organisational members and groups 
will organise events and make sense of these according to prior experience and 
learning (Holland and Quinn 1993).
An awareness of the existence of different interpretive schemas is needed in order 
to understand organisational reality construction. What is also to be noted is that 
meaning constructions often simultaneously will be varied and shared between 
organisational members (Fiol 1996), and organisational consensus and 
fragmentation thus will be parallel occurrences. It is proposed (ibid., p. 179) that 
unified organisational diversity is achieved when organisational members in spite of 
multiple interpretations share a framework of thought -  a general organisational 
schema -  which is broad enough to encompass the differences. Such a unifying 
framework is considered important for organisational action. Porac et al. (1989) 
echo this view when defining consensus as a set of core beliefs within a group but 
around which there exists many variations in perceptions.
Weick (1995) discusses the concept of shared meaning in organisational 
sensemaking, and he argues that this state is difficult to attain. What often can be 
observed, though, is a situation of organisationally shared -  identical -  experience 
leading to unshared meaning. According to Weick, a way of coping with this is to 
avoid summarising or labelling the shared experience and instead accepting the 
shared experience for what it is, leaving the collective sensemaking alone.
On the collective level, Smircich and Stubbart (1985) talk about the organisational 
"drama" which is enacted through interactions between organisational actors, and 
they argue that it is through these enactments that "organisation" is established, 
sustained, and gradually changed. Organisation can be viewed as a stage scene
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where acting individuals perform and construct meaning (Lyotard quoted in Harvey 
1992). Mangham and Overington (1987) also utilise a theatrical metaphor when 
they argue that what occurs in organisations is a matter of performance. Seen from 
this point of view, organisational actors continuously stage performances according 
to their organisational roles. And it is through this acting that organisational reality 
is shaped: “Performance, as a concept drawn out of theatre, implies what is 
happening is a matter of creating realities...” (ibid., p. 102).
A way of handling a shared experience/unshared meaning situation (Weick 1995) is 
by the development of backstage and frontstage communities or regions (Goffman 
1959). These concepts are utilised by Goffman when he explores the theatrical 
metaphor in order to analyse human behaviour in social situations. He defines 
frontstage performances -  which are meant for relatively open audiences -  to be 
efforts to give an appearance of maintenance and embodyment of certain standards 
(ibid., p. 107). In backstage regions, though, the audience is limited and a “guarded 
passageway” is present, and thus, the backstage region is kept closed and hidden to 
members of the general audience. Here, “... the performer can relax; he can drop 
his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character” (Goffman 1959:112), 
and she can safely do the kind of things that ordinarly result in negative sanctions 
(Goffman 1963). What is developed is a frontstage and a backstage language of 
behaviour (Goffman 1959:128).
What we find both in frontstage and backstage situations is “... a team of performers 
who cooperate to present to an audience a given definition of the situation” (ibid., p. 
238). It becomes a vital point to keep the frontstage and backstage audiences 
separated from each other as confusion and threats to the credibility of the 
performers will arise if this is not the case. If such a mix-up of audiences takes 
place, the performers will find themselves tom between two realities with two sets 
of rules of behaviour, and according to Goffman (ibid.), organisational 
embarrassment is almost certain to result. Therefore, the multiple realities of 
organisational actors must be kept separated.
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When bringing these concepts into organisational analysis, what can be seen is that 
actions and sensemaking processes which are deemed legitimate for open 
attendance by broad audiences occur in the organisational frontstage region. 
Organisationally shared experiences (Weick 1995) will occur frontstage, and shared 
meaning -  emphasising organisational coherence and effectiveness - will be 
constructed and promoted through officially espoused theories (Argyris and Schon 
1978). But organisations also have their backstage communities where membership 
is restricted and where participation in actions and sensemaking processes is 
reserved for members. Backstage, organisationally shared experiences may give 
rise to unshared meaning constructs as organisational members interpret their 
experiences in ways that may differ from what is done in frontstage situations. 
Theories-in-use which are different from the espoused theories (Argyris and Schon 
1978) will become apparent in backstage arenas. A summarising and labelling of 
shared experiences resulting in unshared meaning thus may take place in 
organisational backstage environments as the language of behaviour is different 
there from that of the frontstage and as maintenance and embodiment of the 
frontstage standards are not necessitated (Goffman 1959). But it is crucial to keep 
these different organisational regions separated since the different rules of 
behaviour will make for organisational embarrasment if the boundaries between 
them becomes blurred (Goffman, ibid.).
The subjective definitions of organisational situations are by researchers within the 
phenomenological research tradition valued as the most essential data when doing 
organisational analysis as the individual sense making process is looked upon as the 
nucleus in the socially constructed organisational world. If one is to catch the 
process of organising in which people construct their organisational realities, then 
descriptions and evaluations from actors' own points of view become a clue for 
organisational research (Blumer 1986).
When following these lines of thought, it can be stated that organisational members' 
perceptions of safety are socially constructed phenomena. Organisational actors 
will over time construct diverse safety realities built upon differing interpretations 
of organisational events and the existence of differentiated safety experiences.
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People will attach meaning to their work situations as to what is safe and unsafe 
work behaviour, and they will construct their own interpretations of organisational 
safety policies and safety efforts by applying the same interpretive mechanisms as 
they do regarding other spheres of organisational life. Different safety schemas will 
be found within the organisational safety reality, and accordingly, different 
attributions of the same safety events will occur as organisational actors make sense 
of their safety related world (DeJoy 1994). Safety becomes a differentiated and 
situational concept.
What thus becomes necessary in safety research is to widen the scope of approach 
to include multiple constructions of safety realities in both analytical research and 
applied suggestions for improved safety. The safety perceptions of acting safety 
practitioners need to become focussed (Rundmo 1997; Hofmann et al. 1995).
Safety constructs are developed in a situational context which is influenced by 
technology, the interactional and social environment, managerial decisions, the 
specific work procedures of the organisation and other aspects of organisational life. 
Thus, people's safety constructs are complex and often ambiguous, and they are 
continuously changing. Employee safety perceptions are never static, and they are 
seldom exact copies of managerially defined safety issues. According to Thompson 
et al. (1998:21), employees’ perceived sense of workplace safety might be a better 
indicator of safety risk than routine reports and other information available to 
management. The complexity and ambiguity of safety perceptions have to be vital 
aspects of safety research if one is to catch the dynamics of organisational safety 
development (Douglas 1992).
Subjective rationality will be at the core of all individual decision processes, and 
this rationality has to be a matter of serious concern in safety analysis. If 
organisational members behave unsafely, the chances are strong that they 
themselves will be the ones to suffer. Still, there are numerous examples of how 
workers act contrary to safety regulations. Employees may routinely use safety 
short-cuts and adopt these as their standard operating procedures or they may 
choose not to follow the designated safety procedures at all (Hofmann et al. 
1995:131). Donald and Canter (1993) state that accidental behaviour sometimes is
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quite intentional in the way that people know they are acting unsafely but 
nevertheless do it. In such situations, there must be some force that "wins" over the 
safety motivation as individuals' cost-benefit analyses seemingly find it profitable to 
act unsafely. Due to organisational members' subjective rationalities, the benefits of 
unsafe behaviour will be of such value and the likelihood of an accident will be so 
minimal that safety rules are broken consciously. Leidner (1993) argues that 
employees do not act according to rules when they believe their interests are not 
well served by these rules. They might find themselves to be in a situation in which 
-  when following all rules -  the job is done less efficiently and managers will want 
to know why (Lawton 1998). Glendon and McKenna (1995) point to differing 
causes when employees choose to work in what is regarded as unsafe ways, and 
they argue that people's wish to demonstrate their good work skills sometimes may 
be the motivation for taking risks. Lawton (1998:94) echoes this view when she 
states that rules restrict behaviour which may be perceived to reduce the required 
skill to do the job successfully. In such situations, subjective rationalities will 
collide with official organisational rationality, and a difference in sensemaking 
processes will be evident.
In many organisations, elaborate safety systems exist that prescribe safety 
procedures for the prevention of potential damage, and the number of safety 
procedures may be high as more and more areas of work life systematically are 
scrutinised for risk situations. It seems reasonable to assume that it is difficult for 
employees to cope with the magnitude of risk assessments and safety procedures of 
many work places, and that a simplification of the risk and safety picture takes 
place through employee sensemaking processes. These assumptions are in 
accordance with the concept of bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958) in 
which it is discussed how organisational members are unable to take all facts into 
consideration in their decision making processes and will choose certain aspects and 
overlook others in order to reach a conclusion. Thus, in daily work life, employees 
and work groups will select "their" risk situations to focus their safety attention 
upon and more or less ignore others. If the total risk and safety picture was to be 
taken into continuous account, it would be close to impossible to work at all, it may 
be argued.
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An organisation's official safety policies and the implementation of safety 
procedures will be based in organisational power relations. Power relations will 
also influence what is the organisationally permitted debate concerning safety. As 
some defintions of safety become included in the official rhetorics of an 
organisation, contradictory definitions may be labelled as illegitimate and 
negatively sanctioned, and safety taboo areas will develop. The consequences of 
such silencing of oppositional safety definitions may be counteractive to 
organisational members' commitment to official safety procedures. Another effect 
may be the development of backstage safety communities (Goffman 1959). More 
or less undercover safety cultures might thus be the result of organisational 
nonacceptance of individuals' and groups' safety definitions.
One way for organisations to cope with the complexity of safety constructs is to 
accept the existence of multiple definitions within the framework of a general safety 
policy which is broad enough and ambiguous enough to include different 
perceptions of safety. When discussing safety in organisations, Singleton and 
Hovden (1988) state that"... it is desirable to leave some flexibility with the 
operator. Humans are not automats, they seek variety of activity" (p. 157). In 
addition to the satisfaction of some work autonomy, it is also probable that the 
permission of multiple safety definitions will prevent safety overrigidity that may 
lead to low efficiency in daily work. Kjell6n and Baneryd (1983) echo the 
importance of workers' need for independence and a feeling of being in charge 
when safety is concerned, and thus support a discussion of the inherent limitations 
of a stringent safety regime. Leidner (1993) argues that organisations will benefit 
from allowing workers some discretion to define their work situation, and that such 
individual control will further workers' interest and mitigate discontent.
But such a discussion raises vital dilemmas. An essential organisational question to 
pose concerning the possible permittance of different employee or group safety 
definitions will be whether it is possible to maintain multiple safety definitions and 
simultaneously assume compliance to a bureaucratic safety system which seems to 
be the norm of design for today's safety systems. Is it possible to combine "the best 
of two worlds", or is the ideological discrepancy between the need for autonomy
23
and individual creativity and the need for stringent procedures and regulations too 
great for this to become possible?
In my view no definite answers can be given to this question. The goal of 
organisational safety efforts is to prevent accidents and injuries, and situational 
circumstances will have to be taken into account when deciding upon safety 
measures in order to reach this goal. Also, the seemingly nonquestioned tendency 
of safety efforts to be embedded within a bureaucratic framework of thought needs 
to be assessed due to possible counterproductive elements of bureaucracy as the 
sole organising model of safety work. It seems a relevant question whether the 
"iron cage" ideology of bureaucracy with its routinisation and rule focussed 
approach may comprise inherent negative features that will estrange employees, 
prevent autonomy and creativity and create barriers to the development of improved 
organisational safety.
If employee safety constructs are "irregular" and "irrational" and differ from the 
safety requirements of the official safety bureaucracy, then an area of potential 
conflicts exists. Based on my theoretical perspectives, it can be argued that the best 
data in order to analyse an organisation’s safety situation are to be found in 
employees' subjective safety rationalities. Organisations -  and not at least safety 
research -  therefore need to be attentive to these sources of organisational 
knowledge in their safety analyses, safety problem solving and the further 
improvement of safety systems. But: it seems to me a major question of doubt 
whether safety research so far has been able to -  or seen it worthwile to -  develop 
analytical and methodological tools that are fitted to catch a subjective and 
consequently complex safety reality. Without a safety research body which 
focusses upon and honours organisational members' subjective sensemaking, there 
is good reason to assume that organisational safety policies will continue to be 
constructed according to a linear and instrumental way of safety thought.
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1.9.2. Managers and the construction of organisational safety meaning.
Most literature which is concerned with organisational safety (e.g. Glendon and 
McKenna 1995; Guest et al. 1994; Krause et al. 1990; Della-Guistina and Della- 
Guistina 1989; Dawson et al. 1988; Dawson et al. 1984) emphasises the importance 
of managerial engagement, enthusiasm, priorities, counselling and guidance in order 
to create a safe work environment. It is argued that without managerial support of 
safety issues, it is an almost impossible task to succeed with work safety 
improvements.
The acknowledgment of managerial influence can be seen in the numerous calls for 
managers to create a positive safety culture and prescriptions for how to do this 
which are found in safety literature. But this is not any easy and straightforward 
task as the vigour of employee safety definitions and the quality of relations 
between managers and employees will influence the degree of organisational 
acceptance of managerially proposed constructs. Still, though, Berger and 
Luckmann's argument (1966) is a useful reminder about a basic fact of 
organisational reality: He who has the bigger stick has the better chance of 
imposing his definitions. According to Gherardi and Nicolini (2000a), the safety 
dialogue within an organisation is not a conversation amongst peers as some voices 
have priority over others due to the distribution of organisational power and 
influence. Dawson et al. (1982) are also aware of the political dimension of safety 
when they argue that those involved in safety work are not equally matched in terms 
of power and influence. Power is the power to define, says Brown (1989; quoted in 
Czamiawska 1997).
Smircich and Morgan (1982) argue the centrality of managers as creators of 
meaning. Isabella (1990) states that managers use their interpretations of 
organisational reality to frame meaning for organisational members, and she calls 
the managerial constructs the "dominant reality". Other researchers talk about 
manipulative management (Calas and Smircich 1991), culture control directed at 
people's minds (Alvesson and Berg 1992), culture engineering (Kunda 1992), the
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ability of some persons to set the stage for others (Czamiawska 1997) and the 
managerial discourse of control (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000b).
Silverman (1970) states that meaning construction is in a constant flux and will 
differ according to how organisational members interpret what is going on around 
them. Accordingly, competitions about ’’best" interpretations will continuously take 
place within the organisation. For a subjective view to become accepted as a 
"correct one", Silverman (ibid.) argues that what is important is its coherence with 
the already existing organisational world view and the available resources for 
promoting the legitimacy of the view in question. Pollner (1987) points to how 
some constructs of meaning through organisational negotiating processes will 
acquire more legitimacy and authority than others. Organisational power structures 
become visible when the reality definitions of specific actors acquire a dominant 
status and they are able to convince others - at least seemingly - that things "are" the 
way they define them to be (Czamiawska-Joerges and Joerges 1992). Such 
authoritative labelling is a compelling tool in the managerial strive to achieve 
meaning prominence as successful labelling can be considered a key to 
organisational power (Czamiawska-Joerges 1988b).
Czamiawska (1997) points to the role of leaders to provide the organisation with an 
illusion of controllability so that organisastional disorder might not be feared. Seen 
in this perspective, traditional management ideals might consider the existence of 
multiple safety interpretations as a disturbance they have to do something about. 
They put their trust in ever more sophisticated management and information 
systems to create a shared acceptance of the managerial definitions of 
organisational reality (Pym 1990).
Whether employee safety definitions that are incoherent with the official ones are 
allowed access into the structure of preconceived and logically constructed safety 
systems will have to be a matter of empirical study. But as these systems are 
contained within "rational" limits of what are legitimate and preferred safety efforts, 
there is reason to believe that they will tend to maintain a status quo definition of 
the organisational safety paradigm. I have not been able to find suggestions for a
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safety approach that acknowledges alternative and "irrational" safety definitions in 
safety work, although safety researchers (e.g. DeJoy 1994) may point to the 
importance for safety management of organisational members* different 
attributional processes concerning safety. It seems doubtful that alternative safety 
definitions will be granted any significant room within existing safety programmes 
in the near future.
An area of managerial importance is how to document and evaluate safety efforts as 
managers need visible results in order to evaluate if the organisational safety work 
has proved effective or not. The measuring systems which are designed to quantify 
safety related events within a framework of preconceived safety categories are 
considered vital estimates of how organisations have succeeded in their safety 
efforts. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that due to their importance as 
measuring sticks of perceived success for both an internal and external 
organisational audience, the quantified safety results (number of accidents, number 
of near-accidents, number of days without injuries, etc.) may become constructs that 
carry additional meaning besides their mere numerical representations. For 
instance, positive safety results may possibly attain additional meaning as evidence 
of managerial competence and might thus be suggested to be vital for managerial 
career developments. If safety records are given multiple meaning, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that they may initiate frustrations, confusions and 
contradictions that can prove harmful for the joint effort of safety improvement.
As I end my discussion of safety management, I will argue that in order to become a 
"successful" safety manager, it is necessary to be aware of symbolic and cultural 
aspects of leadership as well as the more instrumental ones (Schein 1992). A 
manager who does not reflect about the cultural and symbolic sides of managing 
safety will have difficulties in understanding events in which employees respond 
according to their cultural interpretations. If for example it can be assumed that 
employee perceptions of the genuineness of managerial care are important for their 
willingness to identify with managerial objectives in general, then such felt care 
will also be essential when it comes to the credibility of managerial safety measures 
seen from employees' points of view. Weick and Roberts (1993) support this by
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arguing that the managerial language of care -  in contrast to the language of 
efficiency -  is an essential "success building block" for organisational safety 
improvements.
Also, safety managers who know how they might utilise symbolic and cultural 
leadership activities in order to promote their preferred safety definitions are more 
likely to succeed in their efforts than managers who do not take account of symbolic 
means of leadership. A small word of warning, though, is appropriate: Alvesson 
and Berg (1992) point to the requirement of symbolic managerial actions to be 
accompanied by material and social forms to support and legitimise what is 
expressed in symbolic terms. Without this being the case, symbolic management 
will over time lose its credibility and will ruin its potential for organisational 
influence, they argue.
Based on what I have said so far, I agree with Petersen (1988) when he argues that 
safety issues have to be managed like any other organisational areas. There seems 
to be no need for the development of specific managerial "techniques" in the 
performance of safety management. To the contrary, Della-Giustina and Della- 
Giustina (1989) maintain that safety issues have to be integrated in general 
management considerations and should be looked upon as integral aspects of 
production planning and implementation. Only by this inclusion of safety aspects 
in the core operations of organisations will safety considerations be prevented from 
becoming compartmentalised as a field which may or may not be taken into account 
in daily production decisions
1.10. A cultural perspective of safety.
The concept of safety culture has become a much used rhetorical statement in safety 
research and managerial safety vocabularies, and it may be suggested that the 
concept has achieved meaning as a symbol of safety success. Consequently, it has 
seemingly become included in the belief system of successful approaches to worker 
safety.
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It is also my belief that a cultural perspective of safety is worthwhile both for 
research and practical safety improvement efforts. Through this framework, it will 
be possible to explore safety as actors' subjective experiences (Smircich 1983). A 
cultural perspective with its emphasis on informal processes will likewise be a tool 
for the investigation of coherence or not between an organisation's espoused safety 
theories and its theories-in-use (Argyris and Schon 1978). But in order to become 
fruitful for analytical and practical purposes, "safety culture" has to be removed 
from its present rhetorical position and be reframed to becoming an analytical 
concept. "Safety culture" has to be conquered - or possibly reconquered - as a 
concept of substance and prolific meaning. This can only be done by a brief 
investigation into the concept of organisational culture in general.
1.10.1. The search for culture.
There exists a multitude of definitions of what organisational culture "is". I will not 
choose one or two of these definitions and "swear allegiance" to them, but point to 
what I consider important aspects of cultural analysis. I agree with Alvesson (1993) 
when he states that culture analysis stands for a way of thinking about 
organisational phenomena - a research attitude - that emphasises informal, 
symbolic, subjective, and interpretive aspects of organisational life. It signifies a 
broadening of the "objective" attitude of organisational research by taking into 
account organisational aspects such as subjective experience, emotions, informal 
patterns, norms, ideologies and values. Subsequently, a cultural perspective tries to 
catch also the "irrational" elements of an organisation.
I find Geertz (quoted in Alvesson and Berg 1992) clarifying when he talks about 
culture as a fabric of meaning through which people interpret their experiences and 
receive guidelines for their actions. Accordingly, a cultural analysis must be an 
interpretive one in search of this meaning (Geertz 1993b). Holland and Quinn’s 
(1993) argument that our cultural framework models the world for us points to the 
all-embracing forces inherent in organisational culture. This is echoed by Brook's 
(1997) emphasis of culture as comprising of schemas or collective knowledge 
structures. Also helpful to illuminate the concept of organisational culture is
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Meyerson's (1991) definition of culture as ”... a web of diverse, loosely coupled, 
and volatile networks of symbols and relationships" (p. 260). Over time, culture will 
create taken-for-granted elements in organisational members’ perceptions (Brooks 
and Bate (1994) quoted in Brooks 1997). And finally, Pidgeon (1991) focuses upon 
my research theme when he talks about an organisation's safety culture as a system 
of meaning through which people understand hazards and which specifies what is 
important and legitimate safety considerations in the particular context
When discussing culture research, Schein (1999) talks about organisational 
culture’s different levels and how these will reveal different types of meaning to a 
researcher. According to Schein, the level of artifacts can be seen and observed but 
not understood if looked at isolated, and the level of espoused values are readily 
informed about but cannot be properly understood without deeper investigation into 
the culture. Lastly, the level of shared tacit assumptions is where cultural meaning 
makes itself known when these assumptions are being illuminated. Thus, culture 
research is not any simple task, and one has to realise that “... the important parts of 
culture are essentially invisible” (ibid., p. 21). The levels that a researcher chooses 
to concentrate her culture investigation around thus becomes a compelling aspect of 
culture research as the research findings will be greatly influenced by the choice of 
levels.
Whether to consider organisational culture as an organisational variable similar to 
variables as e.g. structure, production systems, etc., has been a long-standing debate 
within culture research. Those who liken culture to other variables look upon 
culture as something an organisation "has" as a building block among many others 
in the organisational design process (Smircich 1985). To me, this way of looking 
upon organisational culture seems inadequate. If culture has something to do with a 
fabric of meaning, a frame of reference, a web of networks of symbols and 
relationships and is manifested and maintained through the sensemaking efforts and 
actions by organisational actors (Harris 1996), I find it impossible to separate 
culture from other organisational phenomena. It seems to me that culture rather has 
to be looked upon as something which is always "in action" throughout the 
organisation, and accordingly, it cannot be restrained to some organisational aspects
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only. Bate (1994) finds that when researchers utilise broad and inclusive definitions 
of organisational culture, one can delete ’’culture" and substitute it with the concept 
of "organisation". He thus finds it extremely difficult to discriminate between 
"culture" and "organisation" for analytical purposes.
An inclusive definition of organisational culture seems to be imperative in order to 
grasp its importance in organisational life. When culture is perceived as a state of 
organisational mind or as the character of the organisation, the tendency to look 
upon culture as something which may be easily changed by managerial decisions 
will also be contested. Organisational culture is sustained and transformed by 
organisational members’ daily enactments. In such a perspective, a wish for cultural 
change requires nothing less than a fundamental organisational change.
And finally, an imperative question has to be stated concerning the search for 
organisational culture: Whose culture is organisational culture (Gherardi et al. 
1998b)? Based in this, the issues of organisational power and influence have to be 
raised as an integrated part of any culture study.
1.10.2. The integration perspective.
Organisational researchers such as e.g. Deal and Kennedy (1984), Peters and 
Waterman (1982) and Trice and Beyer (1993) seem to utilise the culture concept as 
a coherent and unifying category which is shared by all organisational actors - 
except maybe some deviants. Culture is analysed within a theoretical paradigm that 
may be termed the culture integration perspective (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991).
Clarity, consistency, consensus and non-ambiguity are trademarks of both analysis 
and practical research applications within the integrative framework. Ambiguity is 
systematically excluded, and the culture is looked upon as a harmonious product of 
knowledge and practices (Gherardi et al. 1998b). It is looked upon as a matter of 
research technique to find these shared elements of an organisational culture, and it 
is likewise considered possible to come forward with appropriate prescriptions for 
how to develop a desired and shared culture.
It is a commonly stated critique against this research tradition that it is too 
superficial and that it probably accounts for only parts of an organisational culture. 
The research acceptance of the official philosophy and the espoused values of the 
culture as the culture is questioned, and the necessity of a more polyphonic cultural 
picture is argued. Integrative culture research has been dominated by managerial 
claims to be the legitimate "masters" of situational definitions, and consequently, 
managers' views have been given the status of representing organisational "reality", 
critical voices argue.
When organisational culture is viewed from the integration perspective, a 
questioning of central elements of the main cultural assumptions may be looked 
upon as threatening to cultural unity (Schon 1991). A discussion of basic values 
will be embarrassing if noticed by the external world, and this might be ruining for 
a presented self-perception of consensus and unity (Goffman 1959). The 
organisation will utilise negotiations and defence mechanisms to handle cultural 
opponents, and a marginalisation of such organisational members may be attempted 
by labelling them as "irrational", "emotional", etc. - labels that set them apart from 
the rational paradigm of organisation and protect the consensus organisation against 
opposition.
A researcher can thus never assume that the non-existence of open opposition to the 
official culture depicts a "true" picture of organisational consensus and feeling of 
unity. Frontstage loyalty and unity may often exist in spite of internal tensions 
(Goffman 1959). For individual actors, what may become the answer is the setting 
up of backstage arenas in which they can contradict frontstage values without being 
sanctioned. Such backstage performances function as internal medication as well as 
being cohesive for the backstage participants, and thus, they include both 
integrative and differentiating aspects.
1.10.3. The differentiation perspective.
A differentiation perspective of culture research will question a culture's consensual 
status (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991) and will point to the probability that several
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organisational cultures exist in opposition to each other within the same 
organisational What is assumed to take place is a cultural competition for the 
hegemony of situational definitions. Contrary to what is perceived in the 
integration perspective, the ’'normal" organisation thus will have organisational 
dissensus as a trade mark. The different cultures - often termed subcultures - will 
have internal consensus, and according to Brooks (1997), separate subcultural 
identities are developed. Frost et al. (1991) consider such cultures to be "islands of 
clarity" in organisations that are predominantly culturally inconsistent.
A belief system including desired action patterns, taboos, norms and values will 
exist on group level (Alvesson and Berg 1992), and culture research accordingly 
has to take account of the subcultural level in order to comprehend the cultural 
complexity of an organisation. The group culture may have stronger influence on 
organisational members' reality definitions than the official organisational culture, 
and the subcultural group often becomes people's main frame of reference 
according to the differentiation perspective.
Group identity is defined in opposition to other groups as groups look upon 
themselves as unique social constructions (Turner 1992b). Goffman (1959) argues 
that groups are instruments of identity creation in which distance to other 
organisational members and groups is created. According to Schein (1992), a group 
contains a shared language and common definitions of organisational reality.
Group members share a "sub-dialect", a body of social and work competence 
through which "how to be at work" is defined and sustained.
Gergen (1992) discusses dissensus and differentiation as a positive aspect of 
organisational life. He argues that dissensus is vitalising for organisastional 
performance, and if everything is seen to be running smoothly, then the organisation 
is in trouble. The consensus hegemony in managerial ideologies, though, is a 
barrier for an understanding of the positive aspects of dissensus and heterogeneity. 
According to Gergen, the search for consensus "calms down" and streamlines 
organisations too much, and the inherent organisational vitality of multiple 
definitions ought to be treasured instead of being subdued.
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1.10.4. The fragmentation perspective.
This third perspective of culture analysis is discussed by several researchers (e.g. 
Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a; Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991; Martin and Meyerson 
1988). The fragmentation perspective has, however, been less employed in cultural 
research than the previously mentioned ones.
Ambiguity, fluctuation and multiplicity are key concepts of the fragmentation 
perspective. The organisation is viewed as a fluid and continuously changing entity 
where values, norms, group membership patterns, work actions, social relations, etc. 
never can be analysed in terms of stable patterns or unambiguous meaning 
constructions. Organisational members' interpretations of events and their actions 
accordingly take place in cultures that may be simultaneously differentiated, unified 
and fragmented.
Due to the fluidity of organisational life, members' informal group memberships are 
fluctuating, shifting alliances constantly form, and people's arguments may change 
from one day to the other. What seems to be the situation is summed up by 
Isabella's (1990) evaluation of her data collection process (p. 13): "... concerns 
shifted, reactions varied, and perceptions were both similar and diverse". Nothing 
is stable seen from a fragmentation perspective except for the situation of 
instability. Holland and Quinn (1993) talk about cultural models to be used when 
suitable and set aside when this is not so, suggesting that organisational culture is 
fragmented, incoherent and situational. Organisations are thus characterised by 
confusion rather than clarity and predictability, and it is never possible to foretell 
organisastional members' behaviour due to this situation of flux. Tensions between 
organising and disorganising forces - forces which simultaneously promote unity, 
differentiation and fragmentation - will always take place (Gergen 1992), and such 
tensions will be illuminated by a fragmentation framework of analysis.
What is focussed in a fragmentation culture analysis are the inherent ambiguities in 
any work role with the resulting non-predictable behaviour of organisational actors. 
Such a situation is considered "normal" within a fragmentation view, while it might
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be looked upon as "irrational" and "dysfunctional" within other cultural 
perspectives. The concept of "dysfunctional behaviour" does not have any place 
within a fragmentation paradigm.
It seems reasonable to suggest that a fragmentation view will be the preferred 
analytical perspective within a post-modem framework. A post-modem view that 
emphasises local and individual understanding as opposed to grand theories is in 
line with a cultural perspective where uncertainty, ambiguity, shifting relations and 
conflicting views are at the forefront of interest.
I have always wondered about the states of tranquility and clarity that are presented 
in cultural research, as such "straightforwardness" does not coincide with my own 
experiences as an organisational member. I am thus glad to find an analytical 
perspective that also includes confusion, contradiction and diversity in 
organisations. But the fragmentation perspective also makes me wonder if too 
much emphasis can be placed on heterogeneity and ambiguity, and if there is a 
chance that clarity and unity might be overlooked due to a belief in fragmentation as 
a main organising principle.
I follow Martin (1992, p. 169-170) when she states that"... a researcher has to 
abandon the objectivist assumption that one perspective will be correct, or more 
correct, than others". To do a cultural multiperspective analysis is the challenge, 
and 1 will analyse MAIE safety culture with the help of an integration as well as a 
differentiation and a fragmentation perspective.
1.10.5. Cultural expressions.
Symbols may be defined as "something that in a somewhat ambiguous way 
represents something else" (Alvesson and Berg 1992:211). In order to interpret a 
symbol's meaning and significance, the interpretation calls for an association of 
ideas out of the concrete event (Morgan, Frost and Pondy 1983). Cultural 
expressions like rites, rituals, ceremonies, organisational stories, language patterns, 
etc. have been at the core of much culture analysis. According to Brooks (1997),
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such ritualistic and routinized behaviour helps to preserve organisational members' 
assumptions and beliefs and serve as an anchor point amid organisational ambiguity 
and change.
Patterns of behaviour, pay systems, meeting structures, training systems, physical 
surroundings, information strategies, ceremonies, etc. may also be considered as 
expressions of the dominant cultural vision and be interpreted as cultural 
expressions. Besides their straightforward organisational functions, there will be 
symbolic sides to these different cultural expressions which serve to reinforce 
cultural meaning.
When emphasising symbolic aspects in cultural analysis, research efforts will focus 
around situations that are open to multiple interpretations and definitions. The 
ambiguity and fluidity of such organisational aspects ought to make researchers 
aware of the dangers of interpreting events in order to fit them into "proper” 
symbolic categories. Alvesson and Berg (1992) argue the existense of a symbolic 
romanticism in culture research which tends to interpret most actions within a 
somewhat spectacular and symbolically based organisational reality. Such 
"symbolic pollution" is in their opinion counteractive to a broader understanding of 
the complexity of cultural processes. I follow them in their reflections, and I find it 
vital to interpret cultural expressions and symbols with great care. It is through 
social interaction that the meaning of symbolic actions become established, and thus 
it is imperative to focus on the situations where symbols are utilised in order to 
understand their significance (Feldman 1996).
1.10.6. Safety culture and research considerations.
It has to be emphasised that in all organisations where safety questions are present 
on the agenda, there exists a safety culture. The organisation's safety culture may 
be seen as the totality of beliefs and practices concerning safety, and whether this 
culture is mainly a positive force for the improvement of work safety or whether it 
also comprises negative aspects that are barriers for improvement will be an issue of 
empirical research. What is important to acknowledge is that there is no reason to
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assume that a safety culture per se is a positive tool for improved safety. Culture - 
and safety culture - are analytical concepts to which cannot be attached positive or 
negative connotations as such.
When relating to my previous discussion of culture, I do not think it is possible 
"easily" to implement a positive safety culture in any organisation. I do not 
consider organisational culture as an organisational variable, but rather as 
constituting the organisation with its provision of reality definitions, basic 
assumptions, values and norms for organisational actions. Seen from this 
perspective, a safety culture can neither be implemented as an isolated issue nor 
"had" along with other organisational systems and programmes. A safety culture 
will be developed within the framework of the overall organisational culture, and it 
will be a part of this culture whether organisational actors like it or not. So in order 
to improve a safety culture - which often is called for in safety literature -, what has 
to be focused is the total organisational situation. Planned cultural change is a 
complex process (Schein 1999) whether it concerns safety or not, and without 
taking into consideration the totality of the existing culture, cultural change within 
specific areas is unlikely to be achieved as planned.
A consequence of my view of safety culture as being inseparable from the general 
organisational culture is that my previous culture discussion applies to the concept 
of safety culture as well: A safety culture can be studied from an integration, a 
differentiation and a fragmentation point of view - and from a view combining the 
different perspectives. The safety culture is created and sustained through 
organisational members' enactments within the framework of the existing culture, 
and numerous safety culture expressions exist that represent and sustain cultural 
beliefs, assumptions, values and norms. Some of these will contain more symbolic 
features than others, and it becomes a challenge for safety culture research to 
interpret the different expressions within a cultural context without falling into the 
trap of either ignoring their symbolic significance or over-interpreting expressions 
by attributing them with meaning which is primarily based in researcher 
assumptions.
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As general organisational culture is marked by complexity, ambiguity and a state of 
fluidity, the same can be said about safety culture. Individual and group safety 
sensemaking processes will be complex, situational and ambiguous, and some 
organisational members’ definitions will be more influential than others also within 
a safety culture. Taboos to prevent the questioning of what is officially perceived 
as central safety beliefs are developed, and symbolic actions to sustain the beliefs 
take place. Safety alliances and affiliations will differ, and organisational actors’ 
perceptions about safety will continually be under revision according to their
present organisational situation.
/
Often, work groups will be the "home’’ of different safety cultures, which are 
fundamented in the local knowledge, the social relations, authority and power, and 
the systems of interaction and communication that exist within the groups. 
Differences in safety values and norms may be developed between work groups, 
and different perceptions of what are safety-related issues or not may consequently 
exist between groups.
Organisational safety cultures and safety subcultures may or may not be committed 
to safety learning. In some cultures, accidents and unwanted incidents form the 
basis for learning in order to improve safety work, while in others, such events are 
utilised somewhat superficially as learning devices and do not initiate safer work 
behaviour.
I have mentioned some topics of interest for safety culture research in order to 
highlight that these themes do not differ in their problem orientation from 
organisational culture research in general. The purpose has been to illustrate that 
safety culture research will be identical to general culture research when it comes to 
data collection, the utilisation of concepts and theoretical perspectives. What is the 
main difference is that safety culture research focusses upon safety issues while 
other culture studies have different foci.
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1.11. Safety and organisational identity.
Assumptions about oneself and the external world are basic building blocks in the 
social constructs that are known as organisations' self-perception and identity. 
Organisational identity -  created in interactions between organisational members 
and including the processes of formulating, editing, applauding and refusing -  is 
constantly being constructed and reconstructed in conversations (Czamiawska 
1997). It may be looked upon as the temporary "end result" of a continuous process 
of self-perception and features distinctive, central, and enduring organisational 
characteristics, according to the views of organisational members (Czamiawska, 
ibid.). The inherent vision in an organisation's identity will ideally impart meaning, 
motivate, and resolve organisational concerns along the way (Pettigrew 1979).
Porac et al. (1989) suggest that organisations' competitive strategies are founded in 
their identities.
Czamiawska (1997) argues that identity in modem organisations will tell a tale of 
self-respect, efficiency, autonomy and flexibility, and Erez and Earley (1993; 
quoted in Weick 1995) list the needs for self-enhancement, self-efficiacy and self- 
consistency as motivators in the development of organisational selves and identities.
A shared feeling of identity is considered of importance from managerial points of 
view as it is perceived as vital for organisational coherence. Of many reasons, 
though, it is not uncomplicated to establish a common identity. At group and 
individual level, different identity concepts will exist, and these may to varying 
degrees coincide with the officially espoused identity of the organisation. Kellner 
(1992) argues that what is typical of identity concepts in post-modem times is a 
state of fragmentation and disconnection, and Gergen (quoted in Czamiawska 1997) 
states that a quest for a unified identity concept is not a compelling research 
objective as identity fragmentation is the way of life in today's organisations.
It will be a research theme to inquire whether the concept of safety is included in an 
organisation's self-perception and identity. The presence or not of safety topics in 
the way an organisation looks upon itself will indicate whether safety is considered
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an issue of organisational importance - at least at the espoused level. An 
investigation of what goes on at individual and group level is needed to establish if 
a safety concept which is included in a managerially promoted identity also is 
incorporated in individual identities throughout the organisation.
Groups and individuals will construct their identities from their situational 
perceptions of organisational realities and their participation in communities of 
practice -  informal groups defined by the ways in which members perform then- 
work and interpret events (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a; Gherardi and Nicolini 
2000b; Gherardi et al. 1998a). It is not unreasonable to assume that they will adapt 
to an officially promoted identity concept depending on how they evaluate the 
credibility of the concept’s world views and visions and depending on the 
organisational situation in which the identity is being enacted. Marcus (1992) talks 
about ”... the situated production of identity" (p. 315) and the existence of multiple 
identities within an individual. He also asks the question why one identity becomes 
dominant for a while at the expense of other identities.
According to Rosaldo (1989), an individual may be likened to a busy traffic 
intersection where different identities flow back and forth, and Gergen (1991) is 
occupied with the many voices of one identity (p. 83): "Each self contains a 
multiplicity of others, singing different melodies, different verses, and with 
different rhythms. Nor do these many voices necessarily harmonize. At times they 
join together, at times they fail to listen one to another, and at times they create a 
jarring discord." In his research on service work, Leidner (1993) talks about 
separate situational identities and how one identity is taken to the forefront at one 
time and being "stored" in another situation. An investigation along these lines may 
be able to illuminate both identity unity, fragmentation and disconnection.
If it is a general assessment among employees that safety considerations exist more 
in the officially espoused values than in real life, then it is improbable that safety 
becomes a shared organisational identity aspect among organisational members.
The perceived lack of safety awareness may instead constitute a vital element of 
their group and individual identities. But differences between groups and 
individuals in their identity perceptions are likely to occur. Safety may have a more
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or less prominent place in the different self-perceptions and identity constructs 
disregarding their basis in the same work situation. When such differences can be 
established, then the question has to be posed what the reasons for the discrepancies 
are.
If employees maintain -  backstage as well as frontstage -  that safety is a prominent 
part of their work identity, then there is reason to assume that a high level of 
individual safety awareness can be found. If the majority of employees affirm this 
identity perception, it can be assumed that worker safety is considered vital by the 
organisation as a whole. When this is the case, a safety focus will be shared among 
organisational members and will be a vital component of organisational unity. 
Safety may even become the main element around which organisational identity 
efforts are concentrated.
Erikson (quoted in Gergen 1991) argues that there is no feeling of being alive 
without a sense of identity. When following his line of thought, one has to consider 
individual and organisational identity formation as main mechanisms of 
organisational life.
1.12. Where do my theoretical considerations lead me?
With a post-modern critique of preconceived categories and assumptions in mind, it 
seems somewhat presumptuous to attempt to summarise my specific theoretical 
position. But nevertheless, I will do so, and in such a task, I illustrate that I remove 
myself from a “pure” post-modem stance.
I appreciate the post-modem critique of the “rational madness” in organisation 
theory, and follow post-modernism in its invitation to focus upon organisational 
complexity, pluralism and ambiguity. I also agree with the post-modernist refusal 
to construct “grand narratives”, and I will concentrate my efforts in the construction 
of local knowledge. The mundane and common in organisational members* safety 
related work life will be the basis for my investigations and theory construction.
41
A main approach for the disclosure of organisational complexity and plurality will 
be to concentrate upon organisational members* subjective safety sensemaking 
processes in which they interpret safety related events and construct meaning in 
their organisational reality. I believe this approach to be vital in order to promote 
an analysis of organisational safety that reaches beyond the official and espoused 
organisational meaning constructs and enables me to catch also the theories-in-use. 
The concepts of organisational frontstage and backstage arenas (Goffman 1959) 
will be essential tools in the uncovering and analysis of the safety complexity, and 
managers* authoritative labelling and the “combat” between dissimilar 
interpretations will be important analytical issues to consider.
The formation of organisational identity is based in organisational actors* 
sensemaking processes, and I will investigate into whether safety plays a role in the 
establishment of organisational identity. Closely related to the identity question is 
the issue of organisational culture, and as a main analytical approach, I will do a 
cultural analysis of organisational safety. The analysis will comprise different 
levels of the organisational culture, and will be based in the concept of 
organisational cultures as simultaneously shared, differentiated and fragmented -  a 
multiculture analysis where none of these cultural perspectives are excluded as 
means of analytical understanding although post-modernist influence possibly 
might have induced me with a preference for the cultural fragmentation perspective.
Sensemaking processes, organisational culture and organisational identity will thus 
be main theoretical lenses through which I will attempt to analyse organisational 
safety. My concluding construction of local knowledge will accordingly be 
fundamented in these analytical approaches. Through these theoretical choices of 
mine, it is my belief that I will be able to “understand** safety issues in a way that 
focusses on safety plurality and that offers justice to more than one interpretation of 





The choice of research methodology is never a decision that is taken in isolation 
from a researcher's general theoretical constructs. In this chapter I will make visible 
the reasons for my choice of methodology, I will refer to my field experiences seen 
from a methodological point of view and I will discuss what I consider the strengths 
and the drawbacks of my preferred methodology.
2.2. Theoretical assumptions to influence my methodological choice.
In the previous chapter, I have stated that I want to do an exploratory study of 
worker safety in which multiple organisational voices will be emphasised. This 
objective of mine is based in theoretical assumptions that I have laid out and 
discussed throughout the chapter. I agree with Marsden (1994) when he states that 
in order to improve organisational understanding we need to build from where 
people actually are rather than where we think they are or where we would like 
them to be. To be able to construct organisational understanding, then, I find it a 
necessity to base my work in the complexities of organisational life which often 
seem to be smoothed out in research (Weick 1987). A study which is focussed 
around organisational actors* sensemaking processes and subsequently illuminates 
the subjective safety realities that are to be found in an organisation thus becomes 
vital for me in my endeavour to catch cultural complexity and to make room for 
multiple organisational voices. I have also argued for the utilisation of a cultural 
analytical framework in a search for both visible and hidden aspects of 
organisational safety, and I have stated a research interest in possible incongruities 
between espoused safety ideologies and safety theories-in-use (Argyris and Sch6n 
1978) which may be acted out in frontstage and backstage situations respectively. It 
is my belief that these cited approaches will enable me to uncover organisational 
complexity and to become aware of potential unity as well as differentiation and
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fragmentation in the safety culture. A multiperspective analysis will hopefully 
emerge as a result of these theoretical assumptions of mine.
These theoretical considerations of mine can be argued to be influenced by a post­
modern critique of organisational research. I have discussed post-modemity in 
chapter 1, and this critique has been important for me in my choice of research 
perspectives. My initial feeling that organisational complexity and ambiguity are 
frequently overlooked in organisational analysis and my scepticism of pre­
conceived analytical categories have both been strengthened by post-modern 
thinking in which the emergence of seemingly streamlined organisational entities, 
coherence and "rationality” in organisational research have been questioned and 
challenged (e.g. Czamiawska 1997; Hassard and Parker et al. 1993; Reed and 
Hughes et al. 1992). This paradigmatic critique has been in my backbone 
throughout my research process. When I -  in spite of this -  have not chosen a more 
distinct post-modem approach -  if one can talk about "distinctiveness” when 
discussing post-modernism -  this is due to my previously cited reservations of what 
I consider to be post-modernism’s reluctance to try to construct organisational 
knowledge which goes beyond the establishment of a fragmented organisation 
picture that to a large extent denies researcher interpretation and analysis. I wish to 
be able to come up with organisational understanding that accounts for more than 
fragmented "snapshots” of organisational reality only, even though this 
organisational understanding of mine will not have the ambition of standing 
forward as "grand narratives” that depict general organisational ’’truths”.
In order to accomplish an analysis built upon my cited assumptions, I need 
methodological tools which do not reduce organisations into a few simple 
categories, but which offer multifaceted accounts of organisational reality (Turner 
1988; quoted in Mouly and Sankaran 1995) and embrace the subjective nature of 
organisational members’ views of their experiences (Brooks 1997). Accordingly, I 
do not want to study organisational safety seen predominantly from official and 
managerial perspectives. It is furthermore a vital point for me that in order to grasp 
the safety culture(s) of an organisation, it is essential to focus my research in the
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mundane and everyday actitivites of work life -  although without neglecting the 
more symbolic sides of organisational safety.
2.3. My methodological choice.
When considering methodological options based in these thoughts, the choice of 
research methodology seemed a comparatively simple question to resolve: I 
decided upon becoming an organisational anthropologist, utilising ethnographic 
methods as my main research methodology. Ethnography is distinguished from 
other research methodologies by researcher participation in the daily life of the 
researched organisations over an extended period of time while collecting all types 
of data that may throw light on the chosen research issues (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995; quoted in Bate 1997). Because of this approach, ethnographic 
research becomes focussed around the discovery of "problems” rather than a priori 
hypotheses brought into the organisation (Emmet and Morgan 1982; quoted in 
Wright 1994). Also, Wright (ibid.) states that a ’’trademark” of many ethnographic 
studies has been an interpretive approach in which researchers have tried to 
understand organisations as sites for construction of meaning. It is the core process 
of ethnography to mediate such meaning constructs (Agar 1986).
Based in my theoretical assumptions and my research objective, ethnography as it is 
outlined here is an answer to my quest for a methodological approach. It has 
seemed almost inevitable for me to choose ethnography as the methodological 
foundation of this study, and I think the methodology issue is the research decision 
that has troubled me least during this work. I have never regretted or doubted my 
methodological choice.
2.4. Ethnography as research methodology.
Many researchers have commented upon the hows and whys of ethnographic 
research (e.g. Bate 1997; Mouly and Sankaran 1995; Bryman and Burgess (eds.) 
1994; Geertz 1993a; 1993b; 1988; Kunda 1992; Hammersley and Atkinson 1991; 
Wadel 1991; Woolgar (ed.) 1991; Sanjek (ed.) 1990; Biyman 1989; Van Maanen
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1988; Jackson 1987; Agar 1986; Punch 1986; Whyte and Whyte 1984.). What is 
made clear in these -  and other -  works is that no "authoritative recipe" is offered 
for how to become an organisational ethnographer, although the methodology is 
best known for its fieldwork and the frequent utilisation of participant observation 
(Wright 1994). I believe that this absence of ethnographic recipe is in accordance 
with inherent principles of ethnographic research, although a recipe can be longed 
for when you are "out there", trying to stand on your rather shivering and unstable 
ethnographic feet.
2.4.1. Ethnography as a paradigm for research.
The lack of clear prescriptions for ethnographic performance is based in 
ethnography being more than a mere research methodology. In essence, it is a 
paradigm for research: It is a way of thinking about organisational analysis (Bate 
1997) that makes an ethnographic approach difficult to utilise as a methodology 
without the researcher agreeing to basic principles of ethnographic thought. Even if 
ethnographic research is carried out in multiple ways, the most basic principle of 
ethnography will always have to be focussed: The researcher attempt to involve 
herself with her research "body" in order to gain access to varied and unstructured 
organisational information and the emphasis that is laid upon the discovery of 
problems rather than the testing of researcher pre-conceived categories of what goes 
on in the organisation in question.
According to Van Maanen (1988:117), ethnographic fieldwork "... is a long social 
process of coming to terms with a culture". Agar (1986) states that the essence of 
ethnography lies in the encounter with "alien" worlds and the researcher's 
sensemaking process of these worlds. Through the researcher's position as both an 
insider and an outsider at the fieldwork site, what hopefully will emerge is a 
"discovery of problems" that becomes visible by the interaction between the 
fieldworker's general organisational knowledge and the internal perspectives the 
fieldworker learns in the field (Wright 1994). This exploring attitude and the 
exclusion of a priori research categories are the methodology’s basic fundaments.
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Woolgar (1991) claims that uncertainty is a key principle of ethnographic research, 
and that no easy interpretations and definitions ought to exist for an ethnographer.
Pollner (1987) states that the contribution of ethnography is its potential and will to 
reveal the many organisational layers of assumptions, skills and practices through 
which organisational actors construct their realities, and Wright (1994) emphasises 
how ethnographers analyse the way people make meaning in particular situations 
out of their available cultural repertoire. These research interests and research foci 
will exclude many researchers from using ethnographic methods as the practising of 
ethnography can be looked upon as a paradigmatic way of apprehending the 
organisational world (Linstead 1996). An ethnographic approach involves 
epistemological assumptions that makes it unsuitable and unaccommodating for 
researchers that seek narrowly defined, quickly found and quantified organisational 
information.
2.4.2. To do fieldwork.
"To be there" -  to do fieldwork -  is a basic trait of ethnographic research. The 
researcher is expected to spend considerable time in the organisation over a lengthy 
period. The main reason for researcher attendance over time is to gain 
psychological access to the organisation so she is considered a semi-insider and is 
able to achieve organisational information that otherwise would not have been 
attainable. Through longitudinal fieldwork she will be able to analyse the 
organisational situation based in a more complex picture than if her data were 
obtained by other methods of inquiry.
What I consider the most vital contribution of ethnographic research is that it is an 
instrument for taking account of the polyphonic qualities of organisational reality. 
Through ethnographic fieldwork, the researcher is able to recognise the multiplicity 
of organisational actors' perceptions of organisational life. If this research goal is 
achieved, the researcher will be able to develop knowledge that penetrates the 
organisational surface and represents multiple organisational realities.
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"To be there" and "how to be there" are essential themes of ethnographic research. 
Neither is simple and easy to deal with, and much conscious thought is needed 
regarding these aspects. "To be there" or rather to gain access to an organisation is 
extensively commented upon by many researchers (e.g. Mouly and Sankaran 1995; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1991; Bryman 1989), and without spending too much 
time on this issue, I will emphasise how the researcher ability to gain 
"psychological access" probably depends upon how she first was introduced to 
organisational members. A researcher will have to be granted physical access, and 
management usually holds the key to whether access is permitted or not. So from 
the very outset, most fieldworkers will be identified with management, and this 
organisational entrance will have to be consciously taken into account by 
fieldworkers as it will have a bearing on their future in the organisation.
How fieldworkers go about their data collection is the most crucial aspect of 
ethnographic fieldwork. "How to be there" includes to gain the much talked about 
"psychological access" to groups and individuals. To develop rapport - sympathetic 
relations - with different types of organisational members requires a social ability 
which fieldworkers have to muster. This is a matter fraught with many difficulties 
and which requires constant consciousness and alert from fieldworkers. It is not an 
easy task to find one’s feet in strange surroundings -  “... an unnerving business 
which never more than distantly succeeds” (Geertz 1993b: 13). No recipe can be set 
up for the social awareness and respect needed to become at least partly accepted as 
a part of -  although a strange one -  organisational everyday life.
A main criteria for performing "good" ethnographic fieldwork is fieldworker 
acknowledgment of the significance of differing organisational reality perceptions. 
The fieldworker has to be aware of the potential danger of becoming immersed into 
the world views of some groups and individuals and to believe that their perceptions 
are the only ones worth taking notice of. When multiple realities are being 
recognised to the best of the researcher’s ability and given their place in the data 
material, it is my belief that this broad scope of investigation is a main reward of 
ethnographic fieldwork.
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2.4.3. Ethnography and "objectivity".
But there are critical issues to consider even if the researcher is aware of multiple 
organisational realities. The researcher will never be able to report in any 
"objective" way what is found in the field even though she tries to do this to the best 
of her abilities. What is observed or is being told by organisational members will 
always be filtered and interpreted through the fieldworker's own perceptions and 
influenced by her own world views and preconceived ideas. What she finally 
reports will not be any exact replica of what "really" happened in the field. The 
"results" of a fieldwork study will always be a product of the interaction between 
the researcher and the phenomena which are studied (Turner 1983).
Notwithstanding that researcher empathy is being looked upon as a prerequisite for 
the success of ethnographic fieldwork, it is impossible for anybody fully to perceive 
other people's subjective realitites. The commitment to transcribe organisational 
life may be there, but what in effect comes out of the research process is always a 
translation carried out by the researcher (Bate 1997). I follow R.D. Laing (quoted 
in Gergen 1991:89) when he states: "The data (given) of research are not so much 
given as taken out of a constantly elusive matrix of happenings. We should speak 
of capta rather than data." Or as Geertz says it (1993b:9): "... that what we call our 
data are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they 
and their compatriots are up to ...”.
The researcher will herself be an active participant in ethnographic analysis, and a 
notion of being an observer only without influencing the process at all is not in line 
with my thinking about research. To produce knowledge is a human act (Woolgar 
1991), and researcher statements always have to be looked upon as the result of this 
interpretive processes. An ethnographic research mode does not constitute any 
exception from this. What is needed is a critical and reflexive researcher 
perspective regarding her data collection and the subsequent analysis.
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2.4.4. Participant observation.
Participant observation is the instrument which anthropologists traditionally have 
used as the way of gaining research insight. The concept implies that a fieldworker 
does more than observe what is going on in the organisation: she also participates 
in a wide variety of organisational activities.
Whether participation is possible to achieve depend on the relations between the 
researcher and her informants, and this issue is commented upon at other points in 
this chapter. Observation is the more "simple" objective to succeed with as it 
mostly depends upon the researcher herself. But even in their "pure" forms -  if 
hypothetically we assume that such forms exist -  observations are only partly 
helpful to understand organisational realities, as the observer lacks the inherent 
meaning construction of an action which is possessed by the actor (Schein 1999; 
Schutz 1967).
Both participation and observation are demanding aspects of ethnographic 
research. But worse is still to come: To be a participant observer -  to be an insider 
and an outsider at the same time which traditonally has been a "requirement" of the 
ethnographic ethos -  is a difficult task which calls for social abilities and a 
conceptual clarity that I do not know whether are realistic to require of anyone. The 
two conflicting roles of being a participant observer will remain in constant tension 
throughout a fieldwork (Wright 1994). In spite of the problematic sides of 
participant observation, though, it is a highly praised and almost mythical element 
of ethnographic research. Because of this, I feel it necessary to point to inherent 
difficulties of the participative and observational emphasis in ethnography. 
Participant observation which is performed without an awareness of its limitations 
will become a less credible research tool than when accompanied with reflections 
about its complex sides.
I also find a degree of romanticism in ethnographic accounts regarding participant 
observation. Relations between informants ("natives") and the researcher may be 
idealised, and the well-known anthropological expression of "going native" -  a
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fieldworker tendency to become totally absorbed in life at the fieldwork site -  is 
said to be a common occurrence of ethnographic research. Due to the nature of 
ethnographic fieldwork, this is probably an almost inevitable aspect of the fieldwork 
experience. The challenge of ethnographic fieldwork will be to allow oneself to 
become emotionally immersed with the field site’s way of life and at the same time 
keeping the intellectual and analytical distance that is required in order to evaluate 
one's own fieldwork methods and analytical endeavours. The romanticism of 
becoming a member of the "native tribe" may be personally rewarding, but it is 
doubtful whether such an immersion promotes analytical efforts. To the contrary, 
Geertz (1993b) points to the danger of such a position blocking the researcher’s 
view of her own professional role and thus becoming a threat to anthropological 
analysis. Only romantics or spies would find a point in becoming a native, he 
argues.
Geertz (1993a) sheds light upon the difficulties involved in becoming immersed in 
informants' lives. He argues that it is impossible for any researcher fully to 
comprehend other peoples' imaginations as though they were one’s own, and that 
this is a mission which researchers ought to abandon: "To grasp the concepts that, 
for another people, are experience-near, and to do so well enough to place them in 
illuminating connection with experience-distant concepts theorists have fashioned 
to capture the general features of social life, is clearly a task at least as delicate, if a 
bit less magical, as putting oneself into someone else’s skin. The trick is not to get 
yourself into some inner correspondence of spirit with your informants. Preferring, 
like the rest of us, to call their souls their own, they are not going to be altogether 
keen about such an effort anyhow. The trick is to figure out what the devil they 
think they are up to" (p. 58). Geertz believes that accounts of other peoples' 
subjectivities can be given without the illusion of becoming "soul-mates". What is 
needed, he argues, is what he calls "normal capacities" for relationships including a 
sensitivity of the limits for what is acceptable researcher "intrusion".
Some problems of the fieldwork role are succinctly captured by Freilich (quoted in 
Wadel 1991):
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"A person may drink 
(participate in the native culture) 
drink heavily
(participate, fully, in depth) 
get drunk
(temporarily go native) 
or become a drunk
(go native and stay in that condition)."
Barley (1983) completes the metaphor when he talks about the "ethnographer 
hangover" which takes place after a fieldwork is finished: The fieldworker feels 
extremely happy to be back in her own environment and finds the fieldwork site 
almost unbearable to think about.
In his account of fieldwork in Cameroon, Barley (ibid.) claims that he was never 
really accepted, and therefore was not able to "participate" in an ideal sense of the 
word. He found he was tolerated as a "harmless idiot" who brought certain 
advantages - but also some disadvantages - to the fieldwork site. Barley thus 
shatters the romantic notion of the fieldwork experience in which the fieldworker 
and her informants are spiritually matched and where the relations between them 
are dominated by acceptance, inclusion and mutual trust. Sanjek et al. (1990) also 
join the many ethnographers who in recent years have provided insight into 
researchers' more subtle and not so often mentioned fieldwork difficulties. 
Although many of these reports are based in fieldwork experiences in foreign 
settings, there is reason to believe that similar fieldwork challenges will be present 
also when a researcher performs fieldwork in a location which is less novel to her.
With these critical reflections in mind, I believe that ethnographic fieldwork will 
enable the researcher to collect data about the formal and not least the informal 
processes of organisations in ways that shed light upon the complexity of 
organisational life. Through observation and participation, the researcher hopefully 
will become enlightened about organisational backstages as well as frontstages and 
will be able to explore into possible inconsistencies between espoused
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organisational theories and the theories-in-use. When commenting upon doing 
ethnographic research, Geertz (1993b:20) states that “... it is not necessary to know 
everything in order to understand something”. Based in this research optimism it is 
possible to argue that the necessarily limited organisational insight an ethnographer 
is able to achieve nevertheless will enable her to comprehend significant aspects of 
organisational life.
During my own fieldwork, I never became a "classic” participant observer who 
participated in all the daily chores of my fieldwork site. When I was given access 
to the organisation in question, it was agreed that I was to become an observer of 
organisational work and a participant in organisational life of the work place, while 
full participation of mine in the work chores was never a question on the initial 
negotiating agenda. I considered it unwise to ask for the utilisation of full work 
participation as my research methodology, mainly because it soon became fairly 
clear to me how "proper” research methods were defined in the eyes of those who 
were the potential gate-openers for me into the fieldwork site in question. Even to 
be given permission to become an "observer” was something not easy to achieve, 
and numerous more or less subtle indications told me that this was the most I could 
hope for. Later, though, I was able to partake in the work processes at some of the 
work stations of my fieldwork site to some degree. Thus, I got some sort of feeling 
what work chores and safety issues were all about which was built upon more than 
observation only.
When I -  in spite of the limited work participation I was able to go through with -  
do not hesitate to look upon myself as some sort of participant observer, it is 
because of the extensive participation that I carried through in the social life of the 
fieldwork site. I mingled with organisational members at all possible occasions, at 
breaks and at their side while they performed their work tasks. Through this day-to- 
day participation of mine, my social relations to my informants were established, 
and these relations allowed me to collect my data material both while socially 
participating or at other times in more formal and pre-planned situations. Thus, I 
consider my previous discussion of participant observation to be strongly relevant 
to my doings at my fieldwork site, even though my participation mostly was carried
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out without the direct participation in work tasks. I believe that both the constant 
tension between the observer and the participant role and the danger of becoming a 
romanticising researcher who is totally absorbed in the effort to be included as ’’one 
of them” as well as the other discussed issues of participant observation apply to my 
own fieldwork experience just as much as they do to fieldwork situations in which 
work participation is a more central research element than it was in mine.
2.4.5. Fieldwork relations.
In ethnographic research, the researcher becomes involved with organisational 
members in ways that differ from other researchers' involvement with informants. 
Close relations between the ethnographer and organisational members -  which is a 
"must” in the ethnographic endeavour -  pose multiple challenges in the work 
process, and considerations regarding such relationships need to be taken into 
constant account by the fieldworker.
An “insider” in a social setting -  for instance an organisation -  can be defined as a 
person who makes subjective sense of her own experience within the setting’s 
frames of reference (Merton 1972; Schutz 1964; quoted in Bartunek and Louis 
(1996)). Although never achieving an “insider” position, the ethnographer for a 
while will become a "semi-insider”. I think it is fair to claim that even though the 
researcher is conscious about her relationships and will try to avoid becoming more 
tied to some informants than others, there inevitably will develop situations in 
which the researcher "neutrality" will be put at stake. On account of being a human 
being, the researcher will probably become more attached to some persons than 
others. Becker acknowledges this situation (quoted in Taylor and Bogdan 1984) 
when he argues that a researcher cannot avoid taking sides in her studies, 
disregarding her conscious efforts not to do so. But when being aware of one’s 
biases, it ought to be possible for the researcher to work with her relations to other 
actors and groups in order to establish and sustain relations at a wide organisational 
level. Otherwise, ethnographic research becomes subgroup research without stating 
it being this and accordingly loses its credibility.
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2.4.6. Fieldwork and internal organisational conflicts.
In organisations with ongoing internal conflicts, the researcher challenge to obtain 
rapport with conflicting groups and individuals will be a difficult one to live up to. 
Mouly and Sankaran (1995) point to the difficulty of maintaining a state of 
researcher "neutrality" due to a probable researcher preference for one or some 
parties' arguments, and also due to the not uncommon situation that organisational 
actors will try to use the researcher to achieve their ends in ongoing conflicts. The 
researcher will easily be dragged into organisational politics and power battles if 
she is not extremely aware of this danger. If she is being accused for taking sides in 
an internal conflict, then her possibilities for gaining broad psychological access in 
the organisation are about zero. Organisational members will quickly spot a 
researcher preference for certain individuals and groups in an existing conflict, and 
this will cause restricted access to other individuals and groups. During a long 
fieldwork period, this scenario is likely to become a reality for most fieldworkers.
When being conscious about one's tendency to prefer the points of view of one of 
the battling parts, chances are that the researcher might be able to "manage" her 
biases better than if the biases are not acknowledged. To dull oneself into a sham of 
being neutral is probably worse than anything, and it may lead to a potentially 
damaging unawareness concerning one's own research process. An organisational 
ethnographer who wants to reveal organisational actors' values and beliefs has to be 
willing to recognise her own values and prejudices in the daily research process. 
Organisational groups and individuals will want to establish whether the 
fieldworker is trustworthy when it comes to "keeping the secrets" one is allowed 
access to. During my own fieldwork I was told that in the first phase of my 
fieldwork period, organisational members had been attentive if insights I gained 
about sensitive organisational issues were being fed to other members by me. "If 
we had found that this was the case, then it would have meant the end of your stay 
here," I was told. To comply with a fieldwork promise of confidentiality is not 
always easy, especially when fieldwork extends over a long period of time and the 
fieldworker inevitably becomes attached to certain groups and individuals. A slip 
of the tongue might easily occur and likes and dislikes may not always be held in
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check. For a fieldworker who has been granted access to organisational backstage 
regions, this is an issue of main concern, as it might be anticipated that the 
fieldworker ought to reciprocate backstage information with information from other 
organisational groups' backstages.
2.4.7. Non-symmetrical relations between researcher and informants.
The issue of fieldwork ethics is a vital question for ethnographic researchers, and 
ethical questions will constantly claim researcher attention. Ethical dilemmas and 
questions may at times become so overwhelming that they are in danger of ruining 
the research process, but it is my belief that it is better to have an awareness of 
ethical issues than living in a state of ethical ignorance and unawareness.
An ethical dilemma that I increasingly recognised as a fieldworker was what I 
perceived as the non-symmetrical relations between my informants and myself. I 
was fortunate enough to establish a position in which I was accepted and included 
by the majority of organisational members in their daily work lives as a fellow 
human being, not only as a researcher. I was admitted into many organisational 
backstages, I was treated generously and respectfully, and organisational members 
gave to me in abundance what I mostly craved for their definitions of work place 
safety reality. I was happy that my relationship building with my informants had 
succeeded, but my "success" had a bitter aftertaste which confronted me with 
uncomfortable ethical considerations.
My "consciousness problems" had to do with the personal relationships of 
friendship that developed. I strongly felt that emotional relations were "uneven" in 
the way that they were constructed around friendship intentions (and pretentions?) 
on my part in order to benefit my data collection. Without qualms, I had utilised 
my social abilities to gain people's trust, and as time passed, I felt increasingly 
uncomfortable by what I had achieved. Punch (1986) talks about the fieldwork 
establishment of friendship with people one normally do not mix with, and how a 
fieldworker might exploit emotional involvements in order to get data. During my 
fieldwork period I experienced similar feelings which made me reflect over the non-
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symmetrical relations in which I saw myself as the chief beneficiary and my 
informants to be those who were the main providers.
All social interactions must contain positive incentives in order to take place. So 
what were the incentives in our relationship building from my informants' point of 
view? What are the reciprocal aspects of such relations that make them seem 
worthwhile for both researchers and informants? By reflecting about such 
questions I hoped to gain insights about the felt non-symmetrical field relations.
2.4.8. Why do informants participate in research?
So why are informants willing to share their knowledge of organisational issues and 
even friendship with strangers who come and go and who possibly have no real 
interest in them as human beings except as organisational informants? Why do they 
let themselves be "exploited" to provide the raw material for books and dissertations 
that they probably never will read through the patient enduring of ethnographers’ 
obtuse questions (Geertz 1993b)? I find it hard to believe that informants pay 
much heed to researcher assertions of the general benefits of research and 
knowledge production. There have to exist more specific advantages for informants 
in order to account for their willingness to become involved in fieldwork research.
As I pondered about such questions, some answers began to appear which 
"comforted" me in my ethical concerns. I was told by some informants that it was 
significant for them that I seemingly was genuinely interested in listening to their 
perceptions of safety and work life. "Nobody has ever asked me before about my 
points of view concerning safety issues", one informant said. He had worked at the 
site for many years. So what I seemingly provided to informants was a "Speakers'. 
Comer" in which their own work experiences and perceptions had priority and were 
of prime interest.
Also, I was told that my interest in safety issues contributed to the sustainment and 
development of the organisational safety focus. It was believed that both 
management and employees were more conscious about safety issues while I was
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around and that my presence thus promoted a continuous safety awareness. So 
what they gained from giving me access was a strengthening of the safety focus, 
some said. It is my impression that this part of my field role was most predominant 
during the first stages of my fieldwork period before I blended more or less in with 
the daily routines. At the outset of my fieldwork, some organisational members 
even thought I was a kind of safety inspector.
Whether being an academic in a non-academic environment was a qualification that 
furthered or hampered my fieldwork relations is difficult to decide upon. What was 
said by some, though, was that my academic status served to emphasise the safety 
focus as an organisational issue. The "scientification" that my presence awarded to 
safety gave the issue a more prestigious position, it was said.
For some of my informants, I served as a "wall of grief'. Those who were 
dissatisfied with work conditions found in me a patient and nonjudging listener, and 
at times they might have looked upon me as a "channel" into which they could send 
grievances with the hope of these becoming further transmitted through the 
organisational structure. To volunteer information to a fieldworker thus may 
become a political strategy to informants who might consider closely what 
information to give out and what not to give out in order to promote her own 
political interests. I also became a discussion partner for some informants who 
wanted to debate organisational issues with me and who apparently appreciated my 
"stranger value" (Goldstein quoted in Jackson 1987:69) in the evaluation of diverse 
organisational matters.
As I considered the issues of fieldwork relations, I had to admit to myself that 
although these very "worthy" explanations all could be found in my fieldwork 
relations, the main reason why informants included me in their daily work life 
probably was my role as "refresher-of-the-day". I go along with Barley (1983) who 
found that the main significance of his attendance at the fieldwork site was related 
to informants' general boredom and curiosity towards a new and strange 
"phenomenon". Numerous times organisational members commented upon the 
monotony of their work tasks and how their days consisted of the same
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unchallenging routines. It was frequently said that good social relations were vital 
in order for people to endure the tediousness of the work day, and any event and 
"refreshment" were welcome to break the monotony. As a fieldworker, I 
constituted such a "refreshment". The fact that I was a woman and my fieldwork 
site was an overwhelmingly male work environment probably also enhanced my 
"refreshment value".
A final point of reflection about why organisational actors find it worthwhile to 
invest in a positive relationship is the emotional bonds that the fieldworker might 
develop towards the fieldwork site and organisational members. I know myself that 
as time passed, I became quite attached to this place of work, and I identified with it 
in a way that overshadowed my research interest in safety issues. Hopefully 
without sounding too much like a cliche, I developed a genuine interest in the 
organisation and the people who worked there, and accordingly, I believe I fulfilled 
two "success criteria" for good qualitative research: an ability to relate to others on 
their own terms and a passion for what I was doing (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). I 
enjoyed being with the people at the fieldwork site and cared about them. I am 
quite certain that this personal involvement of mine was an aspect that promoted my 
positive relations with many of my informants. They liked that I liked them, to put 
it simply.
But even so, I never got rid of the uncomfortable feeling of "exploiting" my 
informants for my own purpose. I go along with Punch when he takes as his own 
view the point made by Fielding (1982; quoted in Punch 1986:73) that once you 
have gained the confidence of your informants, you begin to con them. Even if I 
wanted to believe there existed a mutual relationship between my informants and 
me, this was only true to some degree. I was different to my informants in most 
ways. My particular status was emphasised by the fact that I could come and go as 
I pleased and that I would leave the fieldwork site when I considered myself 
finished with my data collection. A Norwegian proverb depicts the impolite person 
who leaves a house as soon as she has achieved what she wants. As I got to know 
my informants as human beings, I felt more and more like one of these rather rude 
persons. When I was satisfied with my data amount, I would go back to my
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academic life and discuss the work lives of my informants as "interesting 
organisational issues".
My only way of giving something back is to write a thesis in which my informants 
become materialised as more than mere "safety objects". I hope I will be able to do 
my analysis in a way that does not "dehumanise" them by making them stand forth 
as mechanical organisational actors and statistical "events" only. Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984) argue that the chosen methodology when studying organisations 
necessarily affect the way researchers come to view organisational members. It is 
my conviction that an ethnographic approach has a potential for bringing alive the 
people of the organisation, and I hope I will be able to take advantage of this 
methodological strength in my work process. I am fully aware of these statements 
of mine being very ambitious, but I am confident that my theoretical perspectives 
and their quest for a polyphony of organisational voices are the best tools in order 
not to reduce my informants to numbers and safety events.
2.4.9. Ethnographic fieldwork and analysis.
A point of much concern in ethnographic research is the way the data material is to 
be analysed. Mouly and Sankaran (1995) refer to Spradley’s (1980) "The 
Ethnographic Research Cycle" in which a cyclic pattern of ethnographic research is 
outlined. This cycle consists of research phases that occur and reoccur in non-linear 
movements and which include the selecting and asking of questions, the collecting 
of data, the making of records, the analysis, and the writing out of the ethnography. 
What distinguishes the ethnographic work process is the non-linearity in research 
design and aspirations. It is impossible to follow a streamlined research design 
from beginning to end, and in my view the mere thought of such a procedure 
violates the essence of ethnographic methodology. If a main issue of ethnography 
is to obtain a multifaceted picture of organisational life and to build the study upon 
multiple definitions of this reality, then the research design has to be flexible and 
open to new discoveries and interpretations.
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Many researchers point to this cyclical quality of ethnographic research, and it is 
emphasised that it is never possible - or desirable - to distinguish strictly between 
the different conceptual stages. New questions of analytical relevance will appear 
as new data are revealed, and forthcoming theoretical insights will cause new 
questions to come forward. There is thus never an end to the researcher need for 
further data and continuous analysis. As more insight into the processes of 
organisational life is gained, the stronger the need to know more becomes 
accentuated. During the course of fieldwork and analysis the initial research idea 
may even become completely altered as data findings may make it clear that the 
intended research issues are of less relevance than was first expected. Turner 
(1994) quotes Pidgeon et al. (1991) who argue that the criteria of data relevance in 
qualitative research develop during the process of analysis. Thus it is evident that 
there must exist a closeness between data collection and analysis. This is echoed by 
Bryman and Burgess (1994b) when they state that it is a common view in 
qualitative research - and consequently also in an ethnographic approach of study - 
"... that analysis is continuous in that it interweaves with other aspects of the 
research process" (p. 218).
Wolff (1976; quoted in Turner 1994) advocates a "surrender and catch" approach to 
organisational research in which he promotes an initial non-directed openness while 
in later research phases he will scrutinise his "catch". Wadel (1991) talks about "the 
dance" between theory, methodology and data in ethnographic research and points 
to the need for continuous consideration of the interaction between different aspects 
of this process. An awareness of not being static and closed to new perspectives is 
what is called for in order to perform this "dance" of ethnographic research.
Several research dilemmas arise from these research ideals, though. Questions have 
to be stated of anyone's ability to be so flexible in thought and research methods as 
is outlined here. It does not seem unreasonable to suspect the existence of a gap 
between espoused theories and theories-in-use in ethnographic research, although 
this probably often will not be openly admitted even if the ethnographic dance has 
been rather stumbling. The prescribed interactions between research aspects in an 
everlasting cyclic movement may be very difficult to cope with in a complex
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fieldwork situation. It may lead the researcher to feel overwhelmed by 
experiencing constant ambiguity and preliminary discoveries which all the time 
require new methodological and theoretical considerations. "Results" are never 
reached in any substantial way, and both internal and external expectations may 
make the researcher "cheat" on epoused ethnographic values of flexibility and 
cyclic research in order to ease a pressure for research "results". Even ethnographic 
research has to come to an end, and it seems doubtful that the cyclic stages of 
ethnographic research are possible to carry out during the entire course of 
fieldwork.
2.4.10. Grounded theory and ethnomethodology.
The concept of "grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin
1990) is central in many ethnographers' research approach. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) argue that a priori assumptions at early research stages serve to mask 
important features of social reality, and in order to counteract such unsatisfactory 
research development, they have developed their specific analytical approach. 
Grounded theory stands for theorising to be developed inductively through the 
study of the actual organisational phenomena. The ideal stance is to let the area of 
research determine what are relevant themes of investigation and to conceptualise 
and construct theories which are steadily "grounded" in field data only.
According to Locke (1996), the following traits characterise a grounded theory 
approach: “It must closely fit the substantive area studied, be understandable to and 
usable by those in the situation studied, and be sufficiently complex to account for a 
great deal of variation in the domain examined” (p. 240). Organisational actors' 
own constructs of their reality will thus be of prime research concern. What are 
perceived as relevant issues among those who have firsthand organisational 
experience have to dominate the research agenda, it is argued (Isabella 1990;
Strauss and Corbin 1990). The task of the researcher becomes to explore the 
organisational situation in order to "catch" the areas of research relevance, to obtain 
data, and to analyse the data in accordance with a set of analytical rules that is 
spelled out in elaborate steps for data coding and analysis. The constant contrasting
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and interweaving of data collection and theorising are cornerstones in grounded 
theory procedures (Locke 1996; Isabella 1990), and the problem of researcher 
interpretation (and possible distortion) during the analytical process is hoped to 
become minimised due to the proposed rules of analytical mode -  although in later 
years, Glaser and Strauss have disagreed strongly between them about the role of 
the researcher and subsequent researcher influence on the studied phenomena 
(Locke 1996). But since grounded theory aspires to develop theory and not only to 
offer descriptions, it is by most grounded theory-oriented researchers considered 
necessary to "intervene" in the immediate categories emerging from the data 
material with analytical concepts for the development of theory. It is believed that 
grounded research procedures makes it possible simultaneously to be true to the 
data material and to develop credible theory.
That the concept of grounded theory has a strong impact on qualitative research can 
be seen from the frequent referrals to the methodology in research methodology 
literature. Bryman and Burgess (1994a) state, though, that there exist very few 
research works in which the specific approach and rigorous procedures of ’’purist” 
grounded theory actually are fully utilised. They argue that grounded theory 
probably is given a large degree of lip-service (p. 6), and that its main importance in 
organisational research can be found in the influence it exerts when emphasising 
development of theoretical constructs based in the existing data material. Locke 
(1996) also questions whether many researchers simply use Glaser and Strauss’ 
(1967) theories to add legitimacy and a stamp of approval to their own work rather 
than elaborating on how they in fact have practiced a grounded theory approach in 
their research endeavours.
Grounded theory as it is outlined by Glaser and Strauss (ibid.) has not constituted a 
part of my approach to fieldwork and theorising as I have not followed the research 
procedures that is spelled out by its creators. As many others doing qualitative 
research, I have found the grounded theory ’’rules” too rigorous to cope with in my 
research effort. When I in spite of this finds it relevant to discuss grounded theory, 
it is because grounded theory with its focus on organisational members' constructs 
and its theory building based upon the constant interweaving between data
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collection and emerging conceptual categories has been an inspiration to me in my 
work. I like to believe that although I by no means can claim to have utilised 
grounded theory procedures, the "spirit" of grounded theory has been present and 
made me acknowledge a multiplicity of reality definitions that I have found at my 
fieldwork site. It seems to me that an ethnographic research process in which a 
"discovery of problems” is a core objective (Emmet and Morgan 1982; quoted in 
Whight 1994) is not far removed from major assumptions in a grounded research 
approach.
Ethnomethodology -  the approach to organisational research which is developed by 
Garfinkel (1967) -  has also been an inspiration with its emphasis on the mundanity, 
the routines and the taking-for-grantedness of work life and social interactions. 
Garfinkel stresses the necessity for organisational research to concentrate on how 
people make meaning in everyday activities, and he urges researchers to explore the 
commonsensical qualities of everyday life with a "stranger perspective" in order to 
understand the meaning constructions that continuously take place. I find an 
ethnographic fieldwork to have the potential for investigating into the non­
spectacular taken-for-grantedness and subtlety of organisational life.
2.5. Ethnography and authorship.
A main question of ethnography is how to present one's findings in a final 
document which encompasses both a livid picture of organisational life -  to recreate 
the feeling of "being there" -  and an analytical approach to the chosen research 
theme.
I have previously argued that no research is value-free and neutral, and that 
researcher theoretical preferences, the choice of research theme, the manner in 
which data collection is carried out and the final construction of the research report 
all will influence the research results. The research results will thus not be 
"objective" results from an "objective" reality, but will be filtered, interpreted, 
described and analysed through the researcher as the intermediate channel. 
Ethnography is about the mediation of organisational frames of meaning through
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the ethnographer's own meaning constructs - and with an audience with its multiple 
frames of meaning at the receiving end (Agar 1986).
It is during the writing process that the researcher power becomes evident as she 
decides upon how to present the data material and her analytical findings. In my 
view, there is no reason for trying to "hide" this situation as it is seemingly 
attempted in research accounts where it is impossible to find the author’s presence 
in the text. I have always wondered about the utilisation of the pronoun "one" in 
academic texts. I find it strange that authorship is not acknowledged by the 
pronoun "I", although I know that academic "rules" with their emphasis on 
"neutrality" account for this practice. I think the Humpty Dumpty approach shows 
a good understanding of what really is going on in the writing of research accounts: 
’"When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just 
what I choose it to mean -  neither more or less"’ (Glendon 1988:87). Based in our 
subjective realities, we all choose our words and the meaning constructions we 
apply to them. Researchers are not exempted from this.
I follow Alvesson and Berg (1992:215) when they point to the obvious fact that 
both researcher and reader are included in the research context as actors. It is my 
firm opinion that the researcher as an author plays a significant part in the research 
process whether she likes it or not. An ethnographic research report will be an 
account of what I as a researcher have perceived the informants to perceive and 
which enables the readers to perceive the informants' situation -  but notably seen 
through my eyes (Gagliardi 1992). As a researcher and an author I have much more 
influence over the public interpretation of what went on in my chosen organisation 
than do the organisational members of my research site (Bartunek and Louis 1996). 
According to Smircich (1985), a goal of interpretive research is to put the author 
back into the text as the one who authorises the account. The researcher 
subjectivity will thus be made visible, and research integrity will be established 
during this acknowledgment of what goes on in a research process.
It will be through a text that is construced by me -  the author -  that the organisation 
and the analysis hopefully will come alive. My choices as an author includes the
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decision of how much prominence to allow the author in the text. Some post­
modern writers allow the author little space and concentrate upon the presentation 
of organisational reality as scattered and incoherent - deconstructed - pictures 
arrived at by direct quotations from informants (Martin 1992). This approach calls 
for an obliteration of the traditional author authority and argues that it presents 
organisational reality as it "is" rather than through the author's eyes, and it claims to 
leave the reader to do the interpretation. It can be asked whether this way of 
presenting organisational data in fact is less "authoritarian" than a more author 
focussed approach. Even if organisational actors are given a "direct" voice and is 
not "translated" by the researcher, it is still the researcher who structures the text 
and selects what is being presented and not presented. I find that the author is just 
as "invisible" but still solidly present here as in traditional scientific works.
Also, if a research goal is to reproduce organisational voices without attempting to 
analyse the organisational situation that emerges, then I find reason to question the 
whole rationale of organisational research. I agree that the multitude of 
organisational voices have been silenced to an unacceptable degree in much 
research and that research results have lacked organisational representativity. But 
the acknowledgment of this situation is a far cry from refusing to interpret and 
analyse organisational data at all. If a complete surrendering of author authority is 
the answer to author dominance, then the scales seem to have tipped in favour of 
another pitfall in organisational research.
It is my conviction that in order to understand organisations it is necessary that 
researchers do interpret and analyse the data material they have collected instead of 
just presenting the data as bits and pieces of a deconstructed organisational reality. 
Thus, I will not stand forward as a very post-modem writer as the author authority 
will be present in my work. The next pressing question will then be which type of 
tale I will choose to write. In other words: Which type of author authority do I 
regard as the "best" in order to do most justice to my research process and my data 
material? I turn to Van Maanen and his "Tales of the Field" (1988) to explore this 
question.
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2.5.1. The realist tale.
Realist tales are defined as being accounts where some invisible author reproduces 
the fieldwork setting through detailed information of what goes on at the fieldwork 
site combined with an abundance of quotes from organisational members (Van 
Maanen 1988). Author authority is established through the narrative's "being-on- 
the-spot" character, although the author herself is seldom visibly present either at 
the fieldwork site or in the text. In the end, though, it is the invisible ethnographer 
who interprets and analyses the data material. The lone and authoritative observer 
who has "got to the heart" of a particular organisational culture has a long tradition 
in ethnographic works (Jeffcut 1993:35).
The realist tale has been criticised for the absence of a visible and self-reflective 
author voice. It is argued that the realist narrative has much in common with a 
traditional research account in the way it portrays the organisational situation as an 
"objective fact". Not much concern seemingly exists about how the researcher's 
theoretical perspectives, her data collection approach, and her selection of research 
themes and analytical categories have influenced the ethnographic tale.
With their nonambiguous findings and clear research results, cultural analyses in 
which the integration or the differentiation perspectives (Martin 1992; Frost et al.
1991) are utilised as main analytical tools seem to “fit” into the realist style of 
writing. There is not much room for reflection about the research process and 
subsequent possibilities of unclarity and doubt when doing research from these 
perspectives. The realist style with its “being-on-the-spot” and “objective” author 
authority will thus serve as a suitable instrument for ethnographers choosing these 
research paradigms.
2.5.2. The confessional tale.
The emergence of the confessional ethnographic tale may be looked upon as an 
answer to this critique. In Van Maanen's (1988:67) words, a central theme in a 
confessional tale is the exploration of how the fieldwork has been accomplished.
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Such a tale includes a detailed account of how the researcher coped with the 
fieldwork situation and also reflections about how the researcher evaluates her own 
pre-set theoretical perspectives, choice of research theme and methods of fieldwork 
to have influenced what she "saw" during the fieldwork period. According to Van 
Maanen (ibid.), a typical trait of confessional tales also is a display of empathy and 
involvement with informants, and this involvement is discussed as a source of 
influence on data collection and analysis.
If in classic ethnography the anthropologist was considered a hero who obtained 
rapport with strange tribes, confessional tales portrait the ethnographer as an anti- 
hero who is an ordinary human being, and who strives to cope with a fieldwork 
situation that is personally and professionally demanding. But in the end, though, it 
seems that the confessional ethnographer produces a tale that is not very dissimilar 
to the realist tale. This seems to take place even though many confessional 
ethnographers differentiate themselves from realist authors by stating that the 
fieldwork experience is not purely observational and descriptive but rather an 
interpretive situation in which the fieldworker's interpretation of what takes place at 
the fieldwork site is a central part of the research process.
The confessional features of an ethnographic tale may come forward in a separate 
chapter, in an appendix, or be engrained in the text throughout the whole tale. The 
purpose of the confessional style is to give authority to the tale by way of pointing 
out the author’s awareness and reflections during all parts of the research process. 
This is supposed to give the author a kind of moral authority vis-k-vis the readers. 
The emphasis on the researcher in confessional tales has been criticised for its self- 
absorbing "ego focus". It is apparently rewarding for a researcher to discuss 
fieldwork circumstances, and this might appear as a tale in itself without clear 
connections to its influence on the research process. It is also questioned whether 
this constant awareness of researcher perceptions, biases, motives, and fieldwork 
relations may lead to something of a paralysis regarding the analysis of the data 
material. Van Maanen (ibid.) calls for a balance between introspection and the 
objectification of fieldwork data. An introspective focus is necessary, but if this 
becomes the central issue for the researcher, then the research focus has shifted.
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2.5.3. The impressionist tale.
The last type of ethnographic tale that Van Maanen (1988) discusses is the 
impressionist tale. The essence of this tale is a thematic and literary construction 
which focusses on the "doings" of the field. This is achieved by the telling of 
stories which depict fieldwork situations in imaginative ways. For the author the 
essential issue is not to present a complete interpretation of the field, but to make 
the audience relive the ethnographic experience. Although the impressionist tale 
inevitably is being established by means of the fieldworker's eyes and conceptions, 
this type of ethnography is open to interpretations in many directions, and the 
author does not present herself as the sole interpretive authority.
Impressionist stories have features that may be likened to the Impressionism school 
of painting. According to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (1989), the 
Impressionist style is a way of painting that"... creates the general impression of a 
subject by using the effects of colour and light, without realistic detail" (p. 625). 
The "colour and light" of the impressionist tale is stories told in a manner that may 
resemble a novel - and not an epic novel, but one which is fragmented and 
noncoherent. An impressionist tale hightlights the episodic, the complex, the 
casual, and the ambivalent issues of fieldwork occurrences, and Van Maanen 
(1988:117) talks about "kitchen sink" reports -  reports into which one dumps all 
sorts of events in a rather "illogical" manner -  when he discusses characteristic 
features of this tale.
It seems to me that the impressionist tale must be the preferred way of writing post­
modern ethnography. Ambiguity, doubt, and multiplicity characterise a post­
modern approach to organisational research, and this epistemological stance 
probably will be most satisfyingly represented by an impressionist way of writing. 
Concern for the traditional "rationality" image of a tale does not occupy an 
ethnographer who is based in this paradigm as the dramas of the field cannot be 
represented in a "rational" way without doing injustice to a post-modem reality 
perception. What is important is that the story attracts the reader and that it gives a 
"true" picture of an ambiguous reality.
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Due to the shared emphasis on ambiguity and multiplicity, an impressionist tale 
would also seem to be a “natural” medium by which to present a culture 
fragmentation analysis (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991). Furthermore, the writing 
style’s refusal to give the author exclusive interpretive authority is another 
ideological aspect that links the impressionist tale and the fragmentation 
perspective.
I find the author authority in an impressionist tale to be based in the manifestation 
of complexity and incoherence. If the readers accept the basic perception that 
organisations are not orderly, rational and easily understood, then the ambigiuties 
and complexities that make up impressionist accounts will be valued. The reseach 
honesty of being unsure will then be taken as a hallmark of quality, and the author 
authority is established through quite opposite means than those of the realist tale.
I admire impressionist writers of two reasons: Firstly, I consider an impressionist 
writer who writes her tale in an engaging manner to possess artistic gifts -  or 
handicraft competence -  of writing that are not commonly found in research 
reports. This style of writing eliminates the boredom that may be felt when reading 
realist and confessional ethnographies. Secondly, I admire them even more for their 
courage. I find it brave to write impressionist tales in an academic world where the 
mode of writing (and thinking) is dominated by "realism". Impressionist writers are 
"strange birds" in mainstream academia, and their authority may not be very strong 
in dominant organisational research circles. I assume that being an impressionist 
writer does not promote an academic career particularly well, and I appreciate 
researchers who nevertheless stick to their convictions and produce ethnographies 
that meet their own standards of thought. I consider impressionist ethnographies to 
be important thought-provokers for ethnographers of all brands, and I believe we 
will gain vital ethnographic insight and reflections from impressionist writers.
My critique of impressionist tales has to do with my previously cited scepticism 
about representing organisational "reality" as a fragmented state of affairs that 
denies almost any interpretation at all. But in spite of these objections, I consider
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impressionist tales as important reminders of not to be too sure that I have found all 
answers in my own analysis and writing. I need such reminders all the time.
In summing up this discussion on ethnographic authorship, it is vital to emphasise 
that writing style is not a purely technical matter, but that the choice of style reveals 
much about the theoretical base of the research work. What is commonly found in 
ethnographies is a blend of styles that corresponds to a researcher’s mixed 
epistemological approach to her work. "Pure" examples of the mentioned styles are 
less often to be seen in ethnographic accounts.
2.6. My tale.
So what about myself? What type of author am I? This is a tough question, and 
one which I have tried to avoid for a long time. But I have to admit that I probably 
am an eclectic type of writer who wants to harvest what I consider the best from 
different writing styles. My ambition of doing a multiperspective analysis is 
paralleled by a wish to utilise more than one style of writing.
I want to be a realist writer in order to produce an ethnographic account which gives 
the feeling of "being on the spot” and I also want to interpret and analyse my data 
material and present research results. But I will not do this by pretending to be an 
invisible author who appears to have no reflections about my own influence on the 
fieldwork situation and the research results. What I have previously written about 
general theory and methodology includes many reflections and discussions about 
my own role in the research process, and such an approach leads my tale in a 
confessional direction. But I do not want myself to appear as the main actor of the 
ethnography. And although I will not utilise an impressionist style in my writing, I 
need the existence of this approach as a constant reminder of the danger of 
becoming too simplifying and too smooth in my representations of organisational 
life. Finally, I would like very much to write a tale that is not boring -  but I do not 
know if I am capable of this.
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For an author, the question of who constitutes her audience is a vital one. In order 
to be understood and hopefully valued, the writing style has to comply with the 
audience's expectations. For the researcher, the audience is the last chain in the 
research process as the work is not finished before the "results" are being 
communicated. It is through audience participation that new knowledge is 
introduced into the research field and thus becomes meaningful for a larger 
audience.
Academia is the most important audience for research reports, whether we like this 
or not. It is among colleauges that our research reports are read and evaluated, and 
the writing style of a researcher will have to reflect this fact. Due to this, I fear that 
the wish of some ethnographers to write an account that is readable also to her 
"natives" might wane as time passes and that accordingly, ethnographers may 
experience that their informants feel rather estranged if encountering the final 
product. This question of "writing for whom" is a dilemma that I find somewhat 
insolvable myself, as I want to write an academic account, but at the same time I 
feel a debt to my informants to write something that they will find comprehensible 
and relevant. In optimistic moments I have been able to persuade myself that I 
would find the time and stamina to write two reports for these two different 
purposes, but I have to admit that this optimism has proved to be unrealistic. At 
present I do not know how -  and if - 1 will be able to repay my informants by 
presenting them with a written piece that will make sense in their situation. 
Sometimes I hope that as time passes, my informants literally will forget me, and 
that their interest in my forthcoming product thus will disappear.
Another issue to take into consideration is what to write about and what not to write 
about. In data collection, confidentiality is commonly promised as a means of 
obtaining information, and it is an ethnographic credo to keep these promises. Even 
so, Punch (1986) states that although confidentiality is seriously attempted by the 
researcher in her writing process, it may nevertheless be impossible unwillingly not 
to reveal specific identities when describing organisational traits and processes.
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When the research report is fed back to the organisation, it often is quite easy for 
internal actors to identify organisational members and the information they have 
revealed to the researcher. When data concerning internal conflicts surface I find it 
an ethical dilemma how to present this information in the finished report. It is 
important to me that my informants do not have to experience unpleasant situations 
due to being identified as "betrayers'' of organisational secrets. Accordingly, such 
"hot” data have to be handled with discretion. Punch (1986) discusses 
confidentiality and research "honesty" in the writing process, and he concludes that 
no easy answers are to be found. The same dilemmas are also dealt with by Whyte 
and Whyte (1984), and their answer is to find a middle way between a practice in 
which all bits and pieces are published disregarding its possible consequences and 
the avoidance of publication at all. Concern has to be paid both to the protection of 
one's informants and to the question of presenting the organisation as "truthfully" as 
possible. My solution will be to avoid the quotation of perceptions that I consider 
harmful for informants' position at my fieldwork site.
I believe it is an impossible task to write an ethnographic account that is appreciated 
by all organisational actors at the fieldwork site. Organisational issues that 
organisational members rather would have seen unmentioned may be disclosed in 
such a report, and the researcher perception of "reality" will not be in accord with 
all members’ own reality constructs. Such dissonance is to be expected as a "trade 
mark" of ethnographic research and should not be allowed to bother me to any 
significant degree.
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) argue that in interpretive research, the traditional 
cause-effect logic of research has to be downgraded in favour of examining the 
rules that people follow. This research is not interested in the construction and 
testing of hypotheses, but emphasises the understanding which is developed through 
the exploration of organisations. The ethnographer does not subscribe to a 
scientific testing role, but rather to a learning role in which the abandonment of 
traditional scientific control is central (Agar 1986).
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I agree with these statements, and accordingly, I will not attempt to construct any 
"grand narrative" or general theories out of my field data. Geertz (1993a) argues 
that what ethnographers should hope to obtain is "local knowledge" based in a 
recognition of the complexity and uniqueness of the culture under study. He states 
that there are enough general principles in the world (p. 5) and argues for the 
development of localised knowledge: "... much is to be gained, scientifically and 
otherwise, by confronting that grand actuality rather than wishing it away in a haze 
of forceless generalisations and false comforts" (p. 234). So instead of trying my 
hand at a grand narrative, I want to write a local narrative where local knowledge is 
at the focus of interest.
That the local knowledge I develop might include aspects which will be of general 
interest is to be hoped. But first and foremost, my goal is to produce knowledge 
which pertains to the safety situation at my chosen fieldwork site -  nothing more 
and nothing less. "Wisdom comes out of an ant heap" says an African proverb 
(Geertz 1993a: 167). This phrase catches my vision of creating local knowledge 
through a study of a multiplicity of complex and simple patterns of organisational 
interaction.
The other -  and less pleasant -  side of the coin when focussing on local knowledge 
has been a worry of mine throughout this work that I would not be able to produce 
"smashing" new knowledge concerning safety. Such expectations are prevalent in 
academia, and I have also encountered the same expectations at my fieldwork site. 
My focus on the mundanity of work life and the rather "ordinary" circumstances of 
my fieldwork site have caused me anguish when thinking about my "results", as 
they probably will not be causing earthquakes within the field of safety research. 
Will I be able to develop a punch line which gives the research a point (Bate 1997) 
or a story-line -  an analytical thread -  that unites and integrates the major themes in 
my data (Taylor and Bogdan 1984:136)? Will I be able to present new insights 
concerning organisational safety issues?
I have neither spectacular, bizarre nor particularly unusual organisational events and 
processes to report about. At times I have feared that "the ant heap" approach may
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be both boring, uninteresting and irrelevant for knowledge production. But I have 
found comfort in researchers like Mehan (1979; quoted in Mouly and Sankaran 
1995) who argues that he does not see the purpose of his ethnographic research to 
be the presentation of unexpected findings. Rather, he sees "... a major purpose of 
ethnography to be the presentation of information that the participants themselves 
already 'know1 but may not have been able to articulate. Such ethnography may 
reveal patterns of interaction that surprise participants or scientists, but surprise is 
not the criterion of value" (p. 46). So at the end of the day, I still believe that my 
polyphonic and mundane perspective of analysis represents the potential to create at 
least a tiny bang in safety research.
Alvesson (1993) states than when exploring organisation as subjective experiences, 
the research necessarily will lose in supposed practicality. If the research focus is 
on organisational processes seen from multiple actors' points of view and includes 
organisational ambiguities and unclearities, then a traditional utility concern has to 
be neglected in order to be able to commit oneself to this approach, Alvesson 
argues. The benefit of such a study is to be found in the way it focusses on 
organisational complexity in order to promote a comprehensive understanding of 
diverse organisational mechanisms (Alvesson and Berg 1992). Ethnographic 
studies "... don't know where they are going to end up; they don’t predict the future" 
(Agar 1986:16). This approach collides with a wish to find straightforward 
explanations and practical solutions. The irony of the utility debate of 
organisational research, though, may be -  according to Smircich (1983) -  that 
research that tries hard to be useful may in the end be less useful than research that 
does not try so hard to achieve practicality. It can never be known until a study is 
finished what its utility achievements will be as different audiences will have 
different evaluations of what they consider useful organisational knowledge in a 
research report.
I find my own views accurately articulated in these statements (and maybe I also 
find some consolation). The news value and the utility value of my research will 
first and foremost be found in my approach of study and what this approach is able
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to reveal based in the perspectives of multiple organisational rationalities. My main 
story and my punch line will be my approach to the investigation of safety.
2.7. A tale of thick description.
According to Geertz (1993b), what defines an ethnographic research effort is the 
utilisation of thick description in all phases of the research process. A “thick” 
description is different from a “thin” one in that it details not only organisational 
actions in an almost microscopic manner but also organisational members* -  often 
multiple -  meaning constructs of the actions, all of this embedded in the 
organisational context where it takes place. This means that thick descriptions of 
organisational actors* doings will be cast in the terms that they themselves place 
upon what they experience, “... the formulae they use to define what happens to 
them” (Geertz 1993b: 15). Geertz goes on to argue that if anthropological analysis 
constructs a tale of what has happened only to divorce the tale from what actually 
has happened -  “... from what, in this time or that place, specific people say, what 
they do, what is done to them, from the whole vast business of the world ...** (p. 18) 
-  then, the tale becomes vacant. A good ethnographic account, however, takes the 
reader into the heart of the issues which it sets out to comprehend and interpret.
The venture of thick description is the essence of being an ethnographer and is 
unseparable from cultural analysis, says Geertz.
The backbone of this research work is the data I have come up with during my 
fieldwork periods at my chosen organisation. These data will form the basis of my 
ethnographic account, and it is my aim to produce a tale of thick description along 
the lines of Geertz* definition of the term.
In order to be able to construct a tale where a multiperspective approach on 
organisational safety is the focus of attention, I will necessarily have to dive broadly 
and deeply into the multiple safety perceptions that were offered me by 
organisational members. Since such actor perceptions are considered more than 
vital within the theoretical and methodological frameworks that I have established 
my research within, it is obvious for me that thick descriptions of organisational
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events will have a dominant place in this tale. So in the spirit of grounded theory 
and ethnomethodology as well as Geertz, I will reproduce organisational actors’ 
subjective and situated safety rationalities for my readers in order to guide them on 
a journey through my sensemaking which in its turn is based in the sensemaking 
processes of multiple organisational actors.
Thus, I will work and rework my data material from many angles and perspectives.
I have to do this if I am to reach my stated research goal of establishing and 
analysing an organisational safety reality which takes into account a complex web 
of safety representations and enactments. Despite of the “danger” of a possibly 
repetitious character and a resulting state of reader boredom due to such an 
approach, I see no other way of conducting my analysis and writing my tale. 
Multiple perceptions have been at the core of my work, both theoretically and 
empirically. Then it is evident that they have to be at the core of my tale as well. A 




FIELDWORK AND DATA ANALYSIS
3.1. Introduction.
My focus in this chapter is to outline my fieldwork and data analysis process. I will 
start with a presentation of my fieldwork site and the work hazards that 
organisational members experience in their work life. Then, I will describe how I 
collected and interpreted my data material. Included in my account will be a 
discussion of fieldwork relations and how these relations may have affected my 
research process. Due to the small number of women at my research site, I choose 
to use male pronouns in my account from the site irrespective of my informants* 
actual gender. This is done in order to prevent the female organisational members 
from being recognised in my text.
3.2. My fieldwork site.
Magnum Aluminium Industries (MAI) is a pseudonym for a Norwegian aluminium 
plant. It was established in 1967 and employs about 1500 people. MAI is part of 
the aluminium division of Magnum Industries which is a large and diversified 
corporation.
During the last 10-15 years, changes in the formal structure of the plant has taken 
place. Departments that are not involved in the production process of raw 
aluminium have been separated from MAI and been included in new organisational 
structures in the aluminium division of Magnum Industries.
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I chose as my fieldwork site the extrusion department of the formerly integrated 
MAI. Since 1988, this department - called Magnum Aluminium Industries 
Extrusion (MATE) - has business-wise been a part of Magnum Industries' National 
Extrusion Group which has its headquarters in a different part of Norway. The 
central management team and staff functions dealing with sales, marketing, and 
finances are located at headquarters. The National Extrusion Group is included in 
Magnum Industries’ Extrusion Group which consists of companies in several 
European countries and is headquartered abroad.
On January 1,1994, MAIE was established as an independent company within the 
structure of the Magnum Industries' National Extrusion Group. From this date, 
MAIE has no longer any formal ties to MAI. But due to the physical location 
within MAI's plant area, it was decided that MAIE was to maintain some 
coexistence with MAI concerning personnel, trade union, and Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE) issues.
MAI is reputed to be a pioneering safety company in the Norwegian onshore 
industry (Lindpe 1992; Tungland 1992; Lind0e et al. 1991; Rasmussen 1990), and it 
has been presented with national awards for its safety approach. The last award was 
received in 1993. In 1995, MADE was the winner of a regional safety award. The 
same year MAIE also was named HSE Champion of the Year within Magnum 
Industries' Extrusion Group.





















There was strong resistance among MAI and MAIE employees against the 
establishment of the independent MAIE. The MAI production worker trade union 
was strongly involved in the matter, and the turmoil at MAI and MAIE became an 
issue in local media. But in spite of strong internal protests, the new company was 
established as planned.
MAIE employs about 115 people. Approximately 90 % of the employees are men. 
What is produced is aluminium profiles which are used in buildings, ship-building, 
the oil industry, etc. The profiles are produced in standard series or after specific 
customer specifications, and the bulk of the production is sold abroad. Window 
frames, staircases, gangways and many other products are made of the profiles by 
the customer companies. The MAIE production takes place in a large and high- 
ceilinged hall with adjoining rooms for specific work tasks. The administration is 
located in a small and fairly new building just across the road from the production 
hall.
3.3. The production process.
The MADE production process is organised in functional units which take care of 
specific parts of the production process. The process involves the following work 
operations:
When the sales people have settled a new order, production management has to find 
out whether there exists an extrusion tool that can be used to produce the ordered 
profiles. Extrusion tools may be likened to household appliances for the decoration 
of cream cakes:
You put the whipped cream/aluminium bolts into a container, and the resulting 
cream decorations/profiles vary due to different "mouth pieces" - extrusion tools - 
which you attach to the container. If the ordered profiles are not produced before at 
MAIE, a new tool has to be ordered from an outside firm. If the tool exists in the 
"tool library", it is taken out from the "archives" and elaborately cleaned and
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prepared for production by the tool department people. A well-prepared extrusion 
tool is vital for the quality of the profiles.
Heavy aluminium bolts are used as raw material for the profile production. These 
are mainly bought at MAI. When the extrusion tool is ready, the tool is fastened to 
the extrusion press which is a huge machinery in the centre of the production hall. 
The extrusion process is then set into action and closely monitored at all times. 
Aluminium bolts are fed into the press, and the applied tool shapes the bolts into the 
required profile form. After the profiles have cooled down for a while - they are 
very hot when they come out of the extrusion press - they are transported on 
conveyor belts to be cut into appropriate lengths. Some profiles are discarded for 
being of poor quality, and these are sold to MAI for recycling. Other profiles which 
are slightly out of shape are brought to the MADE mending work station, where odd 
profiles are straightened and adapted to fit customer specifications.
When the profiles are found to be satisfactory, most of them are taken to a large 
oven in order to be tempered - a process that takes many hours. Some profiles then 
are off to the coating department, where they go through a chemical process 
involving baths of acids and water to give them a specific surface which may or 
may not involve colours. Still other profiles are transported to the small MAIE 
adaptation department where they may be cut into smaller pieces, specific devices 
be attached to them, etc.
Next, the profiles are transported to the package department where they are 
manually packed into large cartons or wooden cases and made ready for shipment. 
Cranes lift the cases onto semi-trailers that are parked inside the production hall or 
they are being transported to the MAI harbour where they are loaded onto ships.
The MAIE employees are divided into work shift groups which work day shifts or 
after a two-shift, three-shift or four-shift schedule. The work shifts are permanently 
organised, each with a shift supervisor as the work leader. There are four extrusion 
press work shifts (the extrusion press never stops except for designated maintenance 
periods), three packaging shifts, two coating shifts, one adaptation shift, one
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maintenance shift, and one extrusion tool shift. The adaptation department 
normally works after a day schedule, but will operate a two-shift schedule when this 
is needed. The maintenance workers also as a rule work day shifts, but in periods of 
much maintenance need they are expected to work at different hours. They may 
also be telephoned at home and asked to come in when equipment emergencies 
occur.
When I first entered the production hall at daytime, what caught my immediate 
attention was the grey-coloured environment. The walls and ceiling of the hall are 
predominantly grey, and the aluminium profiles in their different stages of 
production are also mostly greyish. But although the physical surroundings seemed 
quite gloomy, what also caught my attention was the orderliness of the place. If I 
had expected rubbish and mess at an industrial site, I did not find this at MAIE.
What I also quickly noticed was the high level of noise coming from all comers of 
the hall: Profiles bang into each other, they are sawed, deformed profiles are 
thrown into containers, and the extrusion press produces much noise. The air is 
filled with harsh and uncomfortable sounds.
The temperature in the production hall is fairly normal except very close to the 
extrusion press where it is quite hot. The only fumes and gases to be found are by 
the acid baths in the coating department where the stench is rather penetrating.
What is very striking is the frequency of transport operations up and down the hall: 
Trucks are in constant movement, and cranes operating from the hall ceiling go 
back and forth all the time with their loads of profiles and packed cases. People are 
also constantly on the move from one place to another in the hall even though 
regular shift members mostly restrict their movements within their work station 
"boundaries". Those who go up and down the hall are mostly shift supervisors, 
managers, the maintenance crew, administrative and sales personell, and also guests 
such as customers and corporate representatives, etc.
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All in all, there is a bustling activity during daytime. In evenings, though, I found 
the atmosphere of the production hall to become quite transformed. Due to fewer 
people handling aluminium, the level of noise is considerably lower, and the truck 
and crane traffic is largely reduced. But what makes the most notable difference is 
that the "hordes" of busy-looking people walking up and down the hall have 
disappeared. All this makes the atmosphere of an evening shift (and probably also a 
night shift although I never took part in one) remarkably more relaxed and 
"friendly" than during a daytime work period. The people at work seem - and also 
themselves say - to be more at ease, and this is explained to be the result of the 
absence of daytime stressors such as the high noise level and lots of different people 
milling around their work stations. At evening shifts, shift workers are normally 
occupied with quite straightforward production issues, and they are more able to 
decide upon their own time schedules and production efforts than during daytime 
work, it is said.
I found the evenings I spent in the production hall almost cosy, especially when it 
was dark and cold outside and it was a relief to enter the warm and lighted hall. But 
this feeling of cosiness was more than anything based in the generally lower work 
pressures of the evenings and the more relaxed attitude this created among 
employees. People found time to talk more easily than during daytime shifts, which 
made evening shifts very valuable seen from my data collection perspective.
3.4. Work hazards.
What kind of injuries have MAIE employees suffered? What are the major work 
hazards? What work situations do MADE organisational members fear more than 
others? In order to understand what MAIE safety is about, it is necessary to look 
into the risk situation at MAIE as organisational actors perceive this to exist in their 
daily work life. MADE organisational members' risk constructs are based in own 
and fellow workers' work experience and work accidents and in the hazard scenario 
that is communicated through management information.
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3.4.1. Experienced work accidents.
The majority of MAIE workers have personal experiences from work accidents.
The accidents vary in seriousness from involving hospitalisation to not needing 
medical attention at all. One fatal accident has occurred at MAIE.
"My foot was caught under a pile of profiles". "I have been burned when handling 
hot profiles". "I have injured my fingers when lifting profiles". "Metal particles 
have been stuck in my eye". "I have had numerous small knife cuts while preparing 
packing equipment". "I have been scratched and bruised while handling profiles". 
"Once an extrusion tool fell down and injured my foot". "I slipped on the wet floor 
and injured my ankle." "I have had a broken ankle from a fall on the semi-trailer 
when loading profiles." "I suffer from muscle and back pains due to the lifting of 
heavy profiles." "A splinter from the metal bands that we use for packaging hit my 
face once." "I have had acid bums".
This reveiew is an exemplification of work accidents that MAIE workers have 
experienced. Work accidents and injuries have happened in all MAIE departments, 
and many of them have resulted in cuts, bums, bruises, and broken limbs. The one 
fatal accident at MAIE took place in the coating department, where an employee 
fell into an acid bath.
3.4.2. Worst scenarios.
When MAIE organisational members are asked about what accidents they fear 
most, their answers mainly describe three situations:
• A load of profiles loosens from the transport crane and hits people who work 
underneath.
• An explosion leads to a fire at the extrusion press.
• Newly extruded profiles "go wild" after having come out of the extrusion press 
and hit people at high speeds.
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All three scenarios are based in actual events: Objects have fallen off crane loads, 
there has been a fire at the extrusion press, and newly extruded profiles occasionally 
do "go wild". Fortunately, these events have not caused serious injuries - as of yet, 
it is emphasised.
3.4.3. Invisible and non-acute work hazards.
In many organisational actors' risk concepts, work situations that lead to non-acute 
and long-term injuries have a significant place. The most commonly mentioned 
hazards of this type are the noise level at certain work stations and the manual 
lifting of heavy profiles which takes place at many work departments.
According to employees, what characterises these hazards is that they are focused 
less than more acute and easily visible work hazards in MAIE safety efforts. One 
employee says:
"To be fair I have to say that the noise situation has improved over the years due to 
new technical solutions. But it still is not satisfactory at some work stations. What 
is worse, though, is that the need to lift profiles manually still exists, and that hardly 
any training is given about how to lift while simultaneously protecting your back. 
As the result of hazardous lifting rarely becomes evident until years later, it is 
scarcely treated as any problem of MAIE, but rather as belonging to the individual."
Health problems caused by such invisible and non-acute hazards are not included in 
the MAIE system of accident reporting. This is the case even if employees are 
absent from work due to what the doctor diagnoses as back and muscle injuries 
stemming from long-term work hazards.
3.4.4. Work stress and risk.
"In my opinion what causes most work accidents is work stress. When they rush 
you either by direct orders or by more subtle messages, then what you know about 
working safely often disappears. Of course they never tell us to break safety
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routines - rather to the contrary they might say that sticking to safety is especially 
important in times of rush. But people react differently to stress. Some keep their 
calm, while others get frustrated and lose their alertness”, one employee says.
He is representative for MAIE workers when pointing to the potential for accidents 
in stressful work situations. A large majority of organisational members point to 
work stress as a main precursor for accidents and injuries.
"If there is a breakdown of the extrusion press and it stops, then the level of stress 
becomes high. Every minute the press is out of order, money is lost, and the 
maintenance crew is put under a lot of pressure to make repairs as quickly as they 
can. Fortunately, they are experienced guys, and up till now they have managed to 
work safely in spite of the rush", one employee says.
He is supplemented by a maintenance worker who tells that it might be impossible 
to pay attention to all safety regulations when a production crisis has to be coped 
with:
"But to compensate for this, I will argue that we work with a generally raised 
alertness in such situations. Consequently, I do not think we have had work 
accidents due to work stress in our department", he says.
A high level of work stress is frequently connected to customers’ orders that have to 
be finished within certain time limits. Employees talk angrily about the sales 
department promising delivery without having a clue about production issues, and 
they either praise or criticise their shift supervisors for the ways they handle this 
pressure on behalf of the shift group:
"It is the responsibility of the shift supervisor to calm things down when the work 
situation is becoming stressed. And some of them do. But others do not - they are 
so focused on fulfilling managerial production expectations that they do nothing to 
decrease work stress among shift members. To the contrary, they may create work
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stress by their wish to compete with other work shifts for good production results", 
it is stated by one employee.
Many employees talk about how they slow things down in periods of work stress 
disregarding shift supervisory efforts to do so or not:
"When I find it necessary to calm things due to safety considerations, I do this. But 
this is easier for me than it is for younger workers, as I think they are more afraid to 
be looked upon as lazy or too cautious. I do not care about this", one experienced 
worker says.
It is argued by employees that the gradual reduction in the number of employees at 
some work stations have caused increased work stress. Fewer hands to cope with 
growing production demands has contributed to a generally more stressful work 
environment in spite of improved work equipment, it is said.
Also, new MADE employees who point to what they perceive as non-satisfactory 
work and safety training claim that their lack of work competence functioned as a 
stressor during their first period at MAIE.
It is stated by MAIE employees that the perceived connection between work stress 
and work accidents rarely is documented in accident reports. They claim that what 
normally is written down as the reason for accidents is what directly led to the 
accident -  for example that the employee in question was unattentive and performed 
an unsafe act. Thus, work stress with its perceived hazardous potential for 
accidents rarely comes to organisational recognition, it is argued by MAIE 
employees.
3.4.5. Work monotony as work hazard.
"You do the same work operations over and over again, and the feeling of 
monotony and boredom may contribute to a general carelessness which can lead to 
work accidents. The most common result of this situation is what we call "trade
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mark” injuries: Smaller bums, cuts and bruises happen all the time, and they are 
often not reported as work accidents. What I fear more, though, is that more serious 
work accidents will take place due to the monotony of the work process”, one 
employee says.
Many of the MAIE work operations are monotonous and offer employees few 
changes in work tasks. MAIE management recognizes this situation as a problem 
that may influence both general job satisfaction and work safety, and efforts have 
been done to implement a system of job rotation at some work shifts. Whether 
positive safety consequences can be inferred from this reorganisation is unclear, but 
it is a shared belief of managers and many employees alike that variation in work 
tasks will have a positive impact on the number of work accidents, especially the 
smaller ones.
3.5. Being a fieldworker.
3.5.1. Fieldwork period 1 (January - May 1994).
After initial contact with the safety staff at MAI and MAIE management, I was 
given access to MAIE for a limited period of time as I was allowed to be present at 
the site from the beginning of January 1994 till the end of May the same year. I 
spent two or three days a week at the plant during this period, and I mostly followed 
the schedule of daytime work, which mean I was present at the plant from 7.30 am 
till 3.30 pm. All MAIE employees were informed beforehand of my coming and 
the intention of my work, and they were asked to cooperate with me in my research 
efforts.
The safety manager was appointed as my main contact at the plant. Our relations 
were positive from the first moment, and he was always helpful and interested in 
my work. Gradually he involved me in many of his reflections about MAIE safety 
work, and he became an important informant as my work proceeded. The 
production manager, too, was interested in my work, and he often spent time to
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share his views of safety issues with me, even though his work days were very 
busy.
At the start of this first period, I went through a “get-to-know-the-plant" schedule 
which took me to every comer of MAIE and introduced me to all aspects of the 
production process and most of the MAIE employees. After this initial period 
which lasted for about two weeks, I concentrated on getting to know the employees 
of the plant, both production workers, shift supervisors and managers: I spent time 
with production workers in their coffee and lunch breaks, I sometimes gave a 
helping hand in the production process at some work stations, and I walked around 
the plant and tried to initiate or take part in conversations when it felt natural and 
possible.
On reflection, I can see that an important part of my role construction as a 
fieldworker was my personal history: I am bom in and I presently live in the local 
area where a majority of MADE employees live, and I also speak the local dialect. 
Inhabitants of this region traditionally have looked upon themselves as sharing a 
unique identity encompassing cultural traits such as a marked dialect, 
entrepreneurship, hard work, strong religious interests, rather rough and direct 
norms of human communication, a strong solidarity in times of crises, etc.
Although being an outward-looking region for centuries due to seamanship and 
widespread emigration and thus being much influenced by foreign cultures, the 
region is still in a way a rather "closed" place in which most foreigners - domestic 
or from abroad - seldom are looked upon as truly "genuine" inhabitants even if they 
might have spent a considerable amount of years in the region.
It is important to establish people's family connections when you meet someone you 
do not know in order to place them correctly on the area's social map. I had not 
lived in the region for twenty-five years previous to my fieldwork, but that was not 
essential as I have local family ties and can easily be placed in the local "Who-is- 
who" calendar. From day one it became known throughout the plant who I was 
(meaning primarily who were my father and my brothers and my uncle and my 
male cousins), and it was very common when I was introduced to someone that our
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conversation started by employees confirming their knowledge of one or more of 
my relatives. I, in turn, tried to establish their family background, and I was always 
happy when I could say that I knew some member of their families.
This establishment of local relations was the common ground of communication 
between MAIE employees and me in the first phase of my fieldwork. It felt natural 
and intuitively right for me to engage in this "activity", and it was not something I 
did in a calculating way to obtain good relations with my informants. Rather, it was 
an area in which we all could communicate as fellow human beings, and it 
produced natural conversations which served to ease the social akwardness I felt 
present both in myself as well as among the MAIE employees at the outset of my 
fieldwork. The fact that I gradually became socially established as "being OK" in 
spite of my strange interests in safety and my academic background I mainly 
account to my local area background and that I acknowledged the local norms for 
an interest in people's family backgrounds. I was "one of them" and was thus able 
to gain most employees' positive support in my data collection work. (My being 
"one of them" became almost touchingly clear to me when an acquaintance of mine 
met a production worker out of the work setting, and my presence at MAIE was 
discussed. "She is OK," the MAIE employee said. "She seems to have an interest 
in talking to us about lots of things. I never had expected that.")
So after a while I was able to feel more relaxed about my research at MATE, but the 
feeling of unease never left me completely. It became accentuated every time my 
position as an academic was being mentioned and I discovered how little 
knowledge most of my informants had about college life and how much prestige 
and "mystery" this life was surrounded with in their imaginations. At such 
instances, the social distance between us immediately returned.
Bartunek and Louis (1996) discuss a role position that I find similar to what I 
experienced at MADE. They distinguish between organisational members who are 
fully insiders and people who are not so, but nevertheless can be termed “relative 
insiders” due to their prior knowledge of and connections to the organisation and its 
surroundings in some way. Even if this position of being a relative insider does not 
give insider access to organisational interpretations and organisational affairs, it is a
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position which may enable a person to comprehend more easily what is going on in 
the organisation.
I was a relative insider at MAIE by way of knowing the local culture and its codes 
of conduct, but I was also a relative outsider as I had removed myself through 
education and occupational status from my roots. But this being a little bit of each 
seemed to give me favourable access to the MAIE social networks and to safety 
constructs that were not readily communicated frontstage. Hopefully my being a 
relative outsider has balanced my position as a relative insider in that it has kept my 
insider biases in check due to the mental distance that an outsider position creates.
A feeling of social awkwardness will probably always be a part of ethnographic 
fieldwork unless one "goes native" - which is not a condition to aspire for. 
"Continued involvement in the field can be likened to be constantly on stage", says 
Punch (1986:17), and I tend to agree with him. The feeling of being an actor who 
all the time is tense about her performance never left me while doing fieldwork.
An essential reliability check on ethnographic data is continuously to consider the 
influence of one's role enactment as fieldworker on the research process. Becker 
(quoted in Taylor and Bogdan 1984) argues that a fieldworker cannot avoid taking 
sides in the fieldwork situation, disregarding all conscious efforts not to do so. This 
situation will inevitably influence one’s data collection work, and awareness of own 
biases and preferences is the only possible answer in order to prevent the research 
process from losing its credibility, according to Becker. Mouly and Sankaran 
(1995) echo this concern by pointing to the possibility of fieldworker preferences 
for some actors* arguments and the danger of being dragged into internal 
organisational conflicts.
An awareness of own actions and social ties is thus necessary in order to help the 
ethnographer to control her personal preferences and to evaluate whether the data 
material has been acquired under circumstances that were too strongly dominated 
by her personal likes and dislikes. In my work, this awareness has led to never- 
ending considerations whether the "being one of us"-feeling trapped me into
92
becoming a less critical and less reflective fieldworker than I otherwise would have 
been. This is a question never to be answered in a "scientific" way. Primarily, 
though, I consider my inclusion into the "local tribe" to have been beneficial for my 
data collection. And in spite of my close relations to many organisational actors I 
felt I was able to keep a critical distance to the information they gave me. I look 
upon the mere awareness of these problems to have worked as a constant check on 
my data collection process.
Due to my physical location (I was given a small office in the production hall), the 
way I dressed (I always wore the standard production work outfit), my habit of 
spending the lunch hour with production employees (which I was advised to do by 
MAIE managers) and also probably due to my being a "local tribe member", I 
became more integrated in the production workers' doings and dealings than I did in 
management’s. I never achieved the same access to the full scope of managerial 
safety considerations as I did among production employees. I was told by managers 
at some occasions that I probably knew more about employees' safety constructs 
than they did themselves. I do not know whether they said this because they found 
the thought uncomfortable or not. Whatever the reason, I felt occasionally I was 
kept at an arm's length by some managers.
I might have been able to achieve better psychological access to all managers if I 
had not been so strongly "adopted" by groups of employees, and this is the main 
reason I can see for being critical to my establishment of a local identity which led 
to this integration process. But I think that another issue also contributed to what I 
occasionally experienced as a tense attitude towards me by some of the managers: 
As I have previously argued, it was essential to me that my research should reflect 
the multiplicity - and not only the official managerial versions - of safety realities at 
my fieldwork site. I wanted to give ordinary production workers just as prominent 
a place in my fieldwork efforts and my analyses as anyone else at the plant, and this 
approach might have been found somewhat surprising and odd in managerial 
circles. I explained these intentions of mine when I talked about my fieldwork with 
organisational members, and I tend to believe that this multiplicity emphasis might 
have gained me favourable "scores" within the employee group while it might have
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created some questions regarding my credibility among members of the 
management group.
Due to the unexpectedness of my multiplicity focus, I can understand that my 
approach may have been interpreted by management members as less "neutral” than 
what they preferred it to be. I debated quite a bit with myself whether or not to 
present my approach as clearly as I in fact did, but there seemed to be no way to 
“avoid” openness about this central principle of my research process. I cannot see 
how I could have "hidden" my strong interest in multiple safety definitions - even if 
this interest of mine might have barred me from more backstage management 
information than I was able to get.
In this first phase of my fieldwork, I utilised a wide approach in my data collection. 
Although safety related issues were my main interest, it was necessary for me also 
to collect data concerning many other organisational topics, as I saw it essential to 
investigate MAIE safety as an integrated part of the total organisational situation. I 
was fully aware that this open and indiscriminate "surrender" to the complexity of 
my fieldwork site probably would give me a lot of data that were not directly 
relevant for my safety study. On the other side, it was impossible for me at this 
stage of my work to have any clear-cut and valid opinion about which data were 
relevant for the study of MAIE safety and which were not. The relevance question 
had to be addressed at a later stage.
It was not always easy to stick to my conviction that a wide range of data and 
multiple safety definitions were necessary in order to grasp the safety situation at 
MAIE. Sometimes organisational members openly wondered why I was interested 
in issues which they considered to be far removed from safety considerations, and I 
got the feeling that I occasionally was being looked upon as prying into issues that 
really were none of my business. I could legitimately investigate into the 
"compartment" of safety, but my intentions became more questionable when I also 
showed an interest for "non-safety" issues. Members of MAIE management were 
among those who were sceptical to my wide approach.
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In hindsight, I will argue that what essentially caused some strain in my managerial 
relations during my first fieldwork period was a difference in opinion about how a 
researcher role ought to be enacted. Their approach to research and researchers was 
based in a "scientific’' traditon in which research deals with numbers, drafts, 
questionnaires, etc. - research activities that are structured, effectively implemented, 
and show visible and quick results. My research role was constructed around ideas 
that had very little in common with anticipated researcher behaviour, and this 
asymmetry between management role expectations and my actual role performance 
brought confusion and also some scepticism into our relations. I experienced a 
daily strive in the balance between a fulfillment of what was expected of me in 
order to "prove" I was a genuine researcher and thus to secure my continued access 
and the observation of my own standards of research methodology and approach. I 
had to compromise my ideals many times during my fieldwork, especially in the 
first phase before my role was more firmly settled.
In March 1994, after having learned to know the plant site and many of its people 
and also tried my hands in the production process, I started interviewing at MAIE 
and also at the "mother plant" of MAI. I interviewed the managers at MAIE 
(general plant manager, production manager, financial manager, and safety and 
quality manager), one shift supervisor, the MAIE trade union leader, and five shift 
safety representatives. I also interviewed the general plant manager and the human 
resources manager of MAI, one of the MAI safety staff members, and the trade 
union chief safety official for the whole plant area including MAIE. As my 
intention was to be filled in with safety perceptions and interpretations from actors' 
points of view, these interviews had no pre-planned schedule except for being 
focussed around safety. I took extensive notes during the interviews and wrote 
them out at length immediately afterwards. None of these interviews were tape- 
recorded.
The decision to start planned interviews and the choice of interviewees was the 
result of decisions on my part as I experienced signs of unease in the MAIE 
management group due to the way I chose to carry out my fieldwork. I was subtly 
told that I was expected to interwiev managers and other key safety actors, and it
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was also hinted that my informal mixing with production employees was a little 
more extensive than what had been expected. Apparently, MAIE management was 
most satisfied when I used my office when doing "research", so in order to calm 
down what I perceived as management anxiety and to enter into a more “proper” 
and recognised researcher role, I completed my first interviewing round a little 
ahead of my own preferred time schedule.
During this first fieldwork period, I was present at several meetings and other 
formal events where safety matters were on the agenda. I attended a plant "Family 
Day", seven safety inspections, one management meeting, two shift safety 
meetings, one shift quarterly meeting, some of the monthly meetings between 
management and trade union officials, and a day conference for shift safety 
representatives, managers, and union officials. I took notes during the meetings, 
and I was given the formal minutes for the meetings when such were made.
Shift safety inspections and shift safety meetings frequently take place on a short 
notice, and they might also be rescheduled due to unforeseen productional demands. 
Thus, it was a difficult task for me to keep track of these events, and I was unable to 
participate in all safety inspections and safety meetings even though I was always 
welcomed to do so.
In the way of written documents, I was given or collected myself several of these: 
The MAIE and the MAI Health, Safety and Environment Manuals, information 
sheets from management and the trade union, minutes from shift safety inspections 
and management inspection rounds, newspaper clippings, managerial policy 
documents, etc.
I wrote a field diary covering every day of my fieldwork. In the diary, I have 
outlined events and experiences of my MAIE days: my findings and concerns, the 
main points of numerous informal talks with organisational members, my 
observations, my thoughts about my data material and theoretical assumptions, etc.
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As agreed upon when I was given access to the plant, I wrote a report summing up 
my impressions of the MAIE safety situation after having finished my first 
fieldwork period. I sent the report to MAIE management and had a meeting with 
them in which I was given feedback on what I had written. It was pointed to some 
factual errors in my description of MAIE and its activities, and some managers 
wondered about the way I bad let multiple perspectives come forward in my report. 
I was advised to be aware that the conflicts concerning the recent MAIE 
establishment still would influence many employees' evaluations of the 
organisational situation.
After the meeting, I edited my report in order to correct the errors and also to 
emphasise that what was said in it was not a description of "the” safety situation of 
MAIE, but rather what I had interpreted as the safety situation seen from different 
organisational actors' points of view. What I learned during this communication 
about my report was that I had to be careful in my writing in order not to cause 
potentially harmful speculations about individuals' and groups’ safety perceptions. I 
became faced with the dilemma of what data to include in a written report (Punch 
1986; Whyte and Whyte 1984).
The revised edition of my fieldwork report was submitted to the MAIE trade union 
chief official, and I never received any specific comments about it from the union. 
(My tiny office in the production hall was next door to the trade union office, but 
this physical nearness did not result in me being given any intimate access to the 
trade union's doings, although I had acceptable relations with the trade union 
officials all the time. At different occasions, though, I noticed that management 
representatives imagined me to have closer relations with the trade union than I 
actually had.)
3.5.2. Fieldwork period 2 (March - May 1995).
After the submission of my field report, I formally asked MAIE management for 
permission to continue my fieldwork at the plant. It took months before this 
permission finally was granted me, and based on information that I acquired during
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the last part of my fieldwork, I have reasons to believe that MADE management 
primarily wanted to refuse my request The said reason for this was a worry about 
my work being too time-consuming for both MAIE managers and production 
workers. But due to the support I was given by organisational actors in both MADE 
and MAI, I was finally given permission to come back and finish my field research. 
It was agreed that I would have access until the end of 1995.
I threw myself into fieldwork as soon as the formal permission was granted, and I 
spent my second fieldwork period to reestablish myself at the fieldwork site and to 
find out if new safety issues had emerged during my absence. From now on, I also 
found it less socially awkward to be a fieldworker. I was more able to define my 
daily schedule now as it was less important for me to please everyone due to the 
promise I had obtained for fieldwork completion at MAIE. Also, it felt good to be 
warmly welcomed by the great bulk of employees who said they had been waiting 
for me to come back and were glad to see me. Due to this predominantly positive 
reunion, I had no trouble to renegotiate my continued informal access in the 
production life of MAIE. And as time passed and I became more relaxed about the 
relations between management members and myself, I noticed that the tension I had 
previously experienced began to diminish. I was very decently treated, and whether 
I previously had focussed too much on what I perceived to be strenous relations or 
whether a change occurred is difficult to say, but whatever the reason, I found it 
easier to communicate with management members during the last parts of my 
fieldwork than in the beginning.
I continued to attend meetings and safety inspections also in this fieldwork period, 
and I had 10 interviews with interviewees that I had talked with previously. Six of 
these interviews were tape-recorded. I also wrote my daily field diary. Otherwise, I 
participated in informal events and work occasions after my own discretion as I 
"lurked” around the work site. I was much helped by shift supervisors who 
repeatedly pointed out to me interesting events and who constantly filled me in with 
relevant safety information and other issues of organisational importance. In both 
practical and mental ways, I prepared myself to my main fieldwork period which 
would commence in August 1995.
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3.5.3. Fieldwork period 3 (August - December 1995).
It had been my intention from the outset of the research process to collect data at 
disperse time periods instead of doing data collection in one long period only. I 
chose this approach of separate fieldwork periods in order to be able to catch the 
dynamics of and possible changes in the safety situation better than if I concentrated 
upon one long fieldwork period. I would have preferred my second fieldwork 
period to have been of longer duration, but due to my formal access situation, it was 
impossible to get started again before March 1995.
During my work process, I discovered a benefit of doing fieldwork at intervals 
which I had not considered beforehand: It turned out to be advantageous for me to 
get out of the fieldwork setting and become physically and mentally removed from 
it and thus acquire a distance to both the social and intellectual immersion of being 
a fieldworker. My breaks from the field gave me an opportunity to reflect upon my 
data material and my analytical efforts in a way that provided clarification in the 
continuation of my research. Physically removed from MAIE and engaged in other 
activities, I felt I was better able to regard my data material and my fieldwork 
efforts in a more critical light than I was while I was there in my role as a relative 
insider (Bartunek and Louis 1996). New angles and themes appeared as I pondered 
about MAIE and safety - which I felt I was constantly doing in both systematic and 
unsystematic efforts over the two-year span of my fieldwork periods.
The most strongly felt disadvantage of going in and out of the organisation was the 
need to reestablish myself socially over again twice. My position as a relative 
insider seemed to have been weakened, and although I was fortunate enough to be 
welcomed back by most employees and rather quickly became absorbed into the 
daily life of the plant anew, it was a personally strenous situation once again to be 
the "event of the day" and to answer numerous questions concerning my present 
research plans. Also, I was told about safety related events that had taken place 
while I had been absent that I very much would have liked to have been an observer 
of, and I thus occasionally experienced a feeling of having lost continuity due to my
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periods of absence. But all in all, I consider the advantages of my periodic 
attendance at MAIE by far to outweigh the disadvantages of the approach.
From August until December 1995,1 spent approximately four days (or evenings) a 
week at MALE. Again I participated in shift safety inspections, shift safety 
meetings, meetings between management and trade union officials, I wrote my field 
diary, and I studied written safety information and other available plant information. 
I also took part in the informal life at different shifts when this was possible and felt 
natural, and especially during evening shifts, such informal settings became crucial 
for my data collection. My research efforts in this fieldwork period, however, were 
less wide and all-embracing than previously. This was a result of my acquired 
knowledge of MAIE which made it possible for me to focus in on the more specific 
safety issues without the fear of isolating safety in an organisational compartment of 
its own.
My main data collection strategy during this last fieldwork period, though, was the 
interviewing of production employees. After having finished my first periods of 
fieldwork, I had focussed upon certain perceptions and concepts regarding the 
MAIE safety perceptions, and I had tried to be aware of similarities, disagreements 
and nuances in different actors' constructs. I felt I had managed to catch the 
"skeleton” of the multiplicity of safety perceptions, but I needed both confirmation, 
correction and supplementary knowledge to establish as complete a picture as 
possible of the MAIE safety world. Even though I had observed, listened to and 
talked to a large amount of MAIE employees, I was also aware that I had spent 
considerable more time with some employees and shift groups than with others, and 
I worried that the perceptions of these "key informants" had been given too 
significant a place in my data material so far. So I set out on my grand 
"triangulation" work: In order to check up on my own perceptions so far and to 
supplement them, I wanted to interview all production workers separately - 
provided they were willing to talk to me.
I asked all production workers that were working at MAIE at the time - 95 persons 
including the shift supervisors -  if I could interview them, and all except one were
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positive to my request. Two persons later cancelled their appointments with me. I 
thus interviewed 92 production employees. The interviews took from 30 minutes to 
two hours, with the majority of them lasting for about one hour. I let the 
interviewees decide whether to use a tape-recorder or not, and approximately two 
thirds of the interviews are tape-recorded. When tape-recording was not wanted, I 
took notes which I wrote out immediately after the interview was finished.
The interviews were semi-structured in the way that I did not meet my interviewees 
with a preset list of questions, but I had a set of themes concerning safety which I 
wanted to be touched upon during the interviews. I had developed this "themes 
list" during my first fieldwork periods when I "collected" safety issues and safety 
perceptions, and I wanted to get these further commented upon and illuminated. 
Included on my list were issues regarding dangerous work situations, safety 
training, safety bureaucracy and rituals, shift relations and safety, safety 
management, shift supervisors and safety, safety success factors, the history of 
MAI/MAIE safety, safety in the new organisation, safety and work stress, etc. 
Sometimes it was quite unnecessaiy for me to bring specific issues into the 
interview, as the employees on their own initiative covered a wide range of safety 
themes. At other occasions, I needed my list either to get the interview going or to 
have employees respond to specific issues. Very few of the interviews are 
comparable in form as they never followed any specific structure except for my 
initial words when I told my interviewees about my research project and assured 
them of the confidentiality of the interview situation.
The most crucial reason for my implementation of a "full-scale" interviewing round 
instead of selecting interviewees based upon representational criteria was that I 
wanted more data to confirm the multitude of safety realities and safety constructs 
that I at this stage of my work anticipated. Also, if I was wrong in my assumption 
of a multiplicity of safety perspectives at MAIE, then this extensive interviewing 
would reveal my mistake. Either way, a complete interviewing round would fulfill 
my research commitment of paying attention to all voices - also the normally silent 
ones - of the MAIE safety community.
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I carried out this comprehensive interviewing plan well within the time limits of my 
last fieldwork period. Initially, I was surprised that I never - except once - got a 
refusal when I asked for an interview, but after a while I discovered that the 
willingness to come to my office to talk about safety partially was founded in some 
degree of prestige and that the interviews were much talked about in the work 
environment. Most production employees rarely attended meetings or had other 
appointments during work hours, and it seemed that they welcomed both the 
interview situation and the break from their daily chores that the interviewing event 
offered them. I was often asked by members of work shifts when their shift was 
due for interviews, so even if I had wanted to finish the interviewing without 
including all shifts, I would have felt this to be difficult because of the expectations 
that employees seemed to have of becoming directly involved in my research 
project. It would have been very awkward for me to explain why they were not to 
participate in my work.
I tried to be aware of not asking for employees’ time when it was inconvenient for 
the production process, and I worked closely with the shift supervisors to plan my 
interviewing in a way that did not interfere too much with the work routines. This 
planning process was very time-consuming. I had to locate people, find out 
whether or not I could disturb them in their job tasks, and ask them for an interview 
at a later occasion. When it became clear that they were willing to be interviewed, 
we had to find a suitable time for the event. After having been through this 
procedure, it was seldom necessary to reschedule our appointments, but if this 
occasionally was the case, I was always told beforehand. Not infrequently, it 
happened that shift supervisors offered to fill in for shift members so they could 
keep their interview appointments with me.
At the end of my fieldwork, I was told by management representatives that their 
worries about my taking too much of employees' and managers' time for my 
research had proved unfounded. I had not caused any disturbances in the work 
process, and if they had known this beforehand, they would not have been sceptical 
when I asked to continue my fieldwork, they said.
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3.6. Analytical work.
In my fieldwork periods, I concentrated upon data collection and the writing of 
comprehensive notes about the fieldwork situation. I wrote out all interviews that I 
was not permitted to tape-record, and I also transcribed a considerable number of 
the taped interviews. Paralleling this work, I wrote numerous "reports" to myself in 
which I discussed safety themes that emerged from my data and how I was to 
pursue the themes in my further research.
I experienced the frequently referred to cyclic pattern of ethnographic research 
(Spradley 1980; quoted in Mouly and Sankaran 1995; Wadel 1991) with its 
reoccurring and not easily distinguishable phases to be both productive and anxiety 
producing. It was productive in the way it challenged me to be open and flexible 
regarding my research design and what would be the next turn of the road in both 
the data collection work and my theoretical deliberations. I had given myself the 
vow from the outset of my fieldwork that I would pay the utmost attention to the 
safety definitions that were being presented to me by organisational members and 
that my own categories and concepts which originated in theoretical studies were 
not to take prominence over what I found in the field. The cyclic approach of 
ethnography helped to reassure me that this "grounded" way of conducting research 
was legitimate and not only a way I preferred to work due to an inability of mine to 
discover overarching organisational patterns and structures concerning the MAIE 
safety situation. My chosen approach continuously challenged me not to be 
satisfied with either the amount of data I had collected or the preliminary theoretical 
assumptions I made, and I was constantly pushed further on in data collection and 
analytical endeavours in seemingly never-ending interactions between the many 
different phases of the research process. I had a quite literal feeling of going back 
and forth all the time during my fieldwork periods: One moment I was in the 
empirical world and concentrated on data collection, and the next moment I was 
back in my theoretical world where I worked with my data and tried to reveal their 
secrets so I could go on collecting more data with new knowledge about the MAIE 
safety situation. Back and forth - back and forth - this is how my fieldwork periods 
in retrospect appear to me when I think about them now. I feel confident that this
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ethnographic "dance" (Wadel 1991) which I performed - although at times rather 
clumsy and hesitating - has been my main means for achieving the research results I 
have come up with.
But to do cyclic research is also anxiety creating - at least it worked that way for 
me. The continuous movements between data collection and theoretical 
considerations provided me with an everlasting feeling of frustration of never being 
finished with anything. At times when I thought I was on to something important, I 
had to revise my opinion after the next back and forth movements, and I felt that I 
was doing very little progress in my research. I started to envy colleagues of mine 
who were doing research based in specific theories and whose objective it was to 
confirm or disconfirm a set of theoretical arguments in an empirical context, and 1 
seriously wished I had embarked upon similar projects, as I was almost ashamed of 
my open and flexible approach which I at times felt got me nowhere. During 
periods of my fieldwork, I was so bothered by this uncertainty of mine that I only 
hesitantly talked about my work to colleagues. I was so very different, and this 
uniqueness of mine made me vulnerable as I perceived an unspoken puzzlement in 
my surroundings whether what I was doing was "real" research.
So the ethnographic cyclic approach and my vow not to build my work around pre­
conceived safety categories were not easy research principles to follow. In fear of 
coming up with far-fetched results which were built upon meagre data and which 
might be promoted by my desire to see "results" of my work, I at times fell into the 
opposite ditch of not daring to formulate theoretical assumptions based in my data 
at all because I was uncertain whether "all" elements and angles were properly 
covered. I experienced a strenous indecisiveness which prompted me to turn every 
stone before I was able to draw conclusions. Occasionally, this situation led to 
great frustrations as I became very anxious about whether I utilised my fieldwork 
situation to a maximum effect. I had to work hard with myself to be able to live 
with my constant doubts and at the same time be comfortable with both the amount 
and quality of my data material and the preliminary theoretical suggestions I 
gradually dared to come up with.
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This internal "fight" between a feeling of not having gained enough insight to come 
up with conclusions and my wish to come up with theoretical suggestions 
concerning the MAIE safety situation has been the most strenous part of my 
research process, and I consider the dilemmas I have felt all through the work 
process mainly to be a result of my chosen research perspective. To cope with this 
emotional strain for a research period of several years has not been a pleasant part 
of this work. Rather, it has been the issue that has mostly pestered me and made me 
feel utterly miserable at times. I was never able to solve these dilemmas - they 
probably are unsolvable - and it varied from one day to another whether I found a 
balance in my work or whether I fell down into a ditch and consequently ruined the 
fragile equilibrium of my research approach. I can still feel the tension while I am 
writing these words, and I guess I will continue to experience it as long as I work 
with my research project.
My main efforts of transcription, categorisation and analysis took place after I had 
finished my fieldwork. I have written out or transcribed 65 interviews: all the 
management interviews and randomly chosen production employee interviews -  
although I made sure that all shifts are represented in the fully transcribed 
interviews. I have categorised the interviews according to safety categories that 
emerged during my research process, and I have also categorised my field notes 
within the same system. In the latter part of this categorisation work, I discovered 
that I very rarely came across new approaches and angles concerning the MAIE 
safety situation. This fact combined with time pressures and the abundance of data 
I already had included in my categorisation system made me decide upon not to go 
through with an accurate transcription of the rest of my interviews. Accordingly, 
these are not transcribed, but I have listened to them in order to find supplementary 
information and descriptions which can broaden my analytical basis.
I will briefly exemplify my categorisation approach by coming up with a couple of 
examples which show the approach’s demand for systematic and time-consuming 
efforts. (I do miss a mentioning of this non-glamourous part of organisational 
research in many research reports, and I find such omission unsound since it may 
give the impression that the analytical process is based upon abstract and even
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mystical considerations which are variously grounded in the concrete data material 
that exists.)
One of the safety constructs that I met fairly frequently in my data material was 
organisational actors' perceptions about who had the primary responsibility for 
MAIE safety. Another issue that often surfaced was organisational actors' 
evaluation of specific safety routines, for example shift safety inspections. After 
having transcribed my data material, I went "hunting” for data in which 
organisational members gave their views concerning safety responsibility and shift 
safety inspections. Finally I brought together all data elements that I considered to 
belong to the relevant categories - shift safety inspections and primary safety 
responsibility respectively - and thus ended up with "sets" containing all data I had 
acquired regarding the mentioned issues. In following this procedure for 40 safety 
related categories, I developed a thematic safety picture of MADE in which I had 
included the different safety perceptions that were presented to me by 
organisational members. My next step was then to work with these safety themes 
and try to find issues of specific analytical relevance which could help develop a 
deeper understanding of the MAIE safety situation. After this, I grouped several of 
the safety themes together to analyse them in combination.
During this systematic analytical endeavour, some themes became more prominent 
than others, and some turned out to be of less importance for my understanding of 
the MAIE multiple safety reality. I discovered that issues which I in the first phases 
of my fieldwork had a notion about being of vital importance turned out to be of 
limited significance safety-wise, and also that issues of which I had no early 
knowledge were highly relevant for my analysis of MADE safety. Such discoveries 
of mine are no great novelties in the field of organisational qualitative research, but 
to me they were confirmations that I was right about my methodological choice and 
analytical approach. I shudder to think of what would have been my research 
"results" if I had entered MALE with preset categories with which to analyse the 




SAFETY HISTORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY’S 
ORGANISATION
4.1. Introduction.
Accounts of the MAIE safety history and the road to the present safety situation are 
commonly heard among MAIE organisational actors:
"If you were here twenty years ago, you would not recognise the place. Nobody 
cared much about safety then, and there was filth all over."
"We had a general manager who really is the one to praise for the improved safety 
situation".
"When I started here more than 20 years ago, nobody mentioned safety and safety 
training. We did not know what safety meant. We just started to work."
"What you see at MADE today is the result of a long and continuous work process 
for the improvement of safety".
The purpose of this chapter is to focus upon organisational members’ historical 
safety perceptions in order to show how they form a part of present MAIE safety 
constructs and the present organisational identity. I will analyse perceptions of 
MAIE safety history as they are presented by organisational members with no 
evaluation of their historical "correctness" -  if ever there does exist such a 
"correctness". As a consequence of organisational members* focus upon their 
safety history and development, I will also discuss the question of organisational
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self-perception and identity based in organisational members* interpretations of 
safety and safety success.
4.2. "Then" -
A considerable proportion of MADE organisational members have worked at the 
plant for many years and are thus able to give personal accounts of what it was like 
to be a MAI/MAIE employee during the first years of plant existence. The 
overwhelming majority of them describe their first years at the plant in similar 
words as does this pioneer employee:
"You know, many of us came directly from the boat, and we were used to a 
hazardous work environment in which we were supposed to fix things as they 
surfaced. And we were not given any formal work training here, so when we 
started to work at MAI/MAIE, the skills we employed were the same ones as were 
valued on board the fishing vessel. We were daring and took risks, and our 
"cowboy" spirit was valued by our managers. No one talked much about safety in 
those days. There was not room for that in the struggle to get the plant going."
The lack of work training and its potential consequences for the safety of the work 
place is commented upon by employees when they think back to their first days at 
MAIE. One worker tells how he was told by his shift supervisor that he was to 
work as a truck driver:
"He pointed to a truck and told me that I was to drive it. I had never driven a car in 
my life, but he said it was rather uncomplicated, and then he pointed out the truck 
mechanisms for me. Well, there I was, all of sudden being a truck driver. It was 
nothing but good fortune that I didn't have a serious accident."
Crane operators tell similar stories about starting their work without knowing much 
about their work tasks. But such a situation was considered quite normal then, they 
say, and they did not reflect much upon the potential unsafety of it at the time.
They were aware that they worked at a plant where dangerous situations inevitably
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would occur, and they believed that their own skills and good fortune hopefully 
would save them from becoming severely injured.
Due to the inherent dangers of the MAI/MAIE production process, it is said to have 
been a generally accepted part of plant life - although regrettable - that work 
accidents took place and people became injured. And unfortunate incidents did 
happen, causing injury and suffering: people were burnt by floating aluminium, 
trucks hit people, employees fell down when working at high levels, and many 
suffered severe health damages in the polluted indoor work environment.
The image of MAI/MAIE as a hazardous and drab place of work could also be 
found in the world outside the plant. One of the present managers is the owner of 
children's drawings of the plant site which were made some 20 years ago. 
MAI/MAIE is here depicted as a gloomy and ugly place, and the buildings are 
surrounded with black smoke while some people stretch their heads out of the 
windows and cough. The children artists had never been at the plant, but their 
father was employed there, and they presented an image that had been conveyed to 
them through common descriptions, according to the manager.
Dangerous jobs might also have their more positive side effects: "Back in the old 
days, I know that housewives bragged about their husbands having especially 
dangerous jobs at MAIE. They considered this to be status promoting," the same 
manager says.
But in spite of inherent dangers and rather drab work conditions, employees recall 
that they were happy to work at MADE:
"What was the big difference for me was that now, I had a secure job to go to every 
day, and I got paid regularly. It was a good place to work, and we were proud of 
being employed at the new plant We did not think much about getting injured, and 
of course, we tried our best not to have a work accident even then."
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Whenever I asked MAIE employees about their views of the present safety situation 
at the plant, it was quite common to get an answer which in some way compared 
today's situation with "then”. The previous safety situation seems to employ a 
central place in organisational members’ cognitive schema as a background tapestry 
and a measuring stick against which the present-day safety situation is being 
evaluated in terms of improvement and success. As such, the MAIE safety history 
is alive in many MADE employees' present safety perceptions.
4.3. - and "now".
If MAIE organisational actors have differing views about many issues, there is one 
thing, though, they agree about: The present MAIE safety situation is totally 
different from "then". Through the years, great improvements have taken place in 
the way that worker safety is being handled according to employees and managers 
alike. As a result of this, it is stated that the number of injuries - serious and less 
serious - have drastically decreased through the years.
"Today, safety considerations are central issues of our daily work. We think safety, 
we talk safety, and our managers constantly remind us about it. We know now that 
work accidents do not happen randomly, but that they are caused by unsafe 
situations and acts", one employee says.
This worker is echoed by the majority of MAIE employees, both pioneer workers 
and younger ones. It can thus be stated that there exists a set of shared perceptions 
at MAIE regarding the present safety situation and its positive development from a 
previous poorer state.
Another result of improved safety conditions over time is the knowledge that the 
only limits for further safety development is human effort:
"When they first started to talk about safety issues, many of us said that it was 
impossible to improve safety here. I mean, the production was so complicated and 
if we were to work safer, then we would halt the production process too much. And
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besides, much of the equipment we used to work with was unsafe whichever way 
you worked. But it has been proved over the years that it is possible both to 
improve our work equipment and to work safer without working slower. So don't 
you tell me that further improvements cannot be made. That is not true”, one 
experienced worker says.
Seen from organisational actors' points of view, then, shared safety perceptions built 
upon MAIE safety history have been developed over the years. This framework - a 
seemingly shared cognitive schema - have the following characteristics:
• The MAIE safety awareness has greatly improved over the years.
• A significant decrease in human injuries is the result of this increased safety 
awareness.
• Accidents do not happen, they are caused by human actions.
• Since they are caused by human actions, accidents can also be prevented by 
human actions.
• It is possible further to improve the MAIE safety situation by increased efforts.
It can thus be argued that MAIE general and collective safety constructs have been 
transformed from being fatalistic and passive categories of safety determinism to 
becoming the managable and active categories of present-day safety work. A 
common belief in the possibilities of constantly improved safety is a key 
characteristic of MADE safety culture today and forms the basis for all MAIE safety 
efforts.
4.4. What triggered the safety changes?
If there is a limited set of perceptions to be found in the descriptions of the "then" 
and "now” safety situations among MAIE organisational actors, a more diversified 
picture is painted when reasons for the safety improvements are discussed. 
Employees and managers point to an array of factors they consider to have been 
instrumental in this transformation process.
I l l
The role of the so-called “safety evangelists” is very frequently mentioned as a 
major safety improving trigger. Members of the MAI safety staff are often named 
in this group of key persons along with some managers and trade union officials. 
That the safety proponent role not always was an easy one is exemplified by one of 
the "evangelists":
"When we started to talk about the prevention of accidents and insisted upon the 
wearing of personal protective equipment, regulations for truck driving, and 
registration of all injuries - not to talk about near-injuries - we were considered 
more or less mad. Employees laughed, shook their heads in disbelief and said we 
were extremely unrealistic and even a bit soft. You had to expect accidents in a 
work environment like this, and if you could not live with that, then you ought to 
find yourself another place of work, we were told. It has been a long and persistent 
battle to convince employees that we ourselves are the masters of our accidents, and 
not some unknown force."
A former plant manager is frequently referred to as the one who made safety "take 
off'. He had people clean up the plant outdoor and indoor environment - to people’s 
astonishment he ordered the construction of green lawns and flower beds -, and he 
insisted upon safety improvements in the production process. To ensure that safety 
issues were implemented, he paid unannounced visits to the work sites - even at 
night you could not be sure he would not emerge, it is said. One MAI safety staff 
member recollects:
"One day I was summoned to his office. There I was scolded for not having spent 
enough money on safety improvements during the last months."
The role of corporate management in safety development is often commented upon 
by organisational actors:
"Corporate management put pressure on local management for safety 
improvements. Without this pressure, I doubt if MAIE safety conditions would 
have been as they are today. I think our managers today are evaluated also by way
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of safety results, and I am sure this has been vital for their safety efforts. Corporate 
management very early picked up the emerging national trend of improved safety, 
and this has been our good luck."
Technical improvement of work equipment and machinery is given a significant 
place when MAIE organisational members reflect on bettered work safety. Many 
dangerous work operations have been partly eliminated and in all purchases of new 
machinery and in the planning of new work processes, safety considerations are 
supposed to be taken into account. This routine is mentioned by many 
organisational members as having been a vital safety promoting instrument.
Gradually, a formal structure of safety routines including safety inspections, 
accident reporting, safety meetings, improved housekeeping, safety work 
procedures, etc. has been developed at MAIE. A bureaucratic system (Weber 1947) 
of safety improvement efforts is today the result of this development work, and 
MAIE can be said to have developed a safety strategy in which rules compliance is 
a major means of safety thinking and action (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000). In this 
respect, MAIE is in line with numerous other companies and the bulk of the 
normative safety literature (e.g. Krause 1994; Wilpert and Qvale (eds.) 1993; 
Tungland 1992). Managers and employees alike evaluate the continuous 
implementation of their routinised safety structure to have been of essential 
importance for the permanent improvement of MAIE safety. Without such a 
system, safety efforts would easily have been casual and short-lived, it is said.
Improved work training and specific safety training -  which is compulsory for all 
new employees -  are frequently mentioned reasons of safety improvement. Many 
employees also point to improved safety training for shift supervisors as a safety 
improving factor. The use of personal protective equipment has similarly prevented 
injuries from occurring, it is said. And the many visual safety reminders ("Think 
safety {"-posters, injury wall boards, etc.) along with other written safety 
information has worked to keep up a constant safety awareness, it is argued.
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Employees also mention certain shift supervisors who are given credit for their 
efforts to reinforce safe behaviour and thus are said to have been imperative in 
creating and maintaining employee safety awareness:
"It is annoying that they comment when you do a mistake but never seem to notice 
when you work according to all safety procedures and regulations. Good 
supervisors now and then tell people that they appreciate their competent and safe 
work. That is a great incentive for further safety commitment", one employee says.
4.5. Safety bureaucratisation and decrease of job autonomy?
"Don't get me wrong, but there were valuable things in the old "pre-safety" 
organisation also... The job was in a way freer and more dependent upon my own 
skills and judgement then. All the safety rules and regulations now do not leave me 
many choices, and at times I feel that all the correct procedures prevent me from job 
performance based on my own skills."
An experienced worker utters these words, thus suggesting that MAIE safety history 
also has its less bright sides in organisational members' perceptions. According to 
him, there was a time when independent problem solving and individual work skills 
were in more demand at MAIE than is the case today.
Other pioneer workers echo this worker's regret of days gone. They miss what they 
remember as a situation with less managerial interference in their daily work tasks. 
Whenever this is commented upon, though, it is at the same time emphasised that 
the safety bureaucratisation has been vital for the improvement of worker safety:
"I know it has been necessary to construct rules for everything. But I fear that some 
work satisfaction has been lost along the way to better safety. All the routines and 
reporting and documentation stuff is at times a killer for work motivation. I don't 
know if this could have been handled differently," one employee says.
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MAIE employees are not the only ones to wonder - and worry -  about the 
bureaucratisation of safety. Also safety researchers are occupied with the loss of 
flexibility and work autonomy that may be a result of a stringent safety bureaucracy 
(Singleton and Hovden (eds.) 1988; Kjellen and Baneryd 1983). They point to 
people’s general needs to feel they are in charge of their daily work situation as 
vital also for safety motivation. The loss of work flexibility in a rigid safety regime 
may also influence daily work efficiency, it is stated. This argument is echoed by 
Turner (1992a) who states that a positive safety culture must avoid overly rigid 
attitudes to safety. Leidner’s (1993) general argument that when workers are 
allowed some discretion to define their work situation, their interest will increase 
and potential discontent will be mitigated is also relevant for safety work 
considerations. And Gherardi et al. (1998b:211) state that bureaucratisation of 
safety prevent people from developing strategies to deal with context-specific 
problems. Such a safety structure is thus counter-intuitive in its problem solving 
efforts, it is argued.
I have shown that ambiguity is found among pioneer workers when an evaluation of 
MAIE safety development is undertaken. They value the safety improvements, and 
they simultaneously value and do not value the means that have been utilised to 
reach better safety. But such expressions of ambiguity are not commonly heard 
when the history of MAIE safety development is being discussed on the 
organisational frontstage (Goffman 1959). In backstage settings, though, 
organisational members both discuss the ambiguities and explain that because such 
constructs do not fit into the shared cognitive schema of MAIE safety development, 
they cannot easily be discussed openly.
4.6.The self-perception as a safety conscious organisation: History and present 
accomplishments.
When organisational members talk about MAIE safety in general, they frequently 
talk about what they consider to be the MADE safety success history. But 
interpretations of what has taken place in order to reach a good safety situation 
include more than mere explanations of the past: The constructs simultaneously
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contain an evaluation of today’s safety situation and of what is being perceived as 
important ways of promoting continuous safety improvement. Thus, historical 
accounts are helpful in sharing light on present-day safety beliefs and safety self- 
perceptions.
When safety improvements are considered, MAIE organisational members 
unanimously emphasise that the safety transformation process has happened 
gradually, and that it still is under way. Organisational consensus thus seems to 
exist for improved safety to be a processual and not a static phenomena. Another 
consensual explanation is found in the perception that a formal structure is 
instrumental in order to ensure that this never-ending process is not neglected. The 
necessity of a structured and perpetual safety development process can thus be said 
to be a shared MAIE safety construct.
Otherwise, organisational members come up with a variety of different and in their 
view non-competing explanations when commenting upon the history of the safety 
transformation process, and the multitude of explanations criss-cross all group 
borders and organisational levels. These multiple historical safety constructs can be 
categorised as belonging to a diversity of organisational spheres including 
managerial behaviour, technical improvements, communication processes, 
organisational structure, motivation work, etc. From this multifaceted 
reconstruction of MADE safety history can be inferred another seemingly universal 
characteristic of the MADE safety culture: The perception that worker safety is 
dependent upon a mixture of approaches within different spheres of organisational 
life.
As I have shown, organisational members’ constructs of MAIE safety history depict 
a process of significant safety improvement. This shared MAIE self-perception of 
being a safety conscious organisation seems to have several consequences for 
continued MADE safety improvement:
"You know, it is impossible to feature as number one in safety and openly neglect 
safety issues. The way we look upon ourselves as a safety conscious company of
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the first order results in a special responsibility for MAIE to be safety innovative. If 
this is forgotten, then we can use the big safety words to remind our managers about 
this", one employee says.
Supported by many similar comments, it can thus be suggested that the shared self- 
perception of being a highly safety conscious plant maintains the organisational 
safety focus and promotes further safety innovation -  and even higher safety self­
esteem. The well-known phrase that "success breeds success" can be used to 
characterise an interplay between the high safety self-perception and further safety 
improvements.
But this generally positive safety situation also calls for reflection concerning future 
safety work. MAIE's self-perception of safety success can be seen as breeding 
something else than continued success:
"It was much easier to see results of our safety work in earlier days. Then it was 
very visible that new safety procedures resulted in safety improvements. Today as 
we have reached a high level of safety, it takes much more effort to make visible 
improvements. I don't know -  maybe we ought to find new approaches in our 
safety work. It has been okay, but now I feel we need something new. When you 
do the same things over and over, you get tired of them and you will lose your 
motivation in the long run -  especially if you don't see much improvement any 
longer", one organisational member reflects.
Other organisational members have similar reflections, and among younger 
employees who have been employed in other companies before coming to MAIE, 
perceptions of MAIE as having a rather historically based and non-innovative 
approach to safety work are found:
"They are too concerned with the ways they always have done things. It is tiring to 
hear about this all the time. They ought to learn from others about new ideas to 
refresh MAIE safety work. There are plenty of examples to find”, one new 
employee says.
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"We think we are good, and that is right. But I am scared that our high safety self- 
perception might dominate our perceptions so much that we do not see -  or do not 
want to see -  that there are areas in which our safety work could be improved. 
Over-confidence is nothing but ruining for our safety efforts in the long run. It can 
prevent us from being critical to our own actions. Sometimes I think we are too 
occupied with what we have achieved. I try to be aware of this, but it is not easy", a 
manager notes.
Thus, claims of a potentially ruining complacency can be heard among 
organisational members. It is similarly argued that the organisational self­
perception of safety competence may work as barriers for new safety learning.
"Everybody here thinks they know all the answers already. OK, but there are also 
other perspectives. But they do not want to hear so much about them", a fairly new 
MAIE employee says.
"You know, we are so perfect. We always talk about how well we have done, and 
critical questions are not welcome. I think we look too much to the past. MAIE is 
so content with the safety state of affairs that little is done to integrate new views 
and ideas", an experienced employee states.
Based in thoughts like these, the question can be raised whether MADE has become 
trapped in its own self-perception of safety competence and success and whether 
dysfunctions of success (Miller 1990; quoted in Colville et al. 1999) have become 
elements of the MAIE safety reality. If the success frame of reference functions as 
a hindrance for critical questions and the opening up for new safety perspectives, 
then the long-term costs of a preoccupation with the "glorious past" in combination 
with the present-day high level of safety self-esteem may be rather negative for the 
development of the MADE safety culture.
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4.7. A distinguished safety organisation.
But in spite of some awareness of possible negative effects of a high safety self­
esteem, what most distinctly characterises MAIE is that most organisational 
members share a construct that MAIE has been successfully transformed from 
being in a disreputable ’’then” situation safety-wise to today’s generally praised 
’’now” state of safety affairs. This self-perception of being a successful safety 
organisation is voiced by organisational members over and over again:
"Safety is our first priority. The most important issue for us is that all workers leave 
the gates every day without injuries, and we never compromise when safety is 
concerned. You just have to look at our safety statistics to see that we have 
succeeded in becoming a safety conscious company. There is no doubt that we take 
worker safety seriously, and even though we still experience unfortunate events, our 
safety work is successful. But we must never stop looking for safety improvements, 
though", a MAIE manager says.
"We are very safety conscious here at MADE, much more than they are at other 
plants. We are reminded of the importance of safety at all occasions, and managers, 
shift supervisors, shift safety representatives and work colleagues keep a constant 
eye on our work behaviour safety-wise. From what I hear about other work places, 
our safety work is much better than what goes on elsewhere. You can also easily 
see this difference when hired firms come in here to do a job. We very seldom 
experience severe injuries as can easily be the case in an industry like this. It is 
good to work at a place where safety really is taken seriously", one employee says.
"It is the way we always think about safety, whatever job operations we are 
involved in. It is in our blood in a way. And it exists because wherever you turn at 
MAIE, you hear about safety", another employee states.
The organisational self-perception of safety competence is supported by outsider 
views of the MAIE safety work as well: As is mentioned in chapter 3, MAI -  
which then included MAIE -  was in 1993 presented with a national award for its
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safety approach, and in 1995, MAIE won a regional safety award and was also 
named HSE champion of the year within Magnum Industries' Extrusion Group.
MAIE organisational members are proud of the way they perceive their work place 
to emphasise safety issues. They also express pride in the widely shared construct 
that MAIE is a more safety conscious plant than most other organisations, and they 
appreciate that the outside world acknowledges this perceived safety excellence.
The self-perception of being a first-class safety organisation is very often 
communicated by an overwhelming majority of organisational members. When 
they talk about MAIE in general terms, its perceived safety competence is very 
frequently on the agenda.
4.8. The organisational centrality of the frontstage safety identity.
According to Czamiawska (1997), organisational identity may be looked upon as 
the temporary "end result" of a continuous organisational process of self-perception 
that includes self-respect, efficiency, autonomy and flexibility. The concept of 
identity can thus be said to be a more complex and a more stable phenomena than 
self-perception, and it can be suggested to grasp the "soul" of individuals and 
organisation.
Self-respect, efficiency and autonomy are central elements in the MAIE self- 
perception of being a distinguished safety organisation. Due to the previously 
mentioned frequency with which such perceptions -  and other perceptions of safety 
success -  come to the surface and due to the emphasis of significance I have shown 
is placed on them, MAIE organisational members can be argued to be the owners of 
a shared safety identity.
Pettigrew (1979) argues that ideally, organisational identity will impart meaning, 
motivate and resolve organisational concerns. According to this, a shared MAIE 
safety identity will impart meaning regarding MAIE safety efforts. Such shared 
meaning constructs have been shown to exist in MAIE safety perceptions and 
consequently in the organisational safety identity. Based in the shared identity of
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being a leading safety organisation, MADE organisational members becomes 
motivated to continue their successful safety work. And when disagreements 
concerning safety issues develop -  as in the case of an over-emphasis on the history 
of success -  the shared MADE safety identity keeps the dissension away from public 
places in order to maintain the organisational safety unity.
The concepts of frontstage and backstage arenas (Goffman 1959) will be 
extensively utilised in my analysis of MADE as a safety organisation. When 
following Goffman*s analytical framework, it can be argued that the safety identity 
which is discussed here can be termed the MAIE frontstage identity as this shared 
identity is acted out in open and public places to the benefit of both organisational 
members and an outside audience.
But due to the regular appearances among MADE employees of safety self- 
perceptions that differ from those of safety success and prominence, it can also be 
suggested that backstage safety identities exist as well as the shared frontstage one. 
These safety identities are situated in different communities of practice (Gherardi 
and Nicolini 2000b) -  they are situationally produced (Marcus 1992). They are 
differentiated and complex in their attitudes to MAIE safety, and they may be 
looked upon as subcultural identities (Brooks 1997). What characterises the 
backstage identities is the way they supplement or oppose the shared identity 
concept that is acted out in public. In their "proper” surroundings, these identities 
are performed just as legitimately as the frontstage one is acted out in frontstage 
surroundings. And as MADE frontstage and backstages normally are separate arenas 
with not much overlapping between them (Goffman 1959), the frontstage shared 
safety identity can continue to dominate MAIE rhetorics and espoused theories in 
spite of the existence of backstage safety identities. It is taken to the forefront 
(Leidner 1993) as a construct that is shared by organisational members.
There exists no other organisational area within MAIE that is referred to with 
similar frequency and with similar tones of self-respect, self-enhancement and self- 
efficiacy (Czamiawska 1997; Erez and Earley 1993, quoted in Weick 1995) as is 
the issue of safety. To the contrary, the routines and chores of daily work are often
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commented upon by organisational members in rather derogatory terms. Even 
though production issues at times are brought to positive attention, the possibilities 
of creating and maintaining pride and identity around the repetitive and somewhat 
unchallenging tasks of the production process seem to be rather limited. Safety 
matters have a positive verbal predominance at the MAIE frontstage, and 
organisational pride seems to be reserved for safety related issues. It is the frequent 
flagging in multiple formal as well as informal situations of a safety identity which 
is built upon safety success that sets the MAIE frontstage organisation apart from 
other organisations, both seen from an internal and an external point of view.
4.9. The frontstage safety identity as a unifying organisational force.
Porac et al. (1989) connect an organisation’s notions of identity to its competitive 
strategies. MAIE’s frontstage identity of safety success can be found in operation 
also when it comes to production issues: At MAIE, it is common that competitive 
strength is measured in a comparison of safety key figures with those of other 
companies. It is also frequently argued that successful safety work with its 
emphasis on quality and high work competence is a main competitive component 
which is cost-effective in the long run. Safety is thus connected to MAIE’s 
competitive strategies in a way that enhances the bond between safety and 
organisational activity in general.
Based in the discussed organisational centrality of the MAIE frontstage safety 
identity -  how it imparts meaning, motivates and resolves organisational concerns 
(Pettigrew 1979) -  and in how frontstage safety issues hold an important position in 
MAIE production and competitive concerns, it can be argued that the frontstage 
safety identity constitutes basic building bricks in MAIE’s organisational identity in 
general. Thus, the shared MAIE frontstage safety identity can be seen to function 
as a unifying organisational force.
It can also be suggested that the MADE frontstage preoccupation with safety issues 
constitutes an important MAIE organisational schema (Harris 1996; Isabella 1990;
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Stubbart and Ramaprasad 1990) -  a schema by which organisational members 
categorise and interpret organisational events.
Thus, the collectively promoted MADE frontstage safety identity produces a 
framework of unity and consensus that seems to be vital for organisational activity 
in general. It can be argued that safety takes on the role as a unifying and binding 
force in the sustainment of an integrated organisation.
4.10. Safety history and its implications for today’s organisation: a summary.
MAIE safety history has a prominent place in a majority of organisational members' 
present-day safety perceptions. It is common to evaluate today's safety situation in 
contrast to what was experienced in previous years, and with the past as a 
measuring stick, perceptions of the present safety situation become overwhelmingly 
positive.
Through an interpretation of the safety development process, a seemingly shared 
collective framework of understanding has developed concerning MAIE safety. 
Included in this framework is the perception that accidents are not the result of 
some kind of fate, but are caused by human acts and can be prevented by human 
effort. The belief that increased efforts will further improve the MAIE safety 
situation is also prominent.
When MAIE organisational members venture to explain what has caused the safety 
transformation, their interpretations are more diverse. What is generally agreed 
upon, though, is that a multitude of organisational factors have been at work. What 
is also a shared perception is that the safety development has been a gradual, 
systematic and continuous process. But also ambiguity can be found in reflections 
over MAIE safety history: Several employees -  backstage -  point to a loss of job 
autonomy due to safety bureaucratisation.
MAIE organisational members’ self-perception of their organisation promotes a 
picture of a high present-day safety consciousness which is based in past safety
123
successes as a significant connection between ’’then” and ’’now” can be found in 
numerous perceptions of MAIE safety. Thus it can be argued that what has 
happened safety-wise in the past has a direct bearing on today’s MAIE safety 
situation. These shared constructs of success and safety competence seem to be 
motivators for further safety improvements. Warnings are voiced, though, about the 
potential of a strong and continuous emphasis on safety history and success to 
produce over-confidence and complacency and thus prevent more innovative safety 
approaches.
But in spite of this, the self-perception of being a highly distinguished safety 
organisation is dominant among MAIE organisational members. They are proud of 
the way they perceive MAIE to emphasise safety issues, and they are also proud 
that the outside world considers MAIE to be a safety success history. When MADE 
organisational members talk about their place of work in general terms, the 
perceived safety competence is frequently an issue that is commented upon.
Based in this, it is argued that there exists a shared frontstage MADE safety identity 
which imparts meaning, motivates and resolves safety concerns. Backstage safety 
identities are also found to exist, but even so, the MAIE frontstage safety identity is 
shown to have a very central and prominent place in MAIE organisational life in 
general. Because of its organisational dominance, it is suggested that this frontstage 
safety identity constitutes a basic brick in MAIE’s general organisational identity, 
and thus functions as a unifying and binding organisational force, also outside the 
realm of safety affairs.
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CHAPTER 5
THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF SAFETY WORK
5.1. Introduction.
As I have shown in Chapter 4, a key perception of the MAIE safety culture is that 
the gradually developed MAIE formal safety system has been and is essential for 
the improvement of MAIE safety. This formal organising of safety work is very 
visible at present-day MAIE, and its espoused purpose is to monitor and 
continuously improve MAIE safety work. Most MAIE safety activities are included 
in this structure which is outlined in the MAIE safety manual.
In this chapter, I will focus upon the specific parts of the MADE formal safety 
system in order to analyse the system elements as they are perceived by 
organisational members. Some of the system elements are based in legal 
requirements, and some are initiated on local initiatives. I will not distinguish 
between system parts due to their origin as my intention is to concentrate upon the 
role the elements are perceived to play in today’s safety situation at MADE. I will 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of the formal safety structure and 
organisational meaning construction.
5.2. Shift safety representatives.
5.2.1. The set-up.
At each work shift, one shift member is elected to the position of shift safety 
representative. When elected, the representatives attend a safety representatives' 
training course of 40 hours' duration. Their rights and duties include participating 
in shift safety inspections, to be informed and inform about safety issues, and to 
take part in the reporting of accidents and injuries in cooperation with shift 
supervisors. They are also expected to keep an open eye on daily safety at their 
work shifts and to take safety initiatives.
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5.2.2. Shift safety representatives' role enactment
"The shift safety representatives are key actors in our safety organisation. Together 
with the shift supervisors, they have an essentia] role in the daily safety work. 
Whether a shift safety representative is active or not means a lot in the building of 
shift safety awareness", a MAIE manager says.
Two shift safety representatives talk about their role enactments:
"I really did not care much about becoming a shift safety representative, but since 
nobody else wanted the position, I was more or less told by the others that it had to 
be me. And it is okay since there is not much to say about safety at our shift. We 
are so few, and safety is taken care of by the shift supervisor and the other shift 
members on their own, so my job does not amount to much."
"I have been a shift safety representative for many years, and when I recently joined 
this shift, I was asked to become a shift safety representative once again. It is 
necessary to keep a constant eye on safety, and I try to observe what is going on at 
the different work stations of our shift group. Quite often I discuss safety issues 
with the shift supervisor, and I consider it my duty to make sure that promised 
improvements are implemented. I think it is important that shift safety 
representatives take their job seriously, and I try to do my best."
These different ways of role enactment are affirmed by MAIE organisational 
members when they comment upon shift safety representatives: Some are eager 
and active, and some are much less visible in their role enactment. Within the last 
category, some are too much influenced by shift supervisors and do not take any 
initiatives that may be interpreted as even the slightest criticism of the supervisors, 
it is said.
In order to improve their role enactment, several shift safety representatives 
maintain that they miss an arena where shift safety representatives can meet 
regularly to discuss issues of common concern. Up till now, MAIE management
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has not made it a priority to establish a shift safety representative group, and it is 
believed by those who would like to see such a group that this is due to the costs 
attached to taking shift safety representatives out of their work for meetings.
5.2.3. Differing views on shift safety representatives’ role enactment.
Whether MATE employees prefer the active or more passive shift safety 
representative role enactment is a question that is ambiguously answered by many 
employees. On one side, nearly everyone agrees that an active role interpretation is 
vital for shift safety improvement, and thus, people on the shop floor seem to share 
the managerially promoted belief that shift safety representatives have a key 
position in safety improvement work. On the other side, there are quite a few 
employees who simultaneously argue that shift safety representatives ought not to 
be too active:
"It is not the job of the shift safety representative to baby-sit shift safety. I don’t 
think he should overplay his role and interfere with how we do our job. I don’t want 
him to pester us with safety "advice"’’, one employee says.
A wish for both an active and a less active shift safety representative can thus be 
found within one and the same person's cognitive schema. Ambiguity is also 
expressed when employees evaluate the perceived importance of shift safety 
representatives' role enactment:
"To me, it doesn't seem like shift safety representatives are of much importance 
really for MAIE safety. OK, they participate in safety inspections and some other 
formal events, but that’s about it. If they were not there, I don’t think it would 
matter much”, one employee says.
In dialogues with MAIE employees in which such statements appeared, I several 
times asked whether it would be an idea to get rid of the shift safety representative 
function altogether since it seemingly did not serve any practical purpose. The 
answer to this question of mine was always very similar to this employee's reaction:
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"Oh no, of course we need shift safety representatives. They constitute an essential 
part of our safety system, although it is difficult exactly to say how. I think that just 
by being there, they contribute to the continuous focussing of safety which is a key 
issue in our safety work."
As an answer to my somewhat provocatively perceived question, some employees 
turned to MAIE history to support their argument of the importance of the shift 
safety representative function. The story of Tim, one of the pioneer shift safety 
representatives, was told in order to illustrate how an active shift safety 
representative can make a difference and focus safety through his actions:
Many years ago, the plant general manager brought some guests to show them the 
MADE production process. As they entered his work station, Tim noticed that the 
group did not wear the required protective shoes, and he told them they had to leave 
immediately due to their inadequate gear. Tim's colleagues held their breath, but 
the general manager and his guests left without saying much. A couple of days later 
Tim received a letter from the manager in which he praised Tim for his safety 
alertness and thanked him for being a good shift safety representative.
"Tim was highly respected after this incident, both among managers and employees. 
This shows how important it is to have shift safety representatives who are alert and 
courageous, and although most of their duties are rather mundane, you never know 
when their initiatives will be needed", one of the story-tellers says.
5.2.4. Shift safety representatives: a summary.
In safety regulations and organisational rhetorics, shift safety representatives have a 
prominent place as a vital element of MAIE safety efforts, and in daily work life, it 
can be seen that the prescribed functions of shift safety representatives are 
implemented according to regulations. Even so, shift safety representatives ask for 
increased cooperation within their group to promote a more active and creative role 
enactment, but so far this wish has not been attended to.
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Whether shift safety representatives play the essential role of MAIE safety as is 
proclaimed in organisational rhetorics is differently evaluated by MAIE 
organisational members. Whether shift safety representatives themselves want to 
play an active role in safety improvement work is also an issue of differing 
opinions. And whether employees want them to interfere in daily work tasks or not 
is a question of disagreement and ambiguity among MAIE workers. What there is 
consensus about, though, is the perception that the shift safety representative 
function is as vital as ever, even if it may be difficult to point to specific safety 
achievements because of shift safety representative efforts nowadays. But as a 
means of safety focussing and a symbol of safety tradition and awareness, safety 
shift representatives seem to possess a significant place in organisational actors' 
safety perception.
53 . Shift safety inspections.
5.3.1. The set-up.
Shift safety inspections are scheduled to take place monthly at all MAIE work 
shifts, and usually, they are carried out according to plan. Inspection participants 
are the shift supervisor, the shift safety representative, and at times also the 
production manager. The purpose of the inspections is to monitor shift safety and 
to bring new safety issues onto the shift safety agenda.
53.2. How shift safety inspections are carried out
The sight of shift safety inspection participants who walk around the work station, 
stopping to watch a work operation or to study machinery or other objects is well- 
known to shift members. As the "inspectors" watch, ask and discuss, specific issues 
are written down on the inspection list for later attention.
What can be seen when observing shift safety inspections is the different ways that 
inspections are carried out. At some shifts, the shift supervisor is the one who is the 
dominant member of the group, while at others, the shift safety representative acts
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as an informal leader who takes initiatives and is the group secretary. And at some 
shifts, the inspection group members spend considerable time talking to shift 
members about safety issues, while at other shifts the shift safety inspection may 
take place with hardly any communication with shift members at all.
What also differs is the way shift safety inspections are handled before and after the 
actual inspection: At some shifts, inspection group members meet beforehand to 
plan the inspection and to summarise what has been done - or has not been done -  
about issues brought forward in the last shift safety inspection. At other shifts, the 
inspection begins without such a session. And as will be discussed later, the 
regularity of shift safety meetings to follow inspections also varies among shifts.
53.3. Shift safety inspections as means of safety improvement.
The typical shift safey inspection list comes up with 3 to 10 work issues which are 
to be further considered safety-wise. In shift safety inspection no. 4/94 at one shift, 
the following issues are noted: Water on the floor to be removed, a car is wrongly 
parked in front of one of the outside doors, a new shelf is needed, aluminium 
rubbish by a wall is to be removed, and more storing place for work equipment is 
needed. The inspection list for shift safety inspection no. 3/94 at another shift 
shows these issues: Damaged lamp and faulty tap must be repaired, dirt under 
extrusion tool equipment to be removed, containers for disused aluminium need a 
fixed place, inconvenient lamps to be removed, fire extinction equipment by door 
lacks required control sheet, small fault with crane mechanism, and loose and 
damaged floor grate in outdoor area. What can be found on both lists is the name of 
the person who is responsible for handling each issue and the time period within 
which it is to be fixed.
These two lists feature characteristic examples of the type of issues normally 
focussed at inspections. Broadly, it can be said that the majority of issues can be 
put into two categories: work equipment issues and housekeeping issues.
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"Regular shift safety inspections are invaluable instruments for our safety 
improvement work. It is through the inspections that we become aware of the 
majority of the MAIE safety problems, and it is based in these findings that we seek 
new safety solutions. Safety inspection lists set the agenda in our safety work, and 
by participation in the inspections, employees strongly influence what safety is all 
about," one MAIE manager says.
The large majority of MAIE employees agree with this managerial statement. 
Through the years, many safety issues have been resolved as a result of being 
focussed during shift safety inspections, it is said. Based on this perception, most 
employees believe that when a problem is put on the inspection list, chances are 
good that a solution will be found - or at least it will be explained why it is difficult 
to solve the problem immediately due to economic or technical reasons. Since shift 
safety inspection lists are supposed to be checked over and over until the noted 
problems are resolved, employees consider inspection lists as essential tools for 
safety improvement.
Although MAIE organisational actors may differ in their evaluation of the 
immediate results of shift safety inspections, there is full consensus about the 
importance of the inspections as an institution. It is emphasised by managers and 
employees alike that they make a difference for MAIE safety by their mere 
existence. The regularity of safety shift inspections is an important means to keep 
safety issues constantly focussed, it is argued.
5.3.4. Some employee reflections about shift safety inspections: questions in 
spite of consensus.
Along with the commonly shared positive perception of shift safety inspections, 
ambiguity can also be found. Some employees point to what they perceive as a 
paradox when they compare shift safety inspections with the daily work situation:
It is argued that inspection participants often encounter the same situations they 
write down in their inspection reports without taking much notice of them when 
being out of the inspection framework. It is asked whether issues are "saved" for
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the formal inspection since there is believed to exist an informal requirement for a 
minimum of issues to be noted down during inspections.
What is of concern for quite a few employees is what they perceive as an increasing 
inspection focus on housekeeping:
"I don't know - it seems that shift safety inspections mostly have become rather 
banal housekeeping inspections. Although good housekeeping is important for 
safety, you don’t need safety inspections to clean your house. Rather, I think that 
more specific safety issues ought to be more numerous on inspection lists than is the 
case now. I find it rather pathetic when a large portion of the listed "problems" 
have to do with water on the floor and displaced profiles. Mop the floor and 
remove the profiles, and save the shift safety inspection for more substantial 
issues!", one employee argues.
His reflection is echoed by a significant number of employees, and when discussing 
this, a couple of possible reasons for the housekeeping focus are mentioned: Is it 
the result of a safety situation in which most safety issues are resolved or is it the 
result of a reluctance to raise the "real" safety issues? Different answers point to 
different perceptions of the MAIE safety reality.
Some employees argue that due to the way some shift safety inspections are carried 
out, inspection group members' safety perspectives only come to the forefront. 
Safety issues based in ordinary employees' perceptions of their work situation are 
not focussed, and those being responsible for this are some shift supervisors who 
really are not much interested in the inspections, it is argued.
53.5. Shift safety inspections: a summary.
MAIE shift safety inspections are carried out as intended, and a general consensus 
exists among organisational members about their necessity. The inspections are 
said always to have functioned as key tools of safety improvement, and their role 
today is interpreted to be as important as ever, both to resolve specific safety
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problems and to keep the MAIE safety focus alive. Shift safety inspection lists are 
seen as a main instrument for safety problem solving and for the setting of the 
MAIE safety agenda.
In spite of this consensus, ambiguities and questions about shift safety inspections 
exist. It is asked whose safety perceptions dominate the inspection lists, and it is 
seen as a paradox that issues which are focussed during the inspections may be left 
in peace during the ordinary work day. Most of all, though, it is asked if 
housekeeping problems have achieved a too dominant place among inspection 
issues and thus have gained an unduly position in MAIE safety work.
The institution of shift safety inspections seems to be perceived as important both as 
a direct instrument of safety improvement and as a symbol for the upkeep of good 
safety traditions, and shift safety inspections hold a significant place in 
organisational members’ positive perception of the MAIE safety culture.
5.4. Shift safety meetings.
5.4.1. The set-up.
After a shift safety inspection, a shift safety meeting is to be arranged. Meeting 
participants are the shift safety inspection group, the shift members, the safety 
manager and frequently also the production manager. The purpose of the meeting is 
to inform about and discuss safety issues that have surfaced during the inspection, 
and also to discuss the shift and plant safety situation in general.
5.4.2. How shift safety meetings are carried out - or not carried out.
It can be observed that shift safety meetings are arranged with less regularity and 
with greater difference in form than shift safety inspections.
The press extrusion shifts have regular shift safety meetings with a set agenda: The 
shift supervisor informs about the "results" of the latest inspection, and the safety
133
manager informs about reported incidents and key safety figures as well as talking 
about the plant safety situation in general. Finally, the production manager might 
talk about production results and new production plans. Also, information of 
general plant policy issues may be given. Meeting participants are encouraged to 
come up with questions and comments to the presented issues, and a meal is served 
during or after the actual meeting.
Other shifts have less regular formal shift safety meetings, but at least once every 
six months, all shifts hold a general shift meeting where safety issues are on the 
agenda. In the interval between these meetings, some shifts may have the 
occasional formal shift safety meeting, while others have more informal meetings 
which overlap with a coffee break. At some shifts, these informal meetings are 
often announced right before they take place, and if the work situation requires it, 
they might be postponed to another day. Management representatives may or may 
not participate in these irregular and informal shift safety meetings.
"I have asked our shift supervisor why we don’t have more “real” shift safety 
meetings. We have discussed this among shift members, and we agree that we 
would like to have regular and formal meetings. I don't know why, but he was not 
enthusiastic about my suggestion. Maybe he thinks it is too much work for him. Or 
maybe he felt that there was some criticism of him inherent in my question. But at 
least he promised to consider it", a shift safety representative tells.
5.43. Ambiguous perceptions of shift safety meetings.
Most MAIE employees praise shift safety meetings as important means to further 
improve work safety. They have differing views when considering the meetings in 
detail, though.
"Shift safety meetings are OK, but I wish they were not as boring as they are. It is 
always the same - key safety figures, production information, bragging about how 
good we are in our safety performance. I wish some new issues could appear on the
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meeting agenda, and I know that at some MAI departments, they discuss many 
interesting things," one employee says.
Another comments upon shift safety meetings in this way: "They are important in 
order to keep the safety focus at MAIE. And I appreciate them because they give us 
an opportunity to meet with management in a way we never do during the work 
day."
"Shift safety meetings are boring, and there is not much of a dialogue between us 
and management at there. They talk and talk, while we just sit there. But what is 
nice, though, is that the shift is together and we have a nice meal. It is a break in 
our daily routines and a social event for us. I like to be together with my shift mates 
like this, it makes me feel as part of something," a third employee says.
"I find it valuable to be informed about MAIE safety and the general organisational 
situation at shift safety meetings. These regular meetings is a proof of the MAIE 
safety emphasis," says another employee.
All MAIE managers share a belief in the importance of shift safety meetings: "Shift 
safety meetings are vital as information and discussion arenas to keep the safety 
focus and organisational safety learning constantly alive. At shift safety meetings 
we discuss and evaluate our safety practices in order to become more safety 
conscious," one manager says. He is echoed by the other MAIE managers in this 
view.
The fact that shift safety meetings are irregularly arranged at some shifts are rather 
vaguely commented by managers, and they may say that some shift supervisors 
have a daily safety dialogue with shift members and thus are in small need of 
formal meetings. MAIE managers are also aware of the evaluation of shift safety 
meetings as boring and being dominated by one-way communication, and it is said 
that it is a managerial wish to introduce new themes at the meetings in order to 
make them more interesting. As yet, though, nothing much has been done to 
change the traditional shift safety meeting agenda.
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5.4.4. Shift safety meetings: a summary.
In line with organisational rhetorics, shift safety meetings are looked upon by 
MAIE organisational members as arenas for safety information and safety learning 
and are thus considered vital for the continuous safety focus that MAIE prides itself 
to be a proponent of. But employees perceive other functions of shift safety 
meetings as well: They are looked upon as a chance to meet with managers face to 
face, and they are considered to be important social and shift identity building 
events.
Shifts in which the meetings are regularly arranged are considered by work 
colleagues to have high standards in their safety work as the regularity of the 
meetings is perceived to evidence systematic attempts to improve safety. Shift 
safety meetings thus seem to be associated with high safety awareness in MAIE 
safety perceptions.
Shift safety meetings as an organisational institution is looked upon by the large 
majority of MAIE organisational members as vital for keeping up and expanding 
good safety work - in spite of the fact that a significant number of employees 
having critical remarks about the existing agenda of shift safety meetings. Shift 
safety meetings holds a prominent place in organisational members' perception of 
MAIE safety reality, and the meetings seem to be perceived as instrumental as well 
as a having a social and symbolic function in MAIE safety performance.
5.5. Safety procedures.
5.5.1. The set-up.
At the time of my fieldwork, the MAIE handbook of safety procedures consisted of 
42 specific procedures. The procedures include regulations about how to handle 
chemicals, how to load profiles onto semi-trailers, how to file accident reports, the 
use of personal protective equipment and rules for many other specific work 
operations.
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5.5.2. Safety procedures - from general praise to practical implementation.
MAIE safety rhetorics emphasises that all safety procedures are to be complied with 
by all organisational members in all work situations.
Employees praise the safety procedures as a means of accident prevention in their 
daily work and also as a symbol of MAIE safety awareness. Besides, the 
procedures are appreciated in their function of establishing limits for what can be 
expected of workers in the production process. Due to the centrality of safety 
procedures in organisational rhetorics, it is next to impossible for shift supervisors 
or managers to request work operations that are in opposition to formal safety 
procedures even if they wanted to do so, employees say. Very few instances of 
work requests that are inconsistent with MAIE safety procedures are in fact 
mentioned by MAIE organisational members.
The positive front stage evaluation of the detailed safety procedures is 
supplemented by MAIE employees’ backstage evaluations:
"In my opinion there are too many safety procedures. It is impossible to recognise 
all of them, and you get fed up when there are so many. I think too many safety 
regulations are harmful for our safety motivation in general - soon you cannot cross 
the floor without having to observe specific safety regulations. But on the other 
side, there are work situations in which I think there ought to be more detailed 
safety procedures, so I don’t know. This is not easy," one employee says.
Another employee explains: "Everyone knows that if we worked in accordance 
with all safety rules we would never be able to finish our work within reasonable 
time limits. It is not as if we consciously break safety procedures, it is more like 
adapting the procedures to our work situation in order to make things function in 
daily work life".
"It is too inconvenient to follow every detail in the safety procedures, and I admit 
that laziness is one of the motives for not doing so. And besides, if we followed
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every safety rule, we would work so slowly that there would be no room for 
breaks," a third employee says.
Such situational safety constructs frequently surface when employees are out of 
reach of MAIE managers. Employees argue that their shift supervisors and 
managers agree that interpretation of safety procedures is necessary in daily work 
life in order to get things done. But it is also said that it is best to avoid referring to 
situational safety interpretations, since an open discussion probably would force 
shift supervisors and managers to claim that there is nothing like legitimate 
situational safety constructs and that MADE safety procedures are meant to be 
followed by the letter in all situations.
And even in backstage surroundings, MAIE employees talk about their safety 
procedure adaptations in rather generic terms without being very specific about 
their actual "rule violations". It is claimed that common sense and rules of the 
thumb which have developed during work experience are at the base of a careful 
adaptation of safety procedures, and that competent workers thus know how to 
handle these situations.
The limits for situational adaptation of safety procedures and potential difficulties 
attached to such a practice are also debated:
"When I do not follow the book precisely, I kind of have my own safety procedures, 
and I do not act hazardously. All my actions are always well within good safety 
limits. But I know that if something happened while I was taking a safety short-cut, 
then it would mean trouble for me", one employee says.
MAIE managers say they do not know about adaptations of the MAIE safety 
procedures in specific work situations. They also argue that if they knew, they 
would immediately call a stop to such practice. Thus, the acknowledgement of 
situational safety interpretations as useful tools of work is seemingly not shared by 
managers and employees.
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For an observer of MAIE work situations, it is difficult to point to specific work 
situations in which it is evident that safety procedures are violated. When safety 
regulations are adapted to “fit” specific work tasks, this takes place subtly and is not 
bragged about. It can be suggested that due to this strategy, it is possible to carry on 
an adaptation of safety procedures without violating the MAIE shared perception of 
the benefit of detailed safety procedures.
5.5.3. Personal protective equipment - a safety area of individual discretion?
There is one category of adapted safety procedures, though, that is easy to explore 
into for an observer: The individual utilisation of prescribed personal protective 
equipment is visible for all.
The wearing of hard hats is mandatory all over the production hall at all times. It is 
uncommon to see employees without their hard hat on, and if this happens, it is the 
rule that a colleague, a shift safety representative or a supervisor reminds the 
employee about this failure to comply with safety procedures. (Shift safety 
representatives are by some employees called "hard hats representatives" due to 
their perceived eagerness to notice these safety violations). The constant wearing of 
hard hats seems to be an accepted and unquestioned norm of the MAIE safety 
culture, and the same can be said about protective shoes which as a rule are worn all 
the time by all employees.
Personal protective equipment which is required at specific hall areas and during 
specific work operations may be glasses, gloves, hearing protective devices, and 
long shirt sleeves. It is not uncommon to observe that the prescribed use of such 
equipment is not implemented by both employees and shift supervisors.
"I am aware that I do not use hearing protection even if I am supposed to, but it is 
so uncomfortable to wear those ear plugs. They make me feel isolated from the rest 
of the world," one employee says.
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"It is a nuisance to keep taking the glasses on and off depending on my work tasks, 
so I guess I sometimes do not use them as I am required to. Sometimes I forget, and 
sometimes I am too lazy to take them on," another employee says.
Personal convenience, laziness, forgetfulness and job competence are the 
explanations which are given for non-compliance to personal protective equipment 
safety regulations. Some employees also mention negative motivation that 
originates in shift supervisors' occasional neglect of the proper procedures.
What can be observed is that organisational members often are left in peace when 
they choose not to use personal protective equipment. Although reminders may 
come from work colleagues and shift supervisors, these reminders seem to be of a 
different vigour than those regarding hard hats. And not infrequently, the neglect is 
not commented upon by anyone. Apparently, it is left to individuals' discretion to 
decide whether it is necessary always to adhere to prescribed safety procedures 
about personal protective equipment. The norms of the MAIE safety culture seem 
to provide legitimacy for such personal cost-benefit decisions.
5.5.4. Safety procedures: a summary.
The MAIE safety procedures are praised as important tools to prevent work injuries, 
and they are presented in organisational rhetorics as absolute instructions which are 
to be followed under all circumstances.
Backstage, it is discussed among MAIE employees whether there are too many or 
too few safety procedures. It is argued unanimously that a smooth and effective 
production would be impossible without an adaptation of safety procedures to the 
actual work situation. Besides, worker convenience may also be a reason for 
situational interpretation of the procedures in the specific work context, it is argued. 
The construct of situational safety is acknowledged as a rational one by employees, 
and its practical implementations are done subtly without much open talk. Hence, 
the shared concept of adherence to all safety procedures can exist simultaneously, 
undisturbed by situational interpretations in daily work life.
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The implementation of safety procedures regarding personal protective equipment 
seems to hold a special position within the MAIE safety culture. Except for hard 
hats and protective shoes, organisational members to a large degree are allowed to 
use their own discretion about when to comply to personal protective equipment 
regulations. It might thus be suggested that situational safety definitions are 
considered legitimate when it comes to evaluating the benefits of personal 
protective equipment.
5.6. Safety and work training.
5.6.1. The set-up.
All new employees attend a basic safety course arranged by MAI safety personnel 
before they start work at MAIE. When the new employees begin their job at their 
designated work shift, they are given general and specific safety information and 
receive on-the-spot work and safety training.
Shift supervisors are responsible for arranging the necessary safety and work 
training in order to enable new employees to become competent shift members. It 
is delegated to the shift supervisors to organise the training programme, and 
common procedures for the implementation of training are not followed.
5.6.2. Evaluation of training from the training providers.
MAIE managers argue that training of newcomers in order to make them safe 
workers is best attained by work training in the specific work situation. According 
to managers, this training is most competently organised and implemented by those 
who know the specifics of the shift situation, and managers are in general satisfied 
with how training is taken care of at shift level. There is nothing to indicate that 
new employees are involved in more work accidents than other employees, and this 
shows that MAIE training efforts are successful, managers say.
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But still, some doubt comes forward regarding the ability of all shift supervisors to 
be competent training organisers:
"I don't know - maybe we ought to formalise our training efforts a bit more than we 
do since I am not sure that all shift supervisors are able to - or even see the 
importance of - extensive supervision and training for newcomers. I know that 
there are significant differences in how shift supervisors handle this, and it is 
unsatisfactory if it is dependent upon shift supervisory attitudes whether the training 
is good enough or not," one manager says.
At some shifts, the shift supervisor designs a training schedule in which he, the shift 
safety representative and some workers have designated roles. But it seems to be 
the most common model of training that the shift supervisor delegates the training 
to experienced workers who are to work closely with the newcomers for a period of 
time. Thus, shift colleagues most often act as the de facto trainers of new 
employees.
"I think the way we train new employees directly on the work spot is a good way of 
learning. When I am a trainer I show them how to handle their job tasks, I talk 
about safety issues, and I supervise their work closely in the beginning. And I tell 
them to ask whenever they are in doubt about something. It differs how long it 
takes before they are able to work on their own, and some of them do not ask much 
and seem to me to be rather uninterested. But others quickly become competent 
workers," one experienced employee says.
Most “old” MADE employees find the training of newcomers to be well taken care 
of, and many of them point to improvements from their own training experience - 
which was next to nothing - to support their views. Some shift supervisors 
emphasise that newcomers differ in their training needs, and that the informality of 
the training allows flexibility to take care of such differences. But some employees 
come forward with supplementary views:
142
"I don't dislike to train new employees, but I wish there were some guidelines for 
this. As it is today, I feel that the shift supervisor "dumps” the training 
responsibilities on us without caring much about what we do. It would have been 
better if we had discussed and agreed about what is to happen during the training 
period", one employee says.
Another one says: "I don't think our training is good enough. What I observe is 
that after the so-called training period, the majority of new employees are not 
competent to work on their own. In my work capacity, I have to monitor them, and 
quite often I have to ask them to do things differently. I know they find me a 
nuisance. I have asked my shift supervisor a couple of times if we could plan the 
training better in order to cover all work tasks, but he has been less than lukewarm, 
and nothing has happened. I guess he thinks I stick my nose into something that is 
none of my business".
5.6.3. Evaluation of training from the training receivers.
"I was quite surprised by the training I was given when I came to MAIE. What 
happened was that the shift supervisor mentioned some safety regulations, and then 
I was "handed" to an employee whom I was to be supervised by for a period of 
time. He was nice enough, but what he mainly did was to tell me to ask him if I 
was unsure about anything. I have been employed at a MAI department before I 
came here, and there is a huge gap in the quality of the training I received at MAI 
compared to this. I have to say that I am shocked - they like to talk about safety 
excellence, but the work and safety training does not support such a statement," 
says one of the younger employees.
This employee is echoed by other young employees in an evaluation of the work 
and safety training for newcomers. Many of them talk about their discomfort of 
what they perceive as being left more or less on their own from the very beginning 
as is exemplified by one young employee when he looks back upon his first days 
and weeks at MAIE:
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"I felt totally out of place. I was too shy to ask for help and advice, and 
consequently, I was slow to learn my job tasks. I know that my shift colleagues 
thought me lazy since I did not take initiatives, but that was not the case. It had 
been great if there had been more specific training. I know I would have learned 
quicker then".
But there are also other voices among MAIE newcomers:
"My training period was quite good. I know I was lucky since I joined a shift in 
which the shift supervisor takes an active interest in training. The supervisor 
monitored my training, and he systematically informed me about new issues as I 
gradually learned more. It is a pity that work and safety training at MADE is so 
dependent upon supervisory interest and competence.”
The majority of the MAIE newcomers - the receivers of the work and safety 
training - evaluate the training to be of a lower quality than the training providers 
do. Thus there can be said to exist differing perceptions at MADE concerning the 
design and implementation of the plant work and safety training. These differences 
of perception are commonly not revealed in open ffontstage settings, though, but 
can be found in sheltered backstage situations.
5.6.4. Handling of heavy profiles: a neglected area of work training.
Manual lifting of heavy profiles takes place at many MAIE work stations, and 
although mechanical lifting devices are installed at some places to protect worker 
backs and muscles, these devices cannot fully compensate for the strains caused by 
the continuous handling of heavy loads of profiles. At some work stations, 
mechanical lifting devices have not been installed at all.
Some of the MAIE old-timers remember that long ago, a physiotherapist came to 
MADE and talked about lifting techniques which prevented back and muscle 
injuries, and a few workers remember they have seen brochures about this issue. 
Other workers cannot remember that coping with the hazards of extensive lifting
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has been included in their training, and young employees are quite certain they have 
never been involved in training where proper lifting techniques were on the agenda.
"When you think about our daily work tasks, it is rather awful that such training is 
not a priority at MAIE. I guess this has to do with the invisibility and long-term 
perspective of injuries caused by failure to lift properly. And besides, such training 
would never produce any improvement in the safety statistics since these injuries 
are not included there, and I think this is a reason why nothing much is done as 
there are no statistical incentives to improve the situation. It seems we have to take 
personal responsibility to prevent these injuries - which is not easy in a busy work 
day," one employee says.
5.6.5. Safety and work training: a summary.
MAIE management and the majority of employees praise on-the-spot training, and 
they emphasise the informality of this training as vital for the handling of different 
training objectives and individuals' differing training needs. Still, some would like 
to see formal procedures and guidelines to ensure the quality of the training. They 
argue that today, too much is dependent upon shift supervisors' interest and ability 
to organise a good training situation.
Several of the training receivers - the MAIE newcomers -  are negative in their 
evaluation of the MAIE training efforts. The perceived lack of training structure 
and its random implementation is frequently commented upon, and it is also 
mentioned how the informality of the training can be disadvantageous to persons 
who are shy and socially reserved. New employees who are satisfied with their 
training point to their good fortune of having a shift supervisor with training interest 
and capability.
There seems to exist a gap between how the MAIE training efforts are perceived 
among a majority of training providers and training receivers. Seen from different 
perspectives, they evaluate the MAIE training processes differently, thus bringing 
forward multiple interpretations of the MADE safety and work training system.
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No systematic training is provided about how to handle heavy profiles in order to 
minimise back and muscle injuries. It is generally perceived that the prevention of 
such damages is a personal responsibility, and this situation is by some suspected to 
be the result of the non-acuteness of these injuries and their lack of inclusion in 
statistical safety records.
5.7. Accident and incident reporting.
5.7.1. The set-up.
The purpose of the reporting of accidents and dangerous incidents is to learn from 
these events in order to prevent accidents in the future. According to MAIE safety 
procedures, all accidents leading to person and equipment injuries and all dangerous 
incidents are to be immediately reported to the safety manager. The reporting form 
asks who was involved, what happened, the type of injury, if personal protective 
equipment was used, what was the cause of the accident/incident, and suggestions 
to prevent the same event from happening again. The form is filled in by the shift 
supervisor and the shift safety representative based on details from the one(s) being 
involved in the accident or dangerous incident.
The monthly number of MADE accidents and incidents is communicated to all 
shifts, including descriptions of the type of injuries and dangerous incidents that 
have taken place. More detailed information about occurrences is occasionally 
posted on hall and shift wall boards.
5.7.2. What is reported-
It is commonly heard among MADE organisational members that the reporting of 
accidents and incidents is a vital tool of accident prevention. Thus it is in the 
interest of everyone that all unwanted events are duly reported so that the 
organisation can learn where safety improvements are needed, it is said.
146
At many occasions, MAIE managers emphasise the importance of reporting, and 
they try to encourage employees to report more extensively. Although they are 
satisfied that the number of reported accidents and incidents have improved over the 
years, they are still convinced that not all "reportable" events in fact are reported.
In three randomly chosen months during my fieldwork (March 1994/February 
1995/October 1995) there were reported zero/zero/zero accidents involving absence 
from work, one/two/one accidents involving person injuries, four/one/one events 
involving equipment damage, and zero/three/two dangerous incidents. In the 
fourteen months from September 1994 until October 1995 the number of MAIE 
reports were as follows: two reports of accidents involving absence from work, 17 
reports of accidents involving person injuries, and 42 reports of dangerous 
incidents.
Injured ankles account for the accidents involving work absence, and among the 
person injuries there are reports of acid in face and eye, cut on arm, crushed finger, 
bum on arm and particles in eyes. Reports involving dangerous incidents include 
profiles that fell off a semi-trailer, extrusion tools that fell down onto the floor, 
someone who tripped due to disorderly conditions on the plant floor, a profile that 
fell down on somebody’s wrist, a crane load that was near the body of an employee 
and newly extruded profiles that took an unexpected course on the conveyor belt.
5.73 , - and what Is not reported.
Not a single person at MAIE will argue that all accidents, injuries and dangerous 
events are reported. Different explanations why this is not the case exist:
"It is absurd to argue that all types of injuries are to be reported. I mean, almost 
daily someone gets a cut or a small bum - what we call "trade mark" injuries. There 
is no sense in reporting these because they will always happen and cannot be 
prevented at a place like MAIE. So it is a waste of time to report them", one 
employee says.
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"The reporting of incidents takes time, and I must feel sure of the necessity to 
report before I do so. Smaller incidents are not worth the time and effort of 
reporting - if you report all these, you would be doing nothing else. For instance, I 
think it is absurd to report a limited oil leak on the floor. It is much better to 
remove the oil there and then and being done with it in that way. But they say we 
ought to report this as a dangerous incident", another employee says.
"I do not like to see my name in reports, so I guess I do not report as much as is 
wanted by management. Of course, some incidents have to be reported, but in other 
cases, I try to judge whether it is necessary to report or not. I know I am not the 
only one who thinks like this even if it is "wrong"," a third employee says.
Employees also point to previous experiences of reporting in which they found the 
feed-back of their reporting to be far from satisfactory:
"If you take management’s words seriously and do report, then it is demotivating for 
further reporting if there is not much response in way of work process or equipment 
improvement. When you experience this, you think twice before you report next 
time", one employee says.
What these quotes evidence is the situational interpretations among MALE 
employees about when and what to report and when and what not to report. 
Different norms for reporting seem to exist all over the plant, and according to 
many employees, reporting frequency differs between shifts. These differences are 
explained by shift supervisor and shift safety representative emphasis on the 
importance of reporting.
5.7.4. Reporting as a source of safety learning.
Official MAIE rhetorics states that the reporting of accidents and dangerous 
incidents is a main resource for safety learning and improvement, and MALE 
managers continually emphasise the safety learning perspective when promoting 
more extensive reporting. Both managers and employees maintain that over the
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years, reports have led to many safety improvements, and this shows the importance 
of increasing the amount of reports for a further reduction of work accidents, it is 
said.
In spite of this general agreement, many MAIE organisational members argue that 
the safety learning which originates from reports leaves much to be desired. The 
question that is raised is if information and feed-back from accidents and dangerous 
incidents is given in such a way that it initiates systematic safety learning.
Several MAIE employees argue that not much is done with accident and incident 
reports except for the filing of them, the transferring of them into statistics and the 
sporadic production of summaries which are distributed to shifts and/or posted on 
wall boards. These rather unsystematic ways of handling reported issues are not in 
line with the intentions of safety learning, it is said.
"I do not know much about accidents and even less about dangerous incidents at 
MADE except what takes place at my own shift. You hear rumours, but the 
information about unwanted events is not good enough. Maybe sometimes I see a 
report where some incidents are mentioned, but that's it. They can't expect us to 
read every note on the wall boards, and I don't even know if all information is 
posted there", one employee says.
MAIE managers acknowledge that they have not as yet found the ultimate way of 
ensuring that accident and incident information is systematically spread to all 
organisational members although they claim that the information is easily accessible 
for all who cares to know. It has been repeatedly debated whether it is an idea to 
circulate all reports all over the plant, but the problem of involved persons' 
anonymity has so far prevented this from taking place. But if such a routine can 
improve safety learning, it ought to be considered in spite of its unpleasant sides, 
according to many employees and managers alike.
The issue of safety learning based on reports is not only a question of good 
information routines, however
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"You know what really makes me angry is what often is written down as the reason 
for an accident or a dangerous incident. Not infrequently it is said that the 
employee was not careful enough and this is why the accident took place. I am 
tired of such phrases as the only explanation. I think they ought to find out if there 
are reasons why employees act unsafely and if it has something to do with work 
conditions at the shift, stress at work, etc. It is too convenient just to put down 
employee carelessness and that's it. There isn't much worthwhile to be learned from 
this", one employee says.
This employee is echoed by several employees who question the limited range of 
explanations for work accidents and unwanted incidents appearing in reports. A 
seeming lack of interest in causes which are related to the broader work process 
prevent a thorough evaluation of the situation in which the accident or dangerous 
incident took place, it is said. Many employees state that when this is neglected and 
the cause of accidents are individualised, the potentially useful feed-back from 
unwanted events will be restricted and organisational safety learning will suffer.
But there are also many MAIE employees who find individuals' unsafe acts to be 
the correct explanations for the majority of accidents and dangerous incidents:
"I am convinced that most accidents happen because we do not take proper care.
We take safety short-cuts due to personal convenience, and it is thus often quite 
accurate when it is stated that accidents happen due to individual violations of 
safety regulations. What we can learn from this is to take better care and follow the 
safety procedures strictly," one employee says.
During my fieldwork, I never heard that MAIE management raised the lack of more 
complex accident and incident explanations as an issue of concern. As previously 
noted, their main wony was how to increase the number of reported incidents and 
how to design information routines in order to spread knowledge about accidents 
and incidents for the improvement of organisational safety learning.
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5.7.5. The meaning of reports: different constructs.
The most obvious meaning of accident and incident reports is the one promoted by 
official rhetorics which emphasises reports as a vital tool for safety learning and 
improvement. This interpretation is shared by a majority of MAIE organisational 
members, and it also forms the background for employees' cited discontent with 
how reports are written and utilised as means of safety learning.
But another interpretation of the managerial quest for more extensive reporting is 
brought forward by some employees:
"When you look at how little is done with reported issues, it makes you wonder if 
the much-talked-about importance of reporting has more than one motive. At shift 
safety meetings our safety "results" are compared with those of other plants within 
our corporate group, and if one of the plants has a period with little reporting, this is 
commented upon. It seems to me that the mere number of reports is important in 
order to stand forward as a safety conscious plant, and maybe management is asked 
uncomfortable questions if we have few reported issues", one employee says.
According to this interpretation of the meaning of accident and incident reports, it 
becomes more understandable if the reports are neither always acted upon nor 
systematically utilised for organisational safety learning. They serve their function 
by their mere existence, it is said.
MAIE managers do not share this interpretation of the meaning of safety reporting, 
and they deny the perceptions of corporate plant competition based on the number 
of reported issues.
5.7.6. Accident and Incident reporting: a summary.
In order to learn from accidents and dangerous work incidents, extensive reporting 
of these is encouraged by MAIE management. In spite of this and in spite of an 
improvement of the number of reported issues over the years, it is commonly
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acknowledged that only a portion of MAIE "reportable” events actually are 
reported.
Reasons not to report are said to be a refusal to report "trade mark" injuries, the 
perceived waste of time when reporting minor events, a dislike to see one's name in 
reports, and a general discouragement of reporting which is the result of what is 
perceived as unsatisfactory response to previous reporting. Shift differences of 
what is "reportable" or not is also said to exist.
Even though organisational members in general agree that reporting is important for 
organisational safety learning, differing views about accident and incident reports 
as sources of safety improvement exist. Many employees argue that systematic 
information about reported incidents are lacking, and managers acknowledge that a 
satisfying way of dealing with reports as tools for learning is yet to be found. The 
reported causes of accidents and incidents are also debated by MAIE employees, 
and several point to what they consider an overrepresentation of individualised 
explanations for unwanted events and the neglect of potentially more complex 
causes. Organisational safety learning suffers from this narrow perspective, it is 
said.
And lastly, some employees come forward with supplementary meaning constructs 
regarding accident and incident reporting: The number of reports is important in an 
evaluation of MAIE safety efforts as the amount of reported issues often is 
compared with the numbers found at other plants within the corporation.
5.8. Safety statistics.
5.8.1. The set-up.
The MADE reported accidents and dangerous incidents are registered by the safety 
manager and communicated through different safety statistics once a month to all 
levels of the organisation, including MAIE shift members and corporate 
management.
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The most widely cited key safety figure is the "H-value" which stands for the 
number of injuries involving absence from work per 1 million work hours and the 
"F-value" which gives the number of sick leave days due to injuries per 1000 work 
hours. The less cited "h-value" stands for the number of reported injuries involving 
no absence from work. The MAIE official goal is to have an "H-value" which is 
less than 5,5, an "F-value" which is less than 75 and an "h-value" which is less than 
55.
The numbers of equipment damages and dangerous incidents are shown in monthly 
reviews, and the date of the last injury leading to absence from work is also referred 
here. Besides, this date is communicated on a large wall board that is prominently 
placed in the production hall.
The quantification and visualisation of reported accidents and injuries into statistics 
and graphs are considered by MAIE managers to be an important tool to illuminate 
the MAIE safety situation, and the statistics are extensively communicated both 
internally and externally.
5.8.2. Key safety figures.
The "H-value" of MAIE for 1993 was 10,5 and the "F-value" was 165 (two injuries 
leading to absence from work). For 1994, the "H-value" was 9,5 and the "F-value" 
was 191 (two injuries leading to absence from work). For the first 10 months of 
1995, the "H-value" was 5,5, and the "F-value" was 22,4 (one injury leading to four 
days' absence from work). The "h-value" is not presented in safety reports, but the 
number of injuries not involving absence from work is referred to in the monthly 
reviews, and I have mentioned examples and numbers in section 5.7.2. As can be 
seen, both the "H-value" and the "F-value" are based in worker absence due to work 
injuries. The "H-value" represents the number of injuries and the "F-value" 
describes their seriousness.
MAIE did not reach its safety goals for 1993 and 1994. This fact was frequently 
mentioned by MAIE managers in safety meetings and at other occasions, and the
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need to pay strict attention to all safety regulations were emphasised as remedies to 
achieve better key safety figures in future.
It is difficult to find a MALE employee who can explain explicitly what the different 
key safety figures stand for, and quite a few organisational members openly admit 
that they do not have a clue about what the values represent:
"The "F-value" and the "H-value" or whatever they are called are management 
issues. When they talk about them, I can understand if the numbers are high or not 
so high, but that’s about all. I don't care much about them - what is important is 
what is behind the key safety numbers, and that is work injuries and accidents", one 
employee says.
Many MAIE employees agree to this statement. The statistical language that shapes 
their injuries into rather incomprehensible key safety figures seem to distance and 
alienate employees from these representations, and they frequently refer to key 
safety figures and other safety statistics as being primarily managerial "showcases". 
But even so -  or because of this -  safety statistical representations are one of the 
most widely discussed safety topics among MAIE employees.
5.83. The meaning of safety statistics.
As is the case with accident and incident reports, different meaning constructs are 
attached to safety key figures and safety statistics.
Front stage, MAIE managers and employees alike maintain that safety statistics are 
produced to give a picture of the plant safety situation for the sake of monitoring the 
effects of the safety work efforts. Based in this perception, key safety figures are 
looked upon as vital tools for the comparing of MAIE safety work with 
organisational safety goals and with the safety results of other companies within or 
outside the corporation. This acceptance of the espoused meaning of safety 
statistics is shared among the majority of MAIE organisational members.
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Backstage, though, a large number of employees voice their belief that safety 
statistics can be interpreted in more than one way:
"Make no doubt about it that "H-values" and "F-values" have a specific meaning 
when it comes to managerial careers and the internal competition between the 
different plants within our corporation. If our safety statistics were unsatisfactory 
over a long time period, I am sure that someone from higher up would ask awkward 
questions. I am pretty confident this would hamper MAIE managers’ further career 
prospects", one employee states.
"It seems to be very important for our managers that our key safety figures look 
nice compared to others'. They are extremely focused on our statistical results - 
sometimes it seems they are more focused on this than on the safety situation itself. 
One can only speculate about the reasons for this, but I believe it is important for 
them to keep up the image of MAIE as a safety conscious company", another 
employee says.
Even though this perceived overfocus on safety statistics is widely commented upon 
by employees backstage, it is seldom mentioned directly in discussions between 
employees and managers:
"They become upset if you hint that they are concerned with key safety figures of 
other reasons than to monitor and improve plant safety. This is an issue which it is 
unwise to talk about openly. They don't like you if you do", one employee says.
As a fieldworker I found that the issue of different interpretations of the importance 
of safety statistics was a question which was difficult to bring up among MATE 
managers. When I raised it, I was told that there was no truth in the supplementary 
meaning constructs I had encountered among employees. Evidently, MAIE 
managers found the interpretations of their safety statistical focus as a matter of 
career promotion and status growth to be insulting.
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5.8.4. Reliability of key safety figures: frontstage -
As I have commented upon in section 5.7.3., there is common acknowledgement at 
MATE that all "reportable" incidents are not duly reported. Thus, MADE safety 
statistics -  as also is the case with all other companies' safety statistics, MAIE 
employees and managers argue - are not exact representations of the plant safety 
situation.
MAIE managers as well as employees reflect about the possibilities to "cheat" on 
the statistics in order to produce "good" key safety figures. Stories are told about 
the old MAI days when incentives to hide injuries to keep them out of the safety 
reports were strong, and examples of perceived statistical manipulation in present- 
day companies are also cited. And even within MAIE’s own corporate group there 
can be raised doubts about the reliability of some plants' key safety figures:
"The culture for reporting is different from one company to another within our 
group, and consequently, I think that key safety figures coming from some plants 
are not easily comparable with safety results from other plants. Even though we all 
have the same rules for reporting and the production of key safety figures, I have a 
feeling that some plants try to "improve" their safety results", a MAIE manager 
says.
The reliability of the MAIE safety statistics is commented upon by one of the 
managers in this way:
"If our safety statistics leave something to be desired, it has nothing to do with a 
wish to keep incidents away from the statistics. Our hope is that persistent 
encouragement of more extensive reporting will produce ever more reliable safety 
statistics in the future".
According to this frontstage interpretation of the reliability of key safety figures, 
there may exist a statistical reliability problem also at MAIE. But if MAIE key
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safety figures are less reliable than they ought to be, this is not due to conscious 
statistical manipulation, but rather the result of unsatisfactory reporting routines.
5.8.5. - and backstage.
Most MADE employees share the perception that their managers focus too strongly 
on the statistical safety results, and they argue that this focus at times is 
accompanied by a greater concern for the key safety figures than for worker injuries 
and safety improvement work. Consequently, the reliability of MAIE key safety 
figures is much discussed in backstage settings, and MAIE employees may become 
quite emotional when the issue is on the agenda. A distrust in the communicated 
results can often be heard:
"The safety statistics which they constantly brag about don't represent the real 
safety situation at all. That is why we look away at shift safety meetings when 
managers present them on the overhead projector. We know they would have 
looked differently if everything was reported. The worst is that managers more or 
less force injured workers back to work before they are healed in order to save this 
"H-value". It is disgusting, and it shows that their obsession with the statistics take 
priority over the needs of injured workers", one employee says.
When a worker becomes injured, his absence from work will influence the "H- 
value" if he is absent from the day after the injury took place. And the more days a 
worker is absent, the more this will affect the "F-value". The MAIE focus on these 
key safety figures has in many employees’ perception led to a "ban" of being absent 
due to work injuries:
"You can't be away from work because of a work injury any more. This focus on 
those values has become quite absurd. You know, they call people at home and 
even visit them to "ask" them to come back to work. They say it is important not to 
become socially isolated, and that is supposedly why they offer an injured worker 
an easier job - usually some kind of meaningless copying work - in order to get him 
back to work soon. But we know this is bullshit Why don't they do the same when
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we are absent from work for other reasons? We never hear a word then,” one 
worker says.
One worker who injured his ankle and was taken to the hospital for x-raying tells: 
"While I was on the stretcher, ready to go to the hospital, I was asked by a manager 
if I would be back at work next day. This was very hurtful since it seemed to me he 
was more concerned about the safety statistics than of my health condition".
MAIE managers argue that this worker - and other workers who relate similar 
stories - have misunderstood their intentions for wanting to get people back to work 
soon. Management's low credibility in these matters, though, is based upon 
situations like the following:
Another worker than the previously mentioned one also injured his ankle at work. 
He went to the doctor, was treated for the injury, and stayed at home the next day 
since he could hardly walk. One of the MAIE managers called him and said that if 
he would like to come back to work at once, they had an easy job already arranged 
for him. The result of the phone call was that the injured worker took his car and 
showed up at work.
As his ankle was badly damaged and he hardly could stand on his feet, it was 
evident for all - including MAIE management - that he had nothing to do at the 
plant, and he soon returned home for a sick leave. But the incident angered both his 
work colleagues and the trade union representatives, and MAIE management 
admitted that the incident never ought to have taken place. Their explanation for 
why it nonetheless happened was that they had no idea his injury was as severe as it 
actually was.
"This is a good example of how MAIE managers try to manipulate key safety 
figures. Their main goal is to keep the statistics nice-looking, and they don't care a 
damn if this collides with health concerns. And they talk about safety - what kind 
of safety is it to have a man drive his car when his foot is so badly damaged that he
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becomes a dangerous driver? These incidents have to be stopped. We have told 
management so," a trade union representative says.
When I asked the injured worker why he went back to work, he said:
"They did not force me, so I guess I could have refused. But you feel a certain 
pressure when they ask you to come back soon, and they talked so nicely about how 
they had arranged an easy job for me and all, so I went".
It is argued among MAIE employees that it ought to influence key safety figures 
when a worker is unable to attend to his usual shift duties due to a work injury. If 
this becomes the case, then managerial incentives to drag people back to work in 
spite of their injuries would be smaller, and the safety statistics would become more 
credible, it is said. As it is now, the almost universally shared employee construct 
of a managerial wish to manipulate statistical results is very audible backstage, and 
it is said to be strengthened whenever employees encounter new situations that 
“confirms” this management "policy".
5.8.6. "I don't want to ruin the statistics".
"To ruin the statistics" is a phrase that is often heard at MAIE. It describes 
individuals' dislike of being the one who because of a work injury negatively 
influences “good” shift or plant safety statistics. When employees talk about the 
possibilities of becoming injured, many of them mention the statistical "results" of 
such an event as a supplementary burden to the injury itself.
"I think it would be awful if I were the one who ruined our shift safety statistics 
even if we are told not to think like this. But it is easily said - what would you feel 
if just before your shift had accomplished four years with no injuries causing 
absence from work, you were the one who wrecked this record for all the others?" 
one employee says.
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"Our shift supervisor is concerned that we should not go around and worry about 
ruining our safety statistics. We often talk about the possibility that one of us 
becomes seriously injured, and we emphasise that we will be very supportive of the 
unlucky one. But I don’t know - 1 hope it will not be me. I think it would be a relief 
if after a period of for instance two years management would say: "Now you start 
all over again - today is day zero in your new safety statistics period". The 
pressure becomes higher the more outstanding our safety record is", another 
employee says.
When an employee "ruins" the safety statistics, it may lead to rather curious 
consequences, as was the case during my fieldwork period when an injury involving 
absence happened just a short time before MAIE would have reached a one-year- 
period of no injuries causing absence from work. It was a well-known secret that 
on the day of this anniversary, all organisational members were to receive a bicycle 
helmet as a token of the accomplishment. But when the accident took place, this 
plan had to be altered. It was rumoured that the helmets were labelled with stickers 
marking the safety anniversary, and these had to be removed before the helmets 
were handed out on a later occasion under some other pretext than that of 
outstanding safety results. The story caused many laughs at MAIE - but it also 
caused concern about how the injured worker felt: His "ruining" the statistics was 
really noticed, but fortunately, he was a confident person who had fewer problems 
with this than more unsecure persons would have had, it was said.
The large production hall wall board where the date of the last injury causing 
absence from work is shown produces negative comments from several MAIE 
employees. One of the persons that himself has experienced a serious injury says:
"It is not particularly pleasant to be reminded about your accident every time you 
walk along the production hall. Even if my name was not on the board, everyone 
knew that it was about me. I didn’t like it".
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Also employees who themselves have not experienced to "ruin the statistics" show 
concern about what they consider to be an illumination of colleagues’ accidents. It 
is not necessary to display this information in such a prominent place, it is said.
MAIE managers are well aware of the employee notion of "ruining the statistics", 
and they regret that such worries exist within the MAIE safety culture. To 
counteract this, the safety manager in particular is active in telling shift members 
that key safety figures are unimportant as anything else than a measurement of what 
has happened safety-wise.
"But although I emphasise this as often as I can, I am aware of the ambiguities 
involved in this issue. I really mean that they are not to worry about the statistics - 
it is their health that matters - but at the same time I know they will worry since we 
do focus on key safety figures and the time lapse since the last injury leading to 
absence from work. I think this focus is necessary in order to keep our safety 
alertnessbe, but I don't find this situation particularly easy", says the safety 
manager.
Whether fear of "ruining the statistics” has led to avoidance of reporting injuries 
cannot be documented, and neither can it be documented that this fear promotes 
more attentive work behaviour. What can be said, though, is that the notion holds a 
central position when MAIE employees interpret their safety reality.
5.8.7. Safety statistics and employee ambiguity.
MAIE employees feel distanced from the language of safety statistics, they distrust 
statistical results, and they admit to having fears of "ruining the statistics". But in 
spite of this, employees maintain - as has been mentioned in section 5.8.3 - that the 
MAIE safety statistics offer important accounts of the plant safety situation.
This employee acceptance of safety statistics takes place for instance when MAIE 
workers compare their plant's safety results with those of other plants. Also when a 
safety evaluation of the different MAIE shifts is on the agenda, safety statistics are
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utilised in a seemingly undisputed way to establish a shift's good safety work - or 
the opposite.
The ambiguity in employee evaluation of safety statistics can be looked upon as 
being the result of situational circumstances. When MAIE workers want to rank 
themselves in a safety "hierarchy" either as an organisation or as a shift group, the 
safety statistics are their means of doing so. In such situations, their backstage 
critique of safety statistics has to be kept away.
5.8.8. Safety statistics: a summary.
The MAIE key safety figures and other safety statistics hold a prominent place in 
the MAIE safety culture. They are communicated extensively in order to visualise 
the results of the MAIE safety efforts.
MAIE employees feel distanced to the language of safety statistics, and they 
consider the statistics to be managerially "owned". But the issue of safety statistics 
is widely debated in employee backstage settings.
The official - and generally shared -  interpretation of the safety statistics is that they 
depict a picture of the present MAIE safety situation for the sake of improved 
safety. A supplementary meaning construct which is found among employees states 
that the statistics are vital for managers' career prospects and status within the 
corporation.
In MAIE frontstage situations, it is argued that the reliability of the plant's key 
safety figures is fairly good in spite of the acknowledged problem of under­
reporting. Backstage, though, a widely voiced distrust of how key safety figures are 
constructed can be found. A frequently mentioned reason for this distrust is that 
employees have been "asked" to come back to work in spite of being injured. Such 
incidents are looked upon as "evidence" of the perceived managerial focus on safety 
statistics, and it is argued that this focus diverts attention from "genuine" safety and 
health issues. The statistical focus is also emphasised in MAIE employees'
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concerns about not wanting "to ruin the statistics". Although such worries are 
verbally fought, their existence is not found to be surprising by MAIE management, 
due to the prominence of safety statistics in the MAIE safety culture.
In spite of profound employee back stage criticism of safety statistics, though, key 
safety figures are frequently utilised by MAIE employees when they evaluate the 
safety situation at different shifts and when they compare MAIE to other 
companies.
5.9. Safety ceremonies and rewards.
5.9.1. The set-up.
When a shift group has worked for a year without injuries leading to absence from 
work, this achievement is celebrated at a shift safety meeting where MAIE 
managers provide verbal praise as well as flowers to all shift members.
When several injury-free years have passed, a shift group will be publicly 
recognised as information of the achievement is prominently displayed in the 
production hall. The shift celebration at the safety shift meeting will be more 
elaborate than is normally the case, including the serving of an excellent meal. No 
significant material rewards are presented to shift members on such occasions.
5.9.2. Evaluation of safety ceremonies and rewards.
"In our safety celebrations, it is focused upon the good safety work we have done, 
and I appreciate that. Often, we hear about safety blunders and the need to improve 
our safety work, so it is nice that the things we do right also are noticed," one 
employee says.
He is echoed by many in this appreciation of safety ceremonies, and it is a widely 
shared perception among MAIE managers and employees alike that such 
ceremonies are important in order to keep up the plant safety motivation.
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MAIE’s choice not to give material rewards for good safety results is applauded by 
MAIE employees. Pioneer workers remember the "silver spoon days" of previous 
years when outstanding safety results were rewarded more substantially than they 
are now, and it is considered an improvement that the incentives to manipulate 
safety statistics because of material prizes do not exist anymore. This viewpoint is 
widely shared among MAIE organisational actors, and it is included in the official 
MAIE safety rhetorics as well.
But supplementary points of view can be found among MAIE employees. It is 
questioned whether the fear of statistical manipulation in connection with material 
prizes is overrated, and it is argued that some kind of material rewards probably 
would motivate further safety efforts.
"I think we are so safety-conscious today that we would not “hide” unsafe events in 
order to win prizes - providing the prizes are not extremely valuable. I do believe 
that safety prizes would promote a sound competition between shifts to become 
safety ’winners’, and I think our managers are too afraid to utilise the motivational 
forces in a nice prize. Many people agree with me, but this is not something that 
one talks about loudly, since it counteracts the official views about safety rewards", 
one employee says.
5.9.3. Safety celebrations and safety statistics.
Safety celebrations are intimately connected with the MAIE safety statistics. As I 
have shown in section 5.8, MAIE employees backstage question the reliability of 
these safety results, and the statistical distrust may also lead to a questioning of the 
grounds for shift safety celemonies. The skepticism seems to be strongest when a 
shift celebrates several years of injury-free work.
"We all know that the more years a shift has had no injuries leading to work 
absence, the greater becomes the pressure to keep the shift record clean. When the 
statistics proclaim many injury-free years, I think there is reason to be suspicious 
about the production of these statistics. So this is why shifts celebrating many years
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of outstanding safety results might be looked upon with some mistrust by many of 
us”, one employee says.
When commenting upon a MAIE shift which was celebrated for exceptional safety 
achievements, one employee stated:
"This is really ridiculous. Of the shift members who are praised today, I think that 
two or three have been at the shift all these years. The others are newcomers while 
previous shift members are spread to other shifts. This situation really shows how 
hopeless it is to measure shift safety results in any sensible way - and how hopeless 
it is to celebrate safety results in a manner that is perceived as fair by all of us".
These are all backstage comments and they are voiced by members of shift groups 
that are not in the process of being celebrated. Even backstage I never heard critical 
statements from shift members who were involved in actual shift celebrations 
themselves.
"Jealousy is a main force at MAIE", one employee says. "If someone receives 
something which is not attainable for everyone at the same moment, then you can 
be sure that many signs of jealousy will be displayed. There is a constant 
monitoring of others’ work conditions, and if something looks slightly more 
favourable at one work station, then you can be sure that the bickering will start 
immediately".
This employee interprets skepticism and ridicule of other shifts’ safety ceremonies 
as being based in jealousy, and he is not the only one to argue that such feelings are 
prominent at MAIE. Others say that to doubt the safety records of other shifts but 
not one’s own is quite normal behaviour
"You will defend official procedures and official statistics when they work to your 
favour, even though you are convinced they are questionable in a more general 
way", one employee says.
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Whatever the reasons, what remains a fact is that the statistical grounds for 
celebrations of outstanding safety results are scrutinised and often commented upon 
in rather unkind ways by MADE employees - while at the same time they praise 
safety celebrations as motivating for further safety efforts. The seemingly 
unresolvable problem is what measurement tools to utilise to attain a commonly 
perceived fairness within the area of safety ceremonies and rewards.
5.9.4. Safety rewards or not?
During my fieldwork period, one MADE shift was celebrated because of their seven 
years without injuries leading to work absence. The shift members received public 
praise and attended a dinner party during which they were presented with flowers 
and good words from MADE management and representatives from MAI. The MAI 
internal newspaper also covered the event.
Not long after the celebration, it became common knowledge that this shift was 
going on a study tour to one of MAIE's customers in order to gain improved insight 
into the quality requirements of this profiles purchaser. MAIE managers also 
explained the tour as a result of their belief in the importance of letting employees 
see what happened to MAIE products further down the road as this would improve 
work motivation among shift members. A tour like this was a very rare event of 
recent years at MAIE.
The shift tour lasted for a couple of days and included an overnight stay at a hotel.
It was evaluated by the participants as very successful, both regarding what they 
saw and learned at the customer plant and regarding the social benefits for the shift 
group by being together like this.
This tour became a much talked-about issue among members of other shift groups. 
One employee said:
"I think it is fine that a work shift is given the chance to travel to a customer to see 
what goes on there, and I am sure that MAIE management would gain much by way
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of enthusiasm and effort if this happened once in a while. But it never happens. So 
why does it happen now? There is one reason for that, of course. This whole 
"study tour" is a reward for this shift’s seven-year safety achievement. We all know 
that, they know it, and even one of the managers admitted this to being the case the 
other day".
"So much for the "ban" on safety rewards, really. It will be difficult now for 
management not to send another shift on a "study tour" at a similar occasion. What 
I think is quite ridiculous is the way this tour is concealed as something else than it 
really is. If management wants to start a new policy concerning safety rewards,
OK, do it. But I guess they find this a little too controversial to do openly, so they 
do it this way. I don’t think they should, though, as it gives occasion for rumours 
and speculations," another employee commented.
These comments are representative for how MADE employees outside the 
celebrating shift evaluated the event. Members of this shift were more ambiguous, 
though. Some of them stuck to the official definition of being on a study tour 
without any connection whatsoever to their safety achievements. Others expressed 
uncertainty about why they were chosen for the trip, and some said they supposed 
there was a direct connection between the tour and their outstanding safety results - 
which they found to be in good order.
MAIE management argued that the tour was a genuine study tour and that this 
particular shift was chosen due to its central position in the profiles production.
This event illustrates that the seemingly shared construct of being cautious about 
substantial safety rewards may be more ambiguous than what it initially looks like. 
What annoyed many MAIE employees was not the perception that good safety 
results were rewarded, but primarily the concealed way in which this reward was 
given - even though some had critical comments about the reliability of the stated 
results. Very few organisational members uttered concern about the more 
fundamental questions regarding the study tour/safety reward tour.
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5.9.5. Safety ceremonies and rewards: a summary.
MAIE organisational members appreciate safety ceremonies. It is, however, a 
commonly shared perception that the managerial decision not to reward safety 
results in any substantial way is a correct one. But supplementary views can also be 
found: Some employees question whether the fear of statistical manipulation 
caused by more extensive rewarding is too much emphasised.
Safety celebrations and rewards are based in safety statistics, and employees' 
ambiguities concerning statistical reliability are evident in their assessment of the 
fairness of celebrations and rewards. Especially when shifts are celebrated for 
several years very of injury-free work, a distrust in the statistical result leading to 
the ceremony is apparent. Some MAIE employees argue that the criticism of safety 
ceremonies and rewards - which never is heard when one's own shift is the subject 
of attention - is based in nothing but jealousy. Generally, it seems difficult to find a 
basis for ceremonies and rewards that is accepted as just by all organisational 
members.
When one shift was perceived to be rewarded with a “study tour” for outstanding 
safety achievement, this caused debate because of what employees interpreted as a 
managerial "cover-up" operation in which any connections between the tour and the 
shift's safety accomplishments were denied. The fundamental issue of substantial 
rewarding was barely touched upon in the debate, and this suggests that the MAIE 
shared construct concerning safety rewards might be considerably more ambiguous 
than what seems to be the case at first sight.
5.10. The formal safety structure and organisational meaning.
5.10.1. The formal safety structure as an instrument of safety improvement
The most straightforward and obvious meaning of the MAIE formal safety structure 
is to be an instrument for continuously improved work safety (e.g. Krause 1994; 
Wilpert and Qvale (eds.) 1993; Blockley (ed.) 1992). This aspect is emphasised by
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most organisational members, and they repeatedly point to the importance of the 
formal safety structure when explaining what they perceive as the safety awareness 
culture of MAIE.
While emphasising the importance of the formal safety structure, many 
organisational members also state that the systems routines were more important in 
previous days than they are now. Then there existed more obvious safety 
deficiencies and safety challenges for the formal safety structure to deal with, and it 
is evident for everybody that the formal safety structure has been imperative for the 
creation of safety consciousness and improvement, it is said. Nowadays, substantial 
safety improvements are more difficult to notice because of what has been achieved 
through the years. It is thus suggested that the MAIE formal safety structure was 
more appropriate for the handling of yesterday’s safety situation than it is today. 
Based on this, general talk about a need for renewal of the formal safety structure 
can be heard among MAIE employees and managers, without this being any central 
issue within the frontst'age safety culture.
As a conclusion it can be stated that MAIE organisational members still by and 
large value what they consider the instrumental function of the formal safety 
structure. They agree to the idea that work safety results from the correct 
application of the rules and regulations of the formal safety structure (Gherardi and 
Nicolini 2000b). What also is important, it is argued, is that the MAIE safety focus 
continuously is kept alive by the mere existence of the formal safety structure 
routines. And besides, what is written down cannot be easily overlooked, it is also 
said. Thus, the formal system is considered to be a safety guarantee by 
organisational members.
5.10.2. The formal safety structure as symbolic manifestations of the safety 
culture.
Symbols represent something else than what it looks like at first sight (Alvesson 
and Berg 1992), and when interpreting symbolic meaning, other than instrumental 
features of the concrete event have to be taken into consideration (Pondy et al.
169
1983). One way to analyse the MADE formal safety structure is to regard the 
structure and its different elements as safety symbols. Seen from this perspective, 
the existence of and implementation of the structure elements -  shift safety 
meetings, safety statistics, safety training, etc. -  can be looked upon as being more 
than instrumental means for safety improvement only.
The MAIE safety culture is the pride of most organisational members and it features 
dominantly in organisational rhetorics. According to Czamiawska-Joerges (1992; 
quoted in Gherardi et al. 1998), language is the medium of the culture, and thus, the 
MAIE safety culture becomes symbolically visible through the MAIE extensive 
safety rhetorics. And when employees and managers set out to explain the major 
traits of this perceived positive culture, they emphasise the presence of a general 
safety awareness and a constant safety focus which both are linked to the existence 
of the formal safety structure with its recurring and systematic safety 
manifestations. It may thus be suggested that the safety culture is made visible and 
trustworthy for organisational members and outsiders as well through both the 
safety rhetorics and the operationalisation of formal safety structure elements. The 
assurance of a perpetual upkeep of the MADE safety focus is in this way embedded 
in the plant formal safety structure, and the structure becomes "evidence” of a 
committed plant safety culture.
Seen from this view, it becomes understandable why MADE organisational members 
oppose the idea of removing any of the formal safety structure elements even if they 
may be ambiguous about their instrumental functions. When the structure elements 
are considered cultural expressions as well as instrumental tools of safety 
improvement, then the ambiguity that is caused by a perceived lack of 
instrumentality is overshadowed by a desire that the elements live on as visible 
manifestations of the MAIE safety culture. To remove safety structure elements 
may be interpreted as a weakening of the safety culture.
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5.10.3. The formal safety structure as organisational rituals.
Cultural expressions that take place regularly and in which the same procedure is 
followed each time may be looked upon as rituals (Alvesson 1993). The meaning 
of organisational rituals can be considered to be both instrumental and symbolic, 
depending on what perspective is emphasised in the analysis. A symbolic 
perspective will state that rituals help to preserve organisational members’ 
assumptions and beliefs and thus serve as organisational anchor points (Brooks 
1997).
The routinised implementation of the MAIE formal safety system may be looked 
upon as ritual events which work to preserve organisational members' safety beliefs 
and values. Seen from this perspective, a significant function of the formal safety 
structure is to sustain and reinforce an unambiguous and stable safety culture.
The most obvious MADE safety rituals are the ceremonies in which good safety 
results are being celebrated as is described in section 5.9. The purpose of these 
events is to reward the shift group for good safety performance. It is believed by 
managers and employees alike that such celebrations reinforce the values and norms 
of good safety work and promote further safety awareness.
But other safety structure elements can also be looked upon as rituals carrying a 
symbolic meaning -  and are also in fact interpreted this way by MADE 
organisational members. Shift safety inspections and shift safety meetings can be 
used as examples of such ritually perceived safety structure elements. As I have 
shown, these safety events are criticised backstage by many MAIE employees for 
their lack of instrumentality and innovative qualities, but in spite of this, they are 
considered to be important in their function as safety rituals. Many organisational 
members will argue that today, the ritual meaning of these recurring events is what 
is vital. Shift safety inspections and shift safety meetings may be looked upon as 
rather non-essential for safety improvements, but they are considered imperative 
events as their routine appearances are seen to reinforce the values and norms of the 
MAIE safety culture.
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During some of these ritual safety events, shift members and MAIE managers meet 
Many MAIE organisational actors praise this side of the safety rituals as an 
opportunity for cross-level communication and as a means of strengthening shift 
group cohesiveness. Seen from this perspective, it can be suggested that safety 
rituals operate to build positive social relations between shift members as well as 
between organisational members at different hierarchical levels. It can be argued 
that the cross-level relationship-building may contribute to taking the heat out of 
opposing backstage safety arguments and thus controls the existing ambiguities.
The well-known ritual safety events are seemingly difficult to oppose and change. 
They appear to have attained an organisational position of being taken-for-granted 
due to their state of "always having been there" and their perceived contribution to 
the MADE safety history as well as their present functions. Thus, they may be 
likened to "sacred cows" which are exempted from open scrutiny and change 
efforts. Their ’’task” is to act as organisational anchors amid ambiguity and change 
(Brooks 1997) and thus contribute to the reproduction of organisational order and 
stability.
9.10.4 The formal safety structure as contributor to a distortion of safety 
efforts?
I have shown that safety structure elements can be interpreted as having diverse 
interpretations and not infrequently are perceived to comprise meaning that differs 
from what was originally intended by the safety structure designers. In addition to 
the already mentioned meaning constructs of the MADE formal safety structure as 
cultural symbols and organisational rituals, organisational actors also point to the 
safety system’s perceived importance for managerial career promotion and 
corporate status when they discuss the structure’s functions. In this context, the 
MAIE safety performance is looked upon by corporate managers as an indicator of 
MADE managers' leadership abilities -  a situation that is commented upon by 
Dawson et al. (1984), thus showing it to be of more than local MADE significance 
only. MADE employees argue that these perceived functions promote a managerial 
focus on the formal safety system as such rather than a focus on genuine safety
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improvements -  a situation which could be potentially ruining for the long-term 
survival of MAIE as a safety conscious organisation, it is argued.
What takes place is said to be a managerial focus upon systems elements which are 
quantified such as key safety figures and the number of accident and incident 
reports. But also the other safety systems elements are emphasised in MALE 
management’s safety work. According to MAIE employees, this systems focus has 
led to an organisational safety situation in which safety issues outside the obvious 
realm of the formal safety structure are downgraded to low organisational priority. 
This systems focus may have at least two negative consequences:
The first one is the fate of the safety issues which do not fit easily into the preset 
systems categories or which may create problems for a smooth systems 
implementation. MAIE employees argue that these safety issues have difficulties in 
gaining safety recognition and entering the official safety agenda. An example of 
such an issue is the topic of shift and plant social relations that recurringly is 
debated among MAIE organisational members as a safety issue, but which seems to 
have difficulties to become incorporated into the safety categories of the formal 
structure and hence is dealt with rather cursory, according to organisational 
members. Another example is related to the long-term physical effects caused by 
the lifting of heavy profiles which have found no place in the MADE formal safety 
system. A third example of how the systems focus is perceived to limit the scope of 
safety concern is the previously mentioned debate about the reported causes of 
accidents and dangerous incidents. Employees maintain that the reported causes 
frequently are too simple and unduly personalised and do not take into account the 
complexity of the work situation, and the focus on the formal safety system is said 
to prevent a further exploration into the issue. A last example of how MAIE safety 
efforts are perceived to being focused around systems concerns is the way 
employees interpret statistical results to be more important than health matters when 
people are asked to come back to work in spite of unhealed work injuries.
These - and other -  examples work together to form a MAIE backstage 
interpretation of the formal safety system as having removed itself from its original
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intention of being a tool to fulfil safety improvement goals to becoming goals in 
their own right (Merton 1968). Due to this system goals focus, many possible 
safety improvements are being overlooked, it is argued, as a smooth safety system 
management now is perceived to have taken priority over "what it's all about" - the 
continuous improvement of work safety. This backstage safety construct may have 
embedded a potential for worker demotivation in the long-term sustainment of the 
formal safety structure.
The perceived MAIE focus on the formal safety system safety in its own right may 
also have a second unintended consequence for MAIE worker safety motivation and 
enthusiasm. Many organisational members are occupied with what they perceive as 
the limited emphasis on their human worth in the bureaucratic structures of the 
formal safety system. They argue that the concern for their health and safety as 
humans and individuals is felt to have nearly disappeared in the language, the 
formalities and the systems focus of MAIE safety work. Feelings of alienation are 
especially voiced regarding the topics of key safety figures and the quantification of 
people's accidents into numbers and statistical representations.
This perception of being second in importance to the formal safety structure is said 
by many MAIE employees to initiate personal discontent and frustration. These 
emotions can be witnessed when the "what it's all abouf’-question not infrequently 
becomes an issue of debate in MADE backstage settings. It can thus be argued that 
feelings of personal degradation are elements of the MADE safety culture. The 
question to be raised is whether these employee perceptions function as emotional 
barriers for a whole-hearted participation in MADE safety work.
Based on what is said here, it can be suggested that the MATE focus on its formal 
safety structure contains elements that potentially may contribute to a distortion of 
MAIE safety efforts. Both the system's perceived exclusion of the complexity of 
safety issues and the argued dehumanisation of safety work can be looked upon as 
being potentially destructive for the MAIE safety vision of continuous and ever 
improved safety work.
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5.10*5. The formal safety structure and organisational meaning: a summary.
An analysis of the formal safety structure’s organisational meaning can be done 
from different perspectives. The most obvious is to consider the safety system with 
its recurring routines as an instrument for continuous safety improvement. Also, the 
existence of the formal safety structure works to keep the MAIE safety focus alive 
and is thus viewed as a safety guarantee by organisational members.
Another perspective is to consider the MAIE formal safety structure through the 
lenses of symbolic analysis. Seen from this point of view, formal safety structure 
elements carry meaning as symbols of the MAIE safety culture. They become 
"evidence” of a committed safety culture, and it becomes understandable that 
organisational members support the continued implementation of the structure 
elements even though they may point to a perceived lack of instrumentality.
The third way to analyse the meaning of the MAIE formal safety structure is 
through the concept of organisational rituals. From this perspective, the structure 
elements are significant as regular events around which organisational members 
congregate to preserve their safety beliefs as well as to strengthen MAIE social 
relations. The safety rituals seem to have acquired the status of organisational 
"sacred cows" and are seemingly not liable to open criticism and change. It can be 
argued that through these rituals, the MAIE safety culture is sustained and 
organisational order and stability is being reinforced.
Finally, it can be asked whether the formal safety structure also contributes to a 
distortion of MAIE safety efforts. Organisational members argue that the 
organisational focus on the formal safety system has led to a stronger emphasis on 
the implementation of structure elements in their own right than on the system’s 
intended function of being a tool for safety improvement. This situation is 
perceived negatively to influence the organisation's capability and interest to be 
attentive to safety issues that do not fit into the system categories. The question is 
raised "what it's all about", and it is maintained that the systems focus misses the
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complexity of the MAIE safety reality and thus contributes to distort improved 
worker safety.
Organisational members also point to what is perceived as an ignorance of human 
aspects in the bureaucratic structure of the MAIE safety system. They express 
feelings of alienation and personal degradation due to an interpretation of their 
health and safety coming second in priority to a smooth implementation of the 
formal structure. It seems relevant to raise the question if such emotions function as 
obstacles for an active and enthusiastic participation in MAIE safety work and thus 






Czamiawska-Joerges (1988a) looks upon ideology as a world view containing a 
vision and prescription for action while Trice and Beyer (quoted in Weick 1995) 
define ideology as shared belifes, values and norms that help people to make sense 
of their worlds. Starbuck and Milliken (quoted in Weick 1995) state that values and 
beliefs are influential filters for people in their sensemaking processes. Beliefs are 
what people consider to be true, and values can be said to be ideal moral standards 
of behaviour that people will try to recognise in their organisational enactments.
MAIE's espoused safety ideology - what is said to be believed in and consequently 
is promoted as standards of behaviour - can be found in the plant safety manual. In 
a general statement, it is decreed that human beings constitute the plant's most 
valuable asset, and that the MAIE safety vision is to avoid all human injuries. It is 
further stated that all injuries can be prevented, that safety issues are equal in 
importance to other managerial work tasks, that continuous safety training is 
necessary, that good housekeeping is vital for improved safety, that all safety 
regulations have to be recognised by all organisational members, that everyone is 
obliged to prevent work colleagues’ unsafe acts when possible, and that hazardous 
work situations are to be dealt with immediately. As a summary, it is emphasised 
that through continuous efforts, the MAIE safety situation can be controlled and 
managed, and that good safety is cost-effective. Time, effort, and money are the 
main components to achieve satisfactory worker safety, it is stated.
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What will be the purpose of this chapter is to investigate into the MAIE ideological 
questions that emerge as central issues in the organisational safety debate. Included 
in this debate is frequently the question whether espoused MAIE statements also 
function as the organisation's theories-in-use, or whether they exist in official 
rhetorics only. A possible dissimilarity between MAIE espoused theories and 
theories-in-use (Argyris and Schon 1978) will thus be a part of my analysis. 
Goffman’s (1959) distinction between organisational frontstage and backstage 
communities will be of vital importance in my forthcoming analytical endeavours.
6.2. What is safety all about?
Officially, MADE safety work is about the prevention of work accidents, and there is 
- naturally enough - no dissensus about this general policy statement. According to 
employees, though, the question of what MAIE safety is about is a more complex 
issue than what it may look like:
"Managers do not have to worry about being injured themselves, and that makes the 
big difference between them and us in our safety thinking. When I do my job, I 
constantly have to think safety in order to protect myself from danger. They don't 
have to think like this about their own body and health. So safety is necessarily a 
much more personal issue for me", one employee says.
MAIE employees argue that a wish to avoid personal suffering is their main 
motivation for safety work. In employee perception, managers necessarily cannot 
share this feeling of personal safety resolution. This difference in motivational 
basis is said to have consequences for the way MAIE managers and MAIE 
employees respectively think about and handle safety matters. A nearness versus 
distance issue thus emerges in MADE safety.
In chapter 5 ,1 have touched upon the MAIE "what-it's-all-about"-debate when 
discussing employee arguments that the perceived managerial preoccupation with 
the formal safety structure has led to a distortion of what safety first and foremost is
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about. A dehumanisation of the MALE safety work is said to have become the 
result of this systems focus.
This debate suggests that differing ideological perspectives may exist between 
MAIE employees and MAIE managers in their safety thinking: Due to safety being 
a less direct and less personal matter for managers, their safety priorities will 
necessarily focus upon other aspects than those of employees.
It can be argued that MAIE managers' perpetual emphasis on the formal safety 
system is a natural safety priority seen from a distance/nearness dimension. It 
follows from this that a systematic and correct implementation of the systems 
elements will be of high priority. As I have shown, MAIE managers eagerly 
promote a safety systems focus as a main aspect of the MAIE safety ideology. 
MAIE employees share the emphasis on the formal safety structure. But their 
personal nearness to safety have established a safety thinking that goes beyond a 
mere adherence to the regulations of the formal safety structure. The safety system 
will play a second role if there appears to be conflicting interests between the 
systems thought and what safety is perceived to be about, it is argued. This 
ideological coherence and discrepancy becomes visible in backstage safety arenas 
when the MAIE safety philosophy is debated.
In this debate, employees argue that the MAIE frontstage safety philosophy leaves 
something to be desired when a human focus is concerned. The perceived 
bureaucratisation and dehumanisation of MAIE safety work are frequently cited as 
examples of this lack of desired emphasis. A recurring topic in the debate is the 
question whether injured employees more or less have been forced back to work 
before they were ready due to what is perceived as a managerial systems focus upon 
safety statistics. Employees will relate such examples to an inequality in safety 
ideology that is based in differing nearness/distance to concrete safety matters.
Different organisational positions will often account for different perspectives in 
organisational affairs, and this can be argued to be the case also at MAIE. In spite 
of the espoused and shared frontstage safety philosophy, it can be seen that
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organisational actors at different organisational levels have differing foci when it 
comes to fundamental safety issues. The absence of everyday on-the-floor work 
experience makes managers less able to empathise with MAIE employees and their 
experienced safety concerns (DeJoy 1994). Based on these differences, it can be 
suggested that both unity and diversity characterise the MAIE philosophy regarding 
what safety is all about. The MAIE safety philosophy thus seems to be less 
coherent and more complex than what it appears to be in the espoused safety 
rhetorics.
6.3. Who Is responsible for worker safety?
"I am personally responsible for my own safety. It is up to me to observe the safety 
procedures and attend to my work tasks in a way that prevents me from having an 
accident”, one MAIE employee says.
"Here at MADE, everyone is his own shift safety representative. That means that we 
all have to be just as aware of safety issues as the formal shift safety representatives, 
and we cannot blame others when things go wrong if we have been careless 
ourselves", another employee says.
Similar accounts are heard all over MADE from employees and managers alike, and 
the verbal consistency - frontstage as well as backstage - that characterises the 
safety responsibility issue is striking. Due to its repeated recurrence and 
standardised wording, the statement about everyone being his own shift 
representative can be said to have assumed the character of an organisational 
slogan. As such, it can be interpreted as a cultural expression pointing to 
ideological assumptions of the MAIE safety culture.
As I have shown in section 6.2, many MADE employees argue that their safety 
philosophy is founded in their direct and personal involvement with safety. It can 
be suggested that there is a connection between this personally based safety 
ideology and the responsibility for own safety which is repeatedly vocalised
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throughout the plant. As one employee - who was seriously injured some years ago 
- says:
"When it comes to your own health and welfare, there is nobody you really can trust 
but yourself. I have learned so much. Today, I care for my own skin first and 
foremost".
The statement that safety is a personal responsibility is seemingly contradictory to 
the espoused image of MAIE as a safety conscious organisation due to its 
systematic and collective safety endeavours. This "privatisation" of safety issues is 
thus a feature of the MAIE safety culture that gives way to confusion and unclarity 
about fundamental questions in the MAIE safety ideology.
In spite of the personalised safety constructs, though, there exists no doubt in MADE 
organisational members’ minds about MAIE’s overall responsibility for worker 
safety. Systematic safety efforts are considered to be the necessary framework for 
all safe behaviour, and without this structure being in place and duly implemented, 
it is seen as impossible for individuals to take responsibility for own safety.
Many employees also emphasise that a personal safety commitment is necessary for 
the formal safety structure to become implemented as intended. It can thus be 
suggested that the MAIE concept of personal safety responsibility is dependent 
upon the organisation's collective and systematic safety work -  and vice versa. So 
what at first sight might have appeared as a contradiction between an individualistic 
versus a collective safety philosophy can be looked upon as coexisting approaches 
which are mutually dependent upon each other.
Backstage, though, MAIE employees argue that the personalised safety concept is 
not free from negative consequences seen from their points of view. One example 
of this is found in accident and incident reporting which I have discussed in section 
5.7. MADE employees argue that when causes for accidents and dangerous 
incidents are reported, individualised explanations are overrepresented, and 
accordingly, there is little concern about comprehending accidents from an
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organisational point of view. This investigative focus naturally leads to an 
emphasis on individual corrective measures, and accident reports are dominated by 
suggestions for improved individual work behaviour in order to avoid further 
accidents and incidents. It can be argued that the personalised safety concept thus 
“backfires” in a way that can be considered dysfunctional for organisational safety 
learning due to a neglect of more complex causes for accidents and incidents.
Another example in which the personalised safety concept seems to take priority 
over collective action is in the area of non-acute work hazards, and especially 
regarding the lifting of heavy profiles. As I have mentioned previously, neither the 
reporting system nor safety training incorporate this safety problem, and it is left to 
the individual to cope with this risk situation.
A third example of an area in which a personalised safety concept seemingly has 
become dominant is the utilisation of personal protective equipment. As I have 
shown in section 5.5.3, it is considered an issue of individual discretion whether or 
not to oblige to all safety procedures involving the usage of protective equipment.
It seems to be informally accepted that these decisions -  and their potential 
consequences - are matters of personal choice and responsibility.
Based in these examples, the question can be asked if the personalised MAIE safety 
concept in the long run may contribute to a weakening of the collective safety 
philosophy in spite of what was earlier suggested about the coexistence and 
mutuality of the personalised and the collective safety approaches. The answer to 
this question can be tentative only. What is sure, though, is that once more, 
diversity and complexity are comprised in the MADE safety philosophy in a manner 
that easily may be overlooked if the attention is focused around espoused rhetorics 
only.
6.4. The equality of production and safety issues.
In the official MAIE safety documents it is stated that safety issues are equal in 
importance to all other work operations, and MAIE managerial rhetorics frequently
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emphasise safety's equality with production issues. Due to the statement’s constant 
recurrence, it can be suggested that it has assumed the quality of an organisational 
slogan and thus appears to be a central aspect in the espoused MAIE safety 
philosophy.
MAIE managers argue that there is no discrepancy between the espoused values and 
MAIE’s theories-in-use on this account (Argyris and Schon 1978). They support 
their argument by pointing to safety achievements over the years, how safety 
considerations are included in the planning of all new projects, and how shift 
supervisors are instructed to assure that the work process does not involve unsafe 
work acts because of production problems or delivery demands. MAIE managers 
also state that a safe work process is cost-effective because of its general quality 
promoting effects, and thus, it is rational to promote improved safety whatever way 
you look at it.
The equality issue is regarded by many MAIE employees to be less obvious and 
more ambiguous than it appears to be in managerial rhetorics, though. Backstage, 
the espoused statement is frequently confronted with what is perceived as the MAIE 
theoiy-in-use:
"At the end of the day, production issues do take priority over safety issues. There 
is no doubt in my mind about that. Especially in work situations that are out of the 
normal, like when equipment is not functioning or when important orders are 
queuing up, then production concerns are first on managers* minds. They of course 
don't tell us to turn a blind eye to safety procedures, but we all know when the 
production is of utmost importance, so we will stretch our safety limits a little in 
such situations. But we don't talk about it so much if we do so", one employee says.
"Of course production matters have first priority. It is a lie to say they don't, and it 
is understandable that they do. The reason we are here is to make profits for the 
company. We are all dependent upon MAIE’s profit-making abilities, and the better 
economic results, the more secure is our job future. If we were to think safety 
according to the book at all times, then it wouldn't be possible for us to produce
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with profits, I think. We have to rely on common sense and the employment of 
safety procedures in a sensible way", another employee says.
Other employees are less understanding and more critical when talking about the 
espoused equality between production and safety:
"Don't tell me that this much-talked-about equality exists in real life. It is 
fashionable to say it does these days, but I think it amounts to nothing but words. 
What is said in managerial speeches is not what I find to be the case in my daily 
work life", one employee says.
Another employee tells about an occurrence in which he was forced by his shift 
supervisor to go through with a work task he himself thought was unsafe:
"He told me to go on, and when I mentioned my safety reservations, he became 
angry. So I felt I had no other choice than to carry on, but I was frightened and I 
worked with much care. I was afraid of problems if I refused to do what he told me 
to. But I will never do such a thing again. My shift supervisor was reprimanded 
afterwards, and he has never asked me to do similar things again. But don't talk to 
me about safety having priority over production issues", he says.
One employee views the production and equality question from a different 
perspective:
"I can't believe that we are proud when we talk about equality between safety and 
production issues. What is more important than worker safety? If MAIE really was 
a safety conscious plant, safety ought to have first priority and should never be 
equalled to production issues. But this is far from the situation", he says.
As can be seen from these quotes, the espoused MAIE philosophy of equality 
between production and safety issues is by many employees perceived to be less 
obvious as a safety theoiy-in-use than what is argued by MAIE management. I 
hardly met a MAIE employee who did not point to perceived discrepancies between
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what is officially said and work situations in which production issues have priority 
over safety. These statements are either based in personal experience from stressful 
work situations or in a general belief that when it comes to the crux of the matter, 
production concerns will “win” in the competition between production and worker 
safety.
I never came upon any MAIE organisational member, however, who wanted to get 
away with the espoused statement of production and safety equality. There seems 
to exist a shared wish among MAIE organisational members to hold on to the idea 
of equality as an ideal guideline for the plant safety work even though the 
interpretations of its function as an actual guideline is ambiguous and differentiated.
It can also be suggested that the equality statement comprises aspects that are 
considered beneficial by MAIE employees regardless of its perceived lack of 
“success” in many work situations. For example, the espoused production and 
safety equality is not seldom voiced by employees as an argument in internal 
debates, and it is said that the statement comprises "ammunition” that is difficult to 
disregard by MAIE management due to the central position of the equality issue in 
MAIE official safety philosophy. Lastly, the frequent referral to the equality issue 
is seen by many MAIE organisational members to support the sustainment of the 
plant safety focus, and it can also be suggested to have a symbolic mission both 
internally and externally in the promotion of MAIE as a distinguished safety 
organisation.
6.5. Can all work injuries be prevented?
"Human beings are our most valuable asset, and it is our goal that nobody suffers 
from injuries" says the opening line in MAIE's written safety philosophy. "All 
injuries can be prevented" is another statement in the same document.
Commonly heard at MAIE is this phrase: "Accidents do not happen, they are 
caused". In chapter 4 ,1 have shown how this belief is supported by accumulated 
organisational experience during the course of MAIE safety development.
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Commonly heard at MAIE is this phrase: "Accidents do not happen, they are 
caused". In chapter 4 ,1 have shown how this belief is supported by accumulated 
organisational experience during the course of MAIE safety development.
These espoused statements do not give much leeway for ambiguity: It is possible to 
prevent all work accidents and injuries, and accordingly, the MAIE objective 
becomes to establish good enough safety routines to reach the goal of no human 
injuries.
As I have shown in section 5.8.1, MAIE management has quantified the plant’s key 
safety figure goals. The aim is to have an "H"-value" which is less than 5,5, an "F- 
value" which is less than 75 and an "h-value" which is less than 55. These targets 
include and "foresee" a small number of accidents and injuries to take place at 
MAIE.
A paradox in the MAIE front stage safety philosophy is apparent here: On one side, 
a main goal is that no injuries happens. On the other side, MAIE managers seem to 
accept that necessarily, accidents and injuries will take place in spite of all good 
safety work, and they include this assumption when setting safety goals.
This inconsistency between espoused theory and theory-in-use became accentuated 
during my fieldwork period as it became common knowledge that similar 
differences between general goals and specific safety targets no longer existed in 
several other companies. Quite a few industrial plants -  also locally - had decided 
upon zero as the target for their "H-value", their "F-value" and their "h-value".
The question that inevitably came forward was whether a zero goal policy ought to 
be adopted at MAIE as well. MAIE managers argued that it would be a mistake to 
proclaim a "zero safety goal organisation", and they defended their standpoint by 
pointing to realism in goal setting:
"As long as humans are involved in the production process, accidents will happen 
despite all efforts. The best we can do is to minimise such events, but we can never
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erase them totally. I fear that zero safety targets will be demotivating for safety 
work since we probably never would not be able to reach our safety goals. So I 
prefer to stick to more realistic targets which we are able to reach by good safety 
work. But of course, we do work for zero accidents and injuries all the time. That 
is our overriding goal", a manager says.
Most MAIE employees agree with the managerial scepticism about formalising a 
zero safety goal ambition. They are certain that if a plant never seems to experience 
accidents, then this primarily is the result of manipulation of the safety statistics.
Some MAIE employees, though, argue in favour of a zero safety goal policy. They 
question the managerial reasons for not formalising what they all want to achieve, 
and they point to MAIE safety history and how the concept of "realism" in safety 
work has changed over time. They are convinced that zero safety targets would 
further improve MAIE safety work. The symbolic value of having such goals is 
also pointed to as they claim that organisational members would have reasons to be 
even more proud of MADE as a distinguished safety organisation if zero safety goals 
were decided upon.
"I think this resistance against zero safety goals is hard to believe. I thought that 
zero accidents and injuries was what our safety work was all about. Maybe the real 
reason why they do not want to adopt a zero goal is because they will avoid the 
extra safety efforts that would be necessary to reach such a goal? This is a pathetic, 
debate, and what is really hard to understand is the negative views of many of my 
work mates", one employee says.
It can be concluded that most MAIE organisational members answer the question 
whether all work injuries can be prevented in an ambiguous way. The general 
answer seems to be a "yes" to the stated question, while the answer turns out 
differently when it is related to the more specific MAIE work situation. Thus, the 
inconsistency between the espoused philosophy and what is thought to be possible 
in practical life seems to be accepted by the bulk of MAIE organisational members.
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This acceptance also constitutes the basis for the widespread resistance against a 
MAIE zero safety goal policy.
The organisational challenge is to keep the divergent interpretations of the accident 
prevention goal separated from each other. As long as this is achieved, the 
espoused MAIE accident prevention philosophy exists without being embaiTassed 
by the MAIE theories-in-use.
6.6. Safety ideology: a summary.
The question of what safety is all about is answered unambiguously in espoused and 
shared MAIE frontstage statements: It is about the prevention of work accidents.
No organisational members disagree in this fundamental perspective of MATE 
safety work.
MADE employees nevertheless argue that due to managers* and production workers* 
different organisational positions, different interpretations of this safety 
philosophical statement necessarily will exist among them. A nearness versus 
distance perspective emerges as a result of organisational members’ dissimilar 
liability of becoming injured, and this difference is said to account for what is 
perceived as different safety approaches between MAIE employees and managers. 
MAIE managers’ personal distance to safety problems is perceived to be mirrored 
in their focus on the formal safety structure. MAIE employees argue that safety 
first and foremost is to do with their personal welfare, and although they give 
frontstage support to the systems focus, they are -  backstage -  concerned about the 
system’s perceived lack of a human emphasis.
The espoused frontstage consensus is thus being supplemented by differing 
perceptions of what safety is all about. This situation reveals organisational unity as 
well as diversity in the internal interpretation of a major MAIE safety philosophical 
question.
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The question of who is mainly responsible for worker safety is related to the issue 
of what safety is all about. MAIE organisational members are in no doubt that 
safety responsibility first and foremost is a personal matter, and this conviction is 
based in their previously cited perception of personal nearness to safety issues. This 
"privatisation” of safety efforts may seem to contradict the espoused collectivity of 
the MAIE safety efforts, but by closer look it is found that the collective systems 
approach is perceived to be the necessary framework within which personal safety 
responsibility can be assumed. The collective and the personalised safety approach 
are perceived to be dependent upon each other as mutual contributors to MAIE 
safety.
But disregarding the mutuality, examples are found which suggest that the 
personalised safety concept is given organisational priority. The question has to be 
stated whether this situation in the long run may weaken the collective philosophy 
of MAIE safety.
The equal organisational status of production and safety issues holds a prominent 
position in MAIE official safety rhetorics. MAIE managers maintain that there is 
no discrepancy between their espoused statements and the MAIE work reality, 
while employees backstage argue that what they experience in their daily work is a 
clear production emphasis over safety concerns. Some employees find it fully 
understandable that the espoused equality is overlooked, while others are critical to 
what they experience as a gap between espoused theory and theory-in-use.
But disregarding ambiguous perceptions of the equality implementation, the 
statement is valued by MAIE employees for its ideal intentions, its possible 
utilisation as an argument in internal safety debates, as a contributor to the 
strengthening of the MAIE safety focus and as a symbol of MAIE as a distinguised 
safety organisation.
According to the official MAIE safety philosophy, all accidents and injuries can be 
prevented. What seems to be a paradox, though, is that when MAIE safety goals 
are quantified, an anticipated number of accidents is included. Based on this, it can
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be asked whether the rhetorics regarding the prevention of all injuries is a genuine 
organisational assumption.
Due to other plants' adoption of a zero injuries goal policy, the discussion is raised 
at MAIE whether or not to choose this safety approach. Most MADE organisational 
members are sceptical to this strategy because of what they consider to be an 
unrealistic attitude to human work behaviour and the fear of statistical manipulation 
if zero injuries became the goal.
The analogous existence of differing assumptions concerning the possibility to 
prevent all accidents and injuries illuminates ambiguities within the MAIE safety 
philosophy. And as long as the divergent constructs are kept separated, neither the 
espoused safety philosophy nor the MAIE theories-in-use become embarrassed by 
the incoherence between them.
In chapter 5 ,1 have shown that differences in safety perceptions are not uncommon 
traits of the MAIE safety culture. Now, differences of safety philosophy have also 
been established, and it can be stated that unity as well as complexity and 
fragmentation exist at the MAIE safety ideological level.
190
CHAPTER 7
THE SAFETY CULTURE - SHARED, DIFFERENTIATED AND 
FRAGMENTED?
7.1. Introduction.
Both in chapters 4,5, and 6, the MAIE safety culture has been brought to analytical 
attention. Now it is time fully to concentrate upon the safety culture in an effort to 
bring together cultural elements from all comers of the MAIE safety world.
In this chapter I will do an analysis of the MAIE safety culture based in data from 
my previous chapters. I will investigate into the espoused frontstage safety culture 
as well as the backstage safety cultures in order to present a comprehensive cultural 
picture of MAIE as a safety organisation.
7.2. The integration perspective.
7.2.1. A shared safety culture.
In the investigation of the MAIE safety culture from an integration perspective the 
focus will be upon the culture as a consistent and unifying force (Deal and Kennedy 
1984; Trice and Beyer 1993; Martin 1992). It will be the aim of the analysis to 
investigate into whether the MAIE safety culture comprises assumptions, values, 
beliefs, frames of reference, etc. that are shared among organisational members to 
such an extent that it is plausible to talk about a shared MAIE safety culture.
7.2.2. Shared perceptions of the safety culture.
It is not difficult to find safety values and beliefs that are shared among MAIE 
organisational members. For instance, the historical reconstruction of MAIE safety 
in chapter 4 evidences widely shared perceptions of the present safety situation
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which are based in shared interpretations of what has happened in the past. The 
possibilities for continuous safety improvements, the perception that accidents do 
not happen but are caused by human actions, and the necessity of structured and 
systematic safety work are shared MAIE safety assumptions that originate in 
interpretations of the MAIE safety history.
When investigating into the MAIE safety ideology in chapter 6 ,1 found fully 
consensus about safety work’s key task to be the prevention of work accidents. It is 
also agreed that primarily, each organisational member is himself responsible for 
his own safety and that everyone is his own safety representative. But 
simultaneously, it is a shared perception that MAIE as an organisation is 
responsible for worker safety. The mutual interplay between individual and 
organisational safety responsibility is commonly considered a central aspect of the 
MAIE safety philosophy.
The statement that accidents do not happen but are caused by human acts and thus 
can be prevented is also a shared concept of the MAIE safety culture. But it is also 
agreed that accidents inevitably will happen in spite of all good safety efforts, and 
this belief is manifested in the MAIE safety goals in where it is assumed that a 
certain number of accidents and injuries will happen. It is subsequently agreed by 
most organisational members that MAIE should not apply a “zero accident policy”. 
Another frequently espoused and shared frontstage philosophical statement 
concerns the equal status of MAIE production and safety issues.
In chapter 3, MAIE organisational members state their perceptions of the main 
work hazards. They agree that a main reason for hazardous situations is work 
stress, and they also share the belief that work monotony produces danger. More 
varied work tasks would probably eliminate much of the smaller and more trivial 
work accidents, it is commonly believed.
The shared perception of the general importance of the MAIE formal safety 
structure has already been mentioned. When turning to chapter 5 and the more 
specific structure elements, a shared appreciation of the shift safety representative
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role is found. The same evaluation is given of shift safety inspections which are 
seen as vital for the monitoring of shift safety, but also for the up-keep of the 
general safety focus. Shift safety meetings are likewise commonly looked upon in 
this capacity, and it is also a shared perception that the occurrence of regular safety 
meetings is status-awarding for the shift in question.
Many safety procedures exist at MAIE, and it is a shared feature of the safety 
culture everyone is to comply with them. The safety procedures are looked upon as 
vital means of accident prevention, and their high number can be viewed as 
evidence of the well-developed MAIE safety awareness, it is commonly argued. 
There is also consensus among MAIE organisational members about the benefits of 
on-the-spot work and safety training so that newcomers can learn to cope with 
situational aspects of their work tasks. The way that experienced workers are used 
as trainers is commonly said to be an asset for the training efforts, and it is generally 
argued that training at MAIE is taken well care of.
It is a shared MAIE belief that the reporting of accidents, injuries and dangerous 
incidents is an important tool for safety development and learning, and also that 
through the years, increased reporting has led to improved safety. But even so, it is 
a shared construct that under-reporting exists at MAIE in spite of all encouragement 
to report.
Reported issues are communicated through safety statistics and key safety figures, 
and it is a shared perception that such activities promote safety consciousness and 
learning. The "safety competition" between plants and shifts that is perceived to 
arise from the statistical focus is also commonly looked upon as beneficial for 
safety improvement. What is also a shared feature of the MAIE safety culture is an 
awareness of the possibilities for "cheating" with safety statistics in order to present 
too glorious a picture of a plant safety situation. But the MAIE safety statistics are 
not manipulated and give a reliable picture of MAIE safety, according to frontstage 
consensual statements.
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MAIE organisational members share the perception that safety celebrations are 
motivating for safety efforts. But it is similarly agreed upon that it is difficult to 
find tools which measure safety results in a “just” way. Also, the MAIE policy not 
to present substantial material rewards for good safety results is met with 
consensus.
Summarised from this, it can be stated that there exists a shared MAIE appreciation 
of the formal safety structure and its different elements. The structure is agreed to 
function as an instrument for improved safety as well as being a reminder of and a 
guarantee for a continuous organisational safety focus. Based in the formal 
structure a safety language has been developed, and this language is the shared 
frame of reference through which organisational members interpret, comprehend 
and analyse safety occurrences.
7.23. The safety culture as a shared culture.
As has been shown, consensus about historical perceptions and safety ideology as 
well as about specific elements of the present MAIE safety work is a distinctive trait 
of the MAIE safety culture. It can thus be suggested that MAIE organisational 
members share a unifying safety culture (Deal and Kennedy 1984; Trice and Beyer 
1993; Martin 1992) in which coherence and non-ambiguity are core features.
This MAIE frontstage safety culture is expressed in the many different safety 
manifestations of the formal safety structure and the official rhetorics that support 
and maintain it. The safety culture is shared by the MAIE organisational members, 
and in their perception their safety culture is unique and sets them apart from other 
organisations when it comes to safety attitudes and actions. They share a pride of 
being a part of this safety culture, and they argue in favour of a present-day 
preservation of the various cultural expressions even if they at times may doubt 
their instrumental safety value.
MAIE organisational members thus share a self-perception of being a successful 
safety company. They look upon themselves as having been through a positive 
organisational transformation safety-wise, and this process has resulted in a safety
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competence which in their view exceeds most other companies’. Included in the 
shared self-perception of safety excellence is the notion of the maintenance of a 
continuous organisational safety focus, the perception of the plant’s role as a model 
for safety efforts and a conviction that MAIE also in future will excel in safety 
commitment.
Different researchers (e.g. Brook 1997; Holland and Quinn 1993) are occupied with 
how the organisational culture models the world for organisational members by the 
construction and maintenance of collective knowledge structures. A culture may 
thus be looked upon as a system of meaning (Geertz, quoted in Alvesson and Berg 
1992) through which people interpret their experiences and receive guidelines for 
action. When a culture is shared as has been shown to be the case of the MAIE 
frontstage culture, people will interpret and make meaning based on shared 
knowledge structures -  a collective schema (Harris 1996; Isabella 1990). At MAIE, 
little variation in safety meaning can be found in frontstage situations, and due to 
the constant presence of collectively promoted safety manifestations in MAIE 
frontstage life, it can be argued that the shared frontstage safety culture dominates 
the image of MAIE as an organisation. This officially espoused safety culture with 
its frequent manifestations is supported by managers and employees alike, and it 
would be easy to end a cultural investigation at this point with the conclusion that 
harmony and unity are the only characteristics of the MAIE safety culture.
But warnings do exist concerning this integration perspective of research. Schon 
(1991) asks whether it is the case that a questioning of main assumptions of a 
shared culture may be looked upon as threatening to cultural unity, and thus is kept 
out of the way. Goffman (1963) raises the same question when he maintains how 
such discussions will be ruining for consensus and unity. When considering these 
arguments, it is unsatisfying to leave the analysis of the MAIE safety culture 
without a culture investigation based in other analytical perspectives as well. I want 
to look for cultural traits other than those that are visibly displayed in the shared and 
unifying safety culture. Goffman’s (1959) concepts of frontstage and backstage 
arenas will be my main analytical tools in this endeavour.
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7.3. The differentiation perspective.
73.1. Safety subcultures.
A differentiation perspective of cultural analysis questions a culture’s unity and 
coherence and investigates into the possibility of finding several cultures within the. 
same organisation (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991). Such subcultures are believed 
to be internally consisting of frames of reference and self-perceptions that differ 
from those of other subcultures.
What I will do in my culture differentiation analysis is to investigate into the MAIE 
safety culture to see if I can find cultural features that are in opposition to the shared 
ones I have analysed in section 7.2. I want to find out if there exists safety 
subcultures in spite of the shared and unifying front stage culture I already have 
suggested is a main characteristic of the MAIE safety culture.
73.2. Differentiated features of the safety culture.
What is a significant trait of the MAIE safety perceptions that are in opposition to 
the shared front stage ones is that backstage admittance is needed in order to 
discover them. But given such admittance, it is not difficult to find safety 
constructs that oppose the streamlined consensus of the MAIE frontstage safety 
culture.
The positive evaluation of MAIE’s safety historical development is not contradicted 
backstage, but what is opposed by some organisational members is the seemingly 
never-ending emphasis on this historical process. It is argued that the “glory” of the 
past MAIE safety successes bars the organisation from present-day safety learning 
because of the strong belief in the once achieved safety competence. Instead of 
constantly looking back, MAIE ought to be more aware of and open up to other 
plants’ safety accomplishemts in order to improve safety-wise, it is said.
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In chapter 6 ,1 have shown how MAIE employees maintain that because of different 
positions in the production process, MAIE managers and employees necessarily 
will have differentiated views regarding what safety “is all about”. According to 
MAIE employees, nearness versus distance to potentially dangerous work situations 
account for differences of safety emphasis, and MAIE managers are criticised for 
their perceived dehumanising formal safety structure focus.
Many organisational members argue that a MAIE major stress-related work hazard 
is the reduction of employees that has taken place at many work stations over the 
years. Work stress is likewise created by unsatisfactory training, it is argued, and 
the role of work stress in accidents is underrated when reports are written, it is said 
by employees. All these perceptions are met with disagreement from MAIE 
managers.
Differentiated views are also found concerning the implementation of the MAIE 
formal safety structure. For instance, some shift safety representatives argue that 
the managerial reason for not creating an asked-for shift safety representatives* 
forum is the costs. By not addressing the wish, managers “prove** that costs mean 
more than safety improvements, it is maintained. That cost arguments regarding 
safety efforts are valid is always denied in the MAIE frontstage safety culture.
There are also contradicting views on shift safety inspections. Quite a few 
organisational members argue that the inspections are too routinised and too 
dominated by managers and shift supervisors to catch the “real** issues of what goes 
on safety-wise at the shifts. The safety inspections are too much concerned with 
good housekeeping and ignore more genuine safety issues, it is argued. Likewise, 
there exists divergent views about shift safety meetings. The regularity of the 
meetings is said to be unsatisfactory, and the way shift meetings are conducted is 
negatively evaluated by many employees -  they are too standardised and too 
boring, it is argued.
MAIE safety procedures are generally complied with, according to MAIE 
employees. But there is no doubt that the procedures also are adapted to situational
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circumstances of the specific work task, it is said. Such adaptations are done rather 
discreetly without many words about what is done. Especially, the utilisation of 
personal protective equipment is an area in which official safety procedures often 
are contrary to their stated intentions. MAIE managers claim they are unaware of 
such situational adaptations, and if they knew about them, they would immediately 
call a stop to such practices, they say.
Work and safety training is an area in which there exist distinctly opposing views 
from those of the espoused frontstage culture. Many of the MAIE new employees 
evaluate the received training as rather dissatisfactory, especially when compared to 
training programs they have attended at other plants. Quite a few experienced 
MAIE employees are also critical to the way newcomer training is practised, and 
they would like to see more systematic training programs being organised by MAIE 
management. And it is generally agreed backstage that MAIE neglects training to 
lift heavy profiles in ways that will protect worker backs and muscles from long­
term injuries.
When talking about the reporting of accidents and injuries, many MAIE employees 
are concerned with what they perceive as an undue proportion of personal errors as 
explanations for work accidents. They oppose what they consider to be a too 
strongly emphasised personal safety responsibility, and they argue that often, the 
causes of an accident are found in the totality of the work situation -  which rarely is 
mentioned in reports. Many employees also offer backstage perceptions of the 
importance of reporting that oppose the official frontstage ones: It is stated that a 
high number of reports is vital for MAIE managers in order to sustain the external 
picture of the plant as a safety conscious organisation. MAIE managers deny the 
existence of such a plant safety competition
Backstage, a significant amount of MAIE employees distance themselves from the 
way accidents and injuries are presented in the MAIE safety statistics as they argue 
that the statistical “language” makes them feel like statistical objects and not human 
beings. The espoused meaning of safety statistics is also contested: Is their most 
important function to come up with “good” safety figures in order to promote
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managerial status and careers? As a “proof * of this perception, MAIE employees 
claim it is illegitimate to stay at home while injuries are cured due to “ruinous” 
effects on the safety statistics. MADE managers emphatically deny this to be the 
case.
7.3.3. The safety culture as a differentitated culture.
The safety constructs that are cited here are contradictive to those of the espoused 
and shared MAIE safety culture. They are shared by varied numbers of 
organisational members, and they are all found in backstage situtations only. Here, 
oppositional safety perceptions seemingly live their legitimate lives in arenas where 
membership is restricted and where managers seldom are allowed entrance.
The backstage audiences may consist of members from one shift, or they may 
consist of members from several work shifts. I can find no evidence that work 
shifts form distinct safety subcultures or that work shifts are the primary tools for 
the formation of separate subcultural safety identities. Based on my data, I will 
suggest that there exists a broad and general MAIE safety subculture which is found 
backstage and is sustained by the majority of MAIE employees. This subculture is 
activated in different situations and settings by different participants, and it features 
safety perceptions that are in opposition to those of the frontstage culture.
Schein (1992) talks about subcultural groups sharing a language and common 
definitions of organisational reality. Through their backstage language -  a safety 
subdialect which is different from the MAIE frontstage safety language - and their 
backstage frames of reference, organisational members create a distance to the 
official and shared safety culture (Goffman 1959) when their backstage subculture 
is activated. Such a creation of cultural distance is echoed by Brooks (1997) when 
he claims that subcultures develop differing identities based in their subcultural 
frames of reference and self-perceptions. It can be suggested that MAIE employees 
create and maintain a cultural distance to the shared frontstage safety culture 
through their participation in backstage subcultural activities.
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But I cannot end my analysis of the MAIE safety culture by concluding that I have 
found a shared and unifying safety culture and a differentiated backstage safety 
subculture. My data material tells me that it is not possible to categorise all my 
findings within these frameworks. Both the integration perspective and the 
differentiation perspective advocate a cultural clarity and nonambiguity that I 
frequently found to be missing when I investigated the MAIE safety culture. I need 
to utilise yet another cultural perspective -  the fragmentation perspective -  in order 
to develop my analysis.
7.4. The fragmentation perspective.
7.4.1. An incoherent safety culture.
The clarity of the other cultural perspectives is questioned by a fragmentation 
perspective as the trade marks of an organisational culture are argued to be 
ambiguity, fluctuation, multiplicity, shifting alliances and incoherence (Martin 
1992; Frost et al. 1991; Isabella 1990; Holland and Quinn 1993). It is maintained 
that organisations never can be looked upon as stable patterns of unambiguous 
meaning constructions and that organisational members' cultural models change 
according to situational aspects. Fluidity and instability are characteristics of any 
organisational culture, and the cultural clarity that often is established in cultural 
analysis is a result of the chosen research method rather than of what can be found 
empirically, it is argued.
When turning to this analytical perspective, I will concentrate upon what can be 
interpreted as unstable, incoherent and ambiguous aspects of the MALE safety 
culture. I will investigate into whether the safety culture also can be looked upon as 
being fragmented.
7.4.2. Ambiguity and multiplicity in the safety culture.
It is not any straightforward task to go into my data material and clearly point to 
safety aspects that “evidence” fragmentation in the MAIE safety culture. Doubts
200
and ambiguity regarding data categorisation have been more prevalent at this 
analytical stage than previously. What I will try to show, however, is that within 
the MADE safety culture there exists a multitude of perceptions which are 
distinguished by being ambiguous, incoherent and situational. Consequently, I have 
to abandon the “clarity” of the integration and the differentiation perspectives in 
favour of a focus upon multiplicitiy and fragmentation in the MAIE safety culture.
As is the case with MAIE safety perceptions which oppose the shared front stage 
ones, ambiguous safety interpretations will as a rule be found in backstage settings 
only. So again, Goffman’s (1959) frontstage and backstage concepts are basic tools 
in my analysis.
Ambiguity can be found in MAIE employees* evaluation of the plant’s much- 
talked-about safety development process. Although they praise what has taken 
place, some employees also wonder if something of value has been lost in the 
course of events: Has workers* job autonomy suffered because of the ever growing 
amount of safety regulations? It is also suggested that the MADE formal safety 
structure can be a disadvantage for future safety improvement as the systems 
routines are repetitive and subsequently become boring. They are neccesary for the 
maintenance of safety awareness, but all the same they are a nuisance and a “killer** 
of safety innovation. A solution to this dilemma is not easy to find, it is said.
Ambiguities and multiple interpretations are also found in an investigation of the 
MAIE safety philosophy. As I have shown in chapter 6, MAIE employees argue 
that due to managers* and employees* different positions in the work process, a 
difference of safety focus is unavoidable. According to employees, managers* lack 
of personal identification with the dangers of daily work accounts for their strong 
emphasis on the formal sides of MADE safety work. Employees, focus upon their 
own situational interpretations of what safety is all about, and these may or may not 
be congruent with official policies. Employees also ask whether the 
bureaucratisation of safety work -  a necessary and successful process from 
everyone’s point of view -  has eliminated the “human touch” from MAIE safety 
work.
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The perception that MAIE organisational members are personally responsible for 
their own safety is a central in the MAIE safety culture, but the question is also 
raised whether this premise works to undermine the organisational responsibility for 
worker safety. Another emphasised ideological statement is the espoused equality 
of production and safety issues. Organisational members frequently express doubts 
and ambiguities about the statement’s theory-in-use qualities.
In chapter 5 ,1 have shown that several specific elements of the formal safety 
structure are met with ambiguity among organisational members. Several shift 
safety representatives are uncertain about how to fill their roles, and they feel that 
their fellow workers have situational and changing expectations to them. My data 
material supports such fluctuating expectations of shift safety representative role 
enactment among organisational members. Their importance for safety 
improvement is also ambiguously evaluated by shift colleagues. But even those 
organisational members who do not consider shift safety representatives to be vital 
for safety improvement find it important to keep them functioning.
Organisational members are uncertain whether issues surfacing at shift safety 
inspections always are fixed according to procedures. And in spite of their 
appreciation of the inspections, they also question what they perceive to be an 
informal requirement to come up with a certain amount of issues on the inspection 
lists. They wonder if this “demand” prevents safety issues from being solved in the 
daily work situation so they can be “saved” for formal inspections. Another topic 
that is raised is where the “real” safety issues have gone -  are they all solved, or is 
there a reluctance to raise more significant issues during inspections? Some 
organisational members will also claim that although shift safety inspections are 
important tools for safety improvement, it is a weakness that they are too dominated 
by managerial and supervisory safety perceptions.
Shift safety meetings are looked upon as important safety arenas, but they are also 
looked upon as boring occasions where one-way managerial communication 
dominates. And just as important as their safety function is their social function, 
according to MADE employees.
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When MAIE employees evaluate the plant’s safety procedures, ambiguities and 
fluctuations become visible. At one moment, they complain about the high number 
of safety procedures as a nuisance in their daily work life. Another moment, the 
same employees claim that MADE ought to have even more safety procedures than 
is the case now. In daily work life, employee adherence to safety procedures are 
based upon situational interpretations, and such situational safety decisions seem to 
be accepted as necessary and legitimate among employees. It is claimed that within 
limits, MAIE managers silently accept these multiple interpretations, although 
managers themselves deny this to be the case.
MADE safety and work training is ambiguously evaluated by both managers and 
employees: Should the training be more formalised and standardised -  or is the 
present informal on-the-spot training the best method? Managers know that shift 
supervisors differ in training interests and capabilities, and their doubts are said to 
be based in this fact. Many of the appointed shift trainers also express ambiguities 
about the training: They value the informality and the realism of it, but they would 
bke to know more exactly what is expected of them as trainers. Generally, many 
MAIE employees have a similarly ambiguous interpretation of the plant’s training 
program as they consider it to be both satisfactory and not satisfactory at all. It all 
depends on who is the appointed trainer, it is said.
The reporting of accidents and incidents is an area of MAIE safety which is fraught 
with unclearities, ambiguities and multiple perceptions. Although everyone agrees 
that all accidents and incidents ought to be reported, everyone also knows that this 
is not what actually happens. Many employees are uncertain about what are 
“reportable” incidents, and especially, they discuss the sense of reporting what is 
considered common “trade mark” injuries. It is also ambiguously evaluated 
whether sufficient feed-back and organisational safety learning are the results of 
reporting. Besides, MAIE employees acknowledge their personal anxieties about 
being the one to “ruin” good safety statistics, and they experience increased anxiety 
the more excellent the safety records are. At the same time, they are proud of good 
safety key figures as well as disliking them.
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What key safety figures represent is an issue of diverse backstage interpretations. 
Employees may state that the statistics give a reasonably correct picture of the 
MAIE safety situation, while they also may state that the statistics are unreliable 
and their foremost function is to give a favourable picture of MAIE in a “safety 
competition” between plants. MAIE managers claim that the safety statistics in 
general are reliable accounts of the MAIE safety situation, but they also 
acknowledge that under-reporting is a statistical problem.
Ambiguous employee feelings also surround the big hall board on which the date of 
the latest work accident is prominently displayed. The safety focus function of the 
board is appreciated, but it also is a negative reminder for those who were involved 
in the latest incident, and it works to strengthen the anxiety about “ruining” the 
safety statistics, it is said.
Everybody agrees that it is unwise to reward good safety results in substantial ways 
because such a policy might inspire manipulation of key safety figures. But in spite 
of this, some organisational members wonder if this policy ought to be altered. 
Maybe the danger of manipulation is over-emphasised and material rewards would 
prove to be safety motivating? it is asked.
Modest celebrations of good safety results are appreciated by all organisational 
members. But doubts concerning the statistical results leading to a shift celebration 
are often audible: How can it be “proved” that a shift has achieved such and such 
safety results when it is well known that shifts may have different norms for the 
reporting of accidents and incidents? What is evident, though, is that such 
questions are rarely stated among celebrating shift members themselves.
A shift study tour that took place during my fieldwork period brought forward 
fragmented explanations as to its real reasons for taking place. Even among the 
touring shift members, ambiguity could be found: It was a study tour, but all the 
same, it was not unlikely that it was arranged because of the shift's recent 
achievement of seven years without serious incidents. And even if a safety 
excellence reason is “wrong” according to MAIE safety policy, it felt right that they
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were rewarded in this manner, touring shift members said. Members of other shifts 
agreed to this, and said that what they disliked about the event was what they 
perceived as a managerial concealment of why it happened.
Summed up so far, it can be said that MAIE organisational members have 
ambiguous perceptions about many aspects of the MAIE formal safety structure’s 
implementation. Since these perceptions depict fragmentation and unclarities in the 
MAIE safety culture, organisational members normally keep them backstage where 
they are considered just as legitimate as the shared safety constructs of the MAIE 
frontstage.
7.4.3. The safety culture as a fragmented culture.
Seen through the lenses of the fragmentation perspective (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 
1991; Martin and Meyerson 1988), I have shown that the MADE safety culture is 
characterised by doubt, fluctuation, multiplicity and ambiguity. Organisational 
members are ambiguous in their interpretations of safety events, their perceptions 
change according to situational circumstances, and they may simultaneously 
advocate different perceptions of the same event. This multiplicity of MAIE safety 
constructs is not captured in a culture analysis seen from the integration or the 
differentiation perspectives. As Gherardi and Nicolini (2000a), I have found that 
the idea of a shared organisational culture is a misleading way to approach an 
analysis of a safety culture.
Isabella’s (1990) accounts of her data collection process also express my MADE 
experience as she recounts how informant concerns shifted, reactions varied and 
perceptions were at the same time similar and diverse. The stability and clarity that 
seemed to be significant features of the MAIE safety culture both as a shared 
culture and as a differentiated culture is not dominant any more, and what surfaces 
is a safety culture that is fragmented, incoherent and situational (Quinn 1993).
Brooks (1997) argues that multiple interpretations of reality is the only “truth” to be 
found about organisation life, and he states that complexity has to be analytically
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invited and ambiguity to be accepted as intrinsic characteristics of organisations. 
The fragmentation perspective has enabled me to illuminate the multiplicity of 
safety perceptions that exist at MAIE and to detect that these incoherent, situational 
and fluctuating interpretations are plentiful and recurring in the MAIE safety 
culture.
Seen from a culture fragmentation perspective, the MAIE safety multiplicity is not 
looked upon as examples of “irrational” and deviant behaviour or thought (Schutz 
1967) which can be corrected by increased information, planning, higher 
motivation, etc. Instead, the multiple constructs are seen to represent organisational 
members’ socially constructed realities (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Silverman 
1970; Weick 1995) according to their situational interpretations which are built 
upon prior experience and learning (Porac et al. 1989; Holland and Quinn 1993). 
And as such, they are just as “rational” as any other more “consistent” cultural 
representations.
When summing up my cultural analysis so far, it can be suggested that the MAIE 
safety culture is a shared, a differentiated as well as a fragmented culture. 
According to Gergen (1992), tensions between organisational forces which 
simultaneously stand for unity, differentiation and fragmentation will take place in 
any organisation. Such tensions will exist in the MADE safety culture as 
organisational members are both united, differentiated and fragmented in their 
safety perceptions. The next question to investigate into will thus be if the MAIE 
cultural mixture is sustained in a way that balances the tensions between organising 
and disorganising forces (Gergen, ibid.) in the MAIE safety culture.
7.5. Cultural coexistence in the safety culture.
The emerging picture of the MAIE safety culture shows a culture that is 
significantly more complex than the espoused frontstage culture. Organisational 
members’ safety sensemaking processes in which people interpret and author, 
discover and create meaning (Weick 1995) have shown to be less streamlined than 
what is anticipated by first glance. Reed (1992) argues that organisational
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members’ interpretations of organisational reality either sustain an unstable sense of 
organisational reality or work to transform the organisational situation by new 
interpretations. The question to consider is how MAIE cultural diversity can be 
analysed in this respect.
Fiol (1996) states that meaning constructions often simultaneously will be varied 
and shared between organisational members. As I have shown already, this is a 
situation that is a common trait of the MAIE safety culture. Fiol (ibid.) also talks 
about a unified organisational diversity that is achieved when organisational 
members in spite of multiple interpretations share a framework for thought which is 
broad enough to encompass the differences. It will be a matter of analysis to decide 
upon whether this is the situation at MAIE.
Other dilemmas and organisational challenges related to the issue of unity and 
diversity have to be discussed. Among these are the internal organisational 
competition about “correct” meaning constructions (Silverman 1970) and 
organisational actors* labelling powers to define legitimate reality definitions 
(Czamiawska-Joerges and Joerges 1992).
As I have shown previously, the MAIE shared frontstage safety culture is sustained 
by rhetorics, rituals, acts and safety interpretations that are defined as legitimate by 
MAIE managers and employees alike. In my data material, there is nothing to 
suggest that the sustainment of this safety culture is the undertaking of MAIE 
managers or specific organisational groups only. To the contrary, there exists 
considerable evidence that the frontstage culture is shared and appreciated by the 
great bulk of MAIE organisational members. This culture is perceived to be 
instrumental in the perpetual development of MAIE safety, and its mission is 
supported by symbolic and ritual safety expressions.
This is the frontstage MAIE safety organisation -  a world of harmony and unity, 
devoid of visible differences and ambiguities. It is looked upon as a unitary and 
“strong” safety culture which is considered effective in the promotion of improved 
safety (Gherardi et al. 1998b). But aided by Goffman (1959), I have been able to
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define a backstage safety organisation which at times is in opposition to the 
frontstage one and thus forms a differentiated safety subculture. The most 
distinguished traits of the backstage safety culture, however, are features of 
ambiguity, multiplicity and changing and situational safety interpretations -  a 
fragmented safety culture which is based in work-based and situational 
interpretations of safety efforts and safety structures.
My data material shows that MAIE employees sustain and create the MADE safety 
cultures of both unity, differentiation and fragmentation, while MAIE managers 
concentrate on the sustainment of the shared frontstage safety culture. What can 
thus be said to be a significant trait of the MADE safety culture is that all three 
mentioned cultural categories exist within the same organisation at the same time, 
being enacted by both the same and diverse groups of organisational actors.
This complex cultural situation is coped with due to a separation of arenas in which 
the different cultures are enacted. Frontstage, the shared MAIE safety culture is 
activated mainly by managers and is based in managers* powers to define legitimate 
and “correct** reality definitions (Czamiawska-Joerges and Joerges 1992; Silverman 
1970). These are given frontstage support by employees, and they are not unduly 
challenged by oppositional or ambiguous safety constructs since employees 
consider many backstage perceptions to belong to organisational taboo areas. The 
tensions between organisational forces promoting unity, differentiation and 
fragmentation (Gergen 1992) are in this way held in check. As a result, 
organisational harmony and a united safety organisation with high safety awareness 
are MADE characteristics seen from a frontstage point of view.
As a rule, then, the espoused and united MAIE safety culture coexists peacefully 
with backstage safety cultures. The result is an organisational equilibrium in which 
the multiple interpretations of the MAIE safety culture are allowed to exist in their 
designated grounds. There is reason to believe that this non-overlapping is a 
prerequisite for the cultural balance which distinguishes the MAIE safety culture. I 
have previously referred to extraordinary situations in which backstage constructs 
have “spilled over*’ into frontstage arenas and caused problems for the cohesiveness
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of the front stage culture. If such situations became recurring events, this would 
potentially wreck the cultural balance and lead to a state of uncertainty and 
fragmentation of the organisational frontstage self-perception and espoused values. 
Today, as a consequence of the balancing forces of the MAIE safety culture, 
organisatonal members* interpretations of their safety reality work to sustain a sense 
of organisational stability (Reed 1992) rather than transforming the safety culture 
by backstage interpretations becoming dominant in open organisational spheres.
In a study of Italian construction site-managers, Gherardi et al. (1998b) found that 
good social relations and trust between managers and workers were important 
elements of their safety culture concept. These findings correlate with MAIE 
organisational members* safety concept. So when the complexity and 
fragmentation of the MAIE safety culture at times become visible, good relations 
and trust are at a low level, and informal negotiations are necessary to bring balance 
back to the culture. Such negotiations take place when MAIE managers assure 
employees that the situation which prompted the backstage culture to surface 
frontstage was an unfortunate event which will not be repeated. For example, 
balance-promoting negotiations have taken place after incidents when MAIE 
employees perceive that injured colleagues have been forced back to work because 
of managerial preoccupation with key safety figures. Another example of such 
negotiations is what happened in the aftermath of an event when an employee was 
told by his shift supervisor to carry out a perceived unsafe work operation. Work 
colleagues as well as the trade union became involved in negotiations with 
management, and the general perception that the shift supervisor “got problems** 
because of his behaviour seemed to reestablish the safety cultural equilibrium and 
made it possible to sustain a credible frontstage safety culture.
It can be concluded that the MAIE safety culture is complex and multifaceted, and 
that the complexity is sustained and held together by the existence of separate 
cultural arenas in which different cultural values and expressions legitimately are 
enacted. The next question to consider is how this cultural multiplicity affects the 
further improvement of MAIE safety.
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7.6. The safety culture and safety learning.
The MAIE frontstage safety culture prides itself of being a culture in which 
continuous safety learning is a prime concern. As I have shown in chapter 5, 
learning activities are incorporated in the MAIE formal safety structure. Feedback 
from reported accidents and unwanted incidents is said to be a vital learning source, 
and when MADE managers encourage increased reporting, the learning aspect is 
always emphasised.
Based on my analysis of the MAIE safety culture as being more complex and 
fragmented than the espoused frontstage one, however, the issue of the culture’s 
learning facilities becomes more nuanced than what is suggested in the previous 
paragraph. Schon (1991) argues that people’s knowledge to a high degree is shaped 
on a day-to-day basis during actions and reflections over actions, and according to 
Gherardi and Nicolini (2000a), safety learning occurs when people participate in 
communities of practice. This is also a significant trait of MAIE safety learning: 
Much safety knowledge which is based in organisational members’ work 
experiences can be found -  but mostly in MAIE backstage communities of practice 
where informal safety learning takes place continually.
MAIE managers are aware that a multitude of backstage safety evaluations and 
safety knowledge exist, but no conscious managerial efforts are done in order to 
“promote” the backstage constructs to the official learning spheres of the MAIE 
frontstage. And as MAIE employees have an intuitive understanding that their 
backstage safety knowledge is not welcome in frontstage situations, neither do they 
make any efforts to establish their backstage learning as part of the organisational 
frontstage learning system. Due to the separation of the MAIE front- and 
backstages, then, the bulk of the backstage safety learning rarely surfaces at the 
organisational forefront and is thus excluded from becoming integrated in the 
MAIE formal learning structures.
Hence, it can be argued that frontstage learning efforts are built upon rahter limited 
interpretations of the MADE safety reality, and that the potential for extensive
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organisational safety learning which lies in the wide, ambiguous and complex 
backstage definitions is not taken into account. A positive response to safety 
comments and feedback arising from the lower levels of an organisation is 
emphasised by Turner (1992a) as a prerequisite for safety improvement and 
learning. Gherardi and Nicolini’s (2000b) discussion of safety knowledge and 
learning as being based in situated practice in constant evolution -  the often tacit 
situated curriculums of a work place (Gherardi et al. 1998a) -  emphasises the 
limitations in the MAIE formal learning structures where learning seems to be 
looked upon as the mere delivery of information from knowledgeable sources 
(Eckert 1993; quoted in Gherardi et al. 1998a). It is not speculative to suggest that 
the repertoire -  and the creativity -  of MAIE organisational safety learning would 
broaden significantly if backstage cultural elements were allowed to enter the 
MAIE frontstage learning spheres.
The richness and diversity of the MAIE backstage safety knowledge are missing in 
the frontstage stuctured learning situations which are routinised and predictable 
both in form and contents. The fragmentation of the MAIE safety culture and the 
subsequent separation of learning arenas initiate a formal learning process in which 
safety declarations and insistence on formal compliance are main objectives and 
which is not oriented from within different MALE backstage spheres (Gherardi and 
Nicolini 2000a). The focus is upon the finding of safety solutions instead of upon 
the process of consciously searching for such solutions (Colville et al. 1999) among 
the totality of MAIE safety definitions. Thus, the full participatory potential of 
MAIE safety learning is not utilised, and the frontstage safety culture’s emphasis on 
being a safety learning culture has to be looked upon as an espoused theory that 
may at times be - and may at times not be -  consistent with MAIE learning theories- 
in-use.
When assuming that MAIE safety would benefit from a broader and more creative 
safety learning process, the next question to give serious consideration is what lies 
behind this wasteful learning situation that is brought about by the exclusion of 
backstage learning from the frontstage learning systems. It seems plausible to 
suggest that the previously discussed MAIE cultural balance which is based in a
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coexistence of unifying, contradictive and fragmenting forces can be found at the 
core of this issue. I have shown how the internal balance of the MAIE safety 
culture is a prerequisite for the existence of a multiplicity of cultural manifestations 
in their designated organisational arenas. I have also shown how this equilibrium is 
threatened when values and norms belonging backstage “spill over” into the 
frontstage sphere and illuminate defects in the unity of the culture, thus causing 
organisational embarrassment (Goffman 1959). Seen in this perspective, it becomes 
“logical” and organisationally rational that safety learning built upon backstage 
evaluations cannot play any vital part in the MAIE formal safety learning processes. 
The benefits of an “opening up” for backstage learning contributions would be a 
broader knowledge base and the utilisation of multiple safety perspectives, while 
the dangers would be a change in the organisational knowledge stock which may 
cause disruptions in the united safety culture and lead to unwanted consequences 
due to a threatening of organisational stability (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a).
MADE safety formal learning and development can thus be seen necessarily to have 
to be based in safety knowledge and safety constructs that are derived from 
frontstage safety interpretations. The multiple backstage constructs will have to be 
kept in their designated arenas with the negative consequences this separation can 
be suggested to have for official safety learning and the improvement of MADE 
safety.
7.7. The safety culture -  shared, differentiated and fragmented?: a summary.
An analysis of the immediately visible MAIE safety culture has shown that 
organisational members share safety values, interpretations and frames of reference. 
This includes a shared appreciation of the MADE formal safety structure as well as a 
perception of the MAIE safety culture as a unique and successful culture which 
distinguishes the plant from other organisations. Coherence and non-ambiguity are 
core features in the shared frontstage safety culture, and a collective system of 
safety meaning by which organisational members interpret their safety experiences 
and receive guidelines for action is thus constituted. This shared culture is
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sustained by MADE managers as well as employees, and it is a dominant trait of the 
image of MAIE as an organisation.
But the shared and unifying frontstage safety culture is one side of the MAIE safety 
culture only. Backstage, safety perceptions which oppose front stage culture ones 
can be found, These differentiated safety constructs often object to the streamlined 
frontstage interpretations of the formal safety structure’s implementation. For 
instance, the frontstage constructs regarding accident reporting and safety statistics 
are met with opposing interpretations from many MADE employees.
Distinct subcultural groups cannot easily be outlined, but what can be seen is that a 
large proportion of MAIE employees voice situational backstage safety 
interpretations that are in opposition to frontstage ones. From this it can be 
suggested that a differentiated MAIE backstage safety culture exists which is 
activated by different organisational members and groups under different 
circumstances, and that distance to the shared frontstage safety culture is created 
when the backstage culture becomes manifested.
Ambiguity and fluctuations are not captured in a culture analysis which 
concentrates on unity and differentiation only. At MAIE, there exists a multitude of 
examples that organisational members are ambiguous and incoherent in their safety 
interpretations and that their perceptions fluctuate according to situational 
circumstances. The stability and clarity of the shared and differentiated MAIE 
safety cultures thus have to be supplemented by a cultural perspective which 
focuses upon fragmentation and unclarity. Seen from such a point of view, 
ambiguous and fluctuating constructs are not looked upon as “irrational” and 
deviant, but rather as subjective and situational safety perceptions that represent 
organisational members* safety rationality in just as “proper” a manner as the 
unambiguous perceptions of a shared and a differentiated safety culture.
The complexity of the MAIE safety culture is thus established, and the next 
question to consider is whether the cultural diversity works to sustain or to 
destabilise the plant safety culture. The concepts of frontstage and backstage arenas
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are productive in this analysis, as the shared safety culture is the only one that 
legitimately exists frontstage, while both a differentiated and a fragmented safety 
culture are found in backstage surroundings. This MAIE cultural multiplicity 
becomes manifested in parallel processes that may be enacted by the same 
organisational members, and this is possible because of the separation of enactment 
arenas. In this way, the shared safety culture is enacted frontstage without 
interference from the oppositional and ambiguous cultures of MAIE backstage and 
vice versa, and a MADE cultural equilibrium can be argued to exist in which 
multiple cultural interpretations are allowed to come forward in their designated 
areas.
This situation is the normal state of the MAIE safety culture, but at times, the 
complexity and fragmentation of the culture are visible in open arenas due to 
extraordinary events. After such occurrences, negotiations between MADE 
managers and employees are necessary to bring the required cultural balance back 
to the organisation.
MAIE prides itself of being a safety learning organisation, and systematic safety 
learning efforts are incorporated in the frontstage routines of the formal safety 
structure. Backstage, informal safety learning which is built upon differentiated and 
fragmented safety perceptions takes place. Due to the separation of the MAIE 
cultural arenas, though, this safety knowledge as a rule is kept backstage and thus 
not included in the officially recognised organisational safety learning efforts. As a 
result, the formalised MADE safety learning is based in limited interpretations of the 
organisational safety reality, and the wider potential for safety learning that lies in 
the safety cultural complexity is not explored into.
This “aborted” learning situation seems to promote a waste of improved safety 
possibilities, but when seen from the perspective of the MAIE cultural equilibrium, 
though, such a situation can be argued to be organisationally rational. The opening 
up for backstage safety knowledge into the spheres of the formal frontstage learning 
structures would be accompanied by the danger of disrupting the cultural balance 





The purpose of my research has been to do an exploratory study of MAIE safety 
which focusses around organisational actors* subjective safety sensemaking 
processes. Guided by this theoretical perspective, it has been my aim to produce an 
organisational safety analysis which includes both visible and hidden safety 
representations and enactments. In this last chapter it is my first intention to 
summarise my knowledge about MAIE within the theoretical framework I have 
chosen to utilise. Thus, local MAIE knowledge based in the MAIE safety plurality 
is developed, and this leads me on to outline what I consider to be the most 
distinguishable traits of MAIE as a safety organisation. Finally, I will discuss my 
work in a broader context, also suggesting directions for further safety research.
8.2. Ethnography and the construction of local knowledge.
I have utilised an ethnographic approach in this work. An ethnographic approach is 
a way of thinking about and doing organisational analysis in which the researcher 
attempts to involve herself with her research **body*’ by observing and participating 
in organisational life in order to explore into organisational meaning constructs -  
formal and informal -  on all organisational levels. This involvement of mine has 
taken on the form as a long social process of coming to terms with the MAIE 
culture (Van Maanen 1988). In the course of the exploration process, I have 
attempted to cany out my work without a priori research categories in my luggage, 
and I have previously in this thesis shown that I have revealed many organisational 
layers of assumptions, skills, and practices due to my ethnographic approach 
(Pollner 1987). My obtained organisational insight is presented through thick 
descriptions of MAIE organisational actors* safety meaning constructs in a way that 
does not separate the constructs from the organisational context in which they take 
place -  the essence of being an ethnographer, according to Geertz (1993b). By the
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utilisation of a wide and inclusive ethnographic approach, it has been possible for 
me to establish MAIE organisational members’ safety sensemaking in frontstage as 
well as in backstage arenas.
It has not been my goal to establish general theories about MAIE safety based in my 
research process of ethnographic fieldwork, data collection and analysis of MALE 
safety. Geertz (1993a:4) claims that ”... the shapes of knowledge are always 
ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments and their encasements”. He as 
well as post-modernist writers have convinced me about the futility of a venture 
aimed at producing ’’grand narratives” or generic theory based in my knowledge of 
MAIE, but rather to recognise the complexity and uniqueness of the culture in the 
construction of MAIE ’’local knowledge” (Geertz, ibid.).
What I have done, then, is to produce a local narrative -  built upon multiple 
narratives and thick descriptions of the organisational ’’reality” -  that presents 
MALE safety through the lenses of my perceptions of organisational members’ 
safety sensemaking. Thus, I have developed what Geertz (1993a) calls ’’the 
understanding of understanding”: ”... a number of actual interpretations of 
something, anthropologizing formulations of what I take to be some of the broader 
implications of those interpretations ....” (ibid., 5). It is through these 
interpretations and implications that the MAIE safety pluralism comes into full 
view and my version of MAIE local knowledge is established.
8.3. Sensemaking processes.
In numerous examples related to MAIE safety, I have shown how organisational 
members attribute meaning to organisational events (Weick 1995) and how their 
multiple safety performances create their subjective safety realities (Mangham and 
Overington 1987). Chapter 5 -  The Formal Structure of MAIE Safety Work -  is 
based upon a diversity of sensemaking processes, depicting both consensus, 
differentiation and ambiguity in a multitude of safety related situations. In 
organisational actors’ interpretations of the MADE social reality, their subjective 
safety cognitions and enactments are just as rational, logical and significant as are
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the organisation's official interpretations (Donald and Canter 1993; Leidner 1993; 
Morgan 1990; Geertz 1973, quoted in Weick 1979). They are based in work 
experience and competence and thus incorporate much safety knowledge and 
potential learning (Douglas 1992; Blumer 1986). A significant trait of the MAIE 
frontstage (Goffman 1959) safety culture, however, is that diverse safety 
interpretations are not acknowledged as being of safety importance. To the 
contrary, the plurality and unshared meaning constructs (Weick 1995) of MAIE 
safety sensemaking are considered incompatible with the espoused and shared 
MAIE frontstage safety culture, and are thus ordinarily to be found only in 
backstage arenas where they cannot interfere with the frontstage culture.
A characteristic trait of the diversity and plurality of MADE safety sensemaking 
processes is ambiguity and frequent changes also within individuals’ interpretations 
of safety events. Safety constructs vaiy as new situations arise in which prior 
interpretations do not seem to fit in any longer (Isabella 1990). Also, organisational 
members may have more than one interpretation of the same safety situation (Fiol
1996), the interpretations being enacted under differing organisational 
circumstances. It can thus be stated that fluidity is a significant feature of the MAIE 
safety sensemaking processes.
That meaning is imparted through identity creating sensemaking processes which 
motivate and resolve organisational concerns (Pettigrew 1979) has been discussed 
in chapter 4. It is also suggested that safety issues becomes a binding force in the 
sustainment of MAIE as a unified organisation. In this context, Reed's (1992) 
suggestions about the potential of sensemaking processes to sustain or transform an 
organisation have to be considered. I have argued that the transformative elements 
of MAIE organisational actors’ sensemaking are kept separated from the 
organisational frontstage, and that this spatial separation is imperative in order to 
keep up the espoused frontstage culture and organisational unity (Schon 1991). The 
diversity of MAIE individuals' safety sensemaking is thus ''tamed” and regulated 
into different organisational spheres. In this way, the MAIE multiple safety 
interpretations’ potential for organisational transformation become limited. I follow 
Weick (1995) in his distinction of shared experience/unshared meaning as I suggest
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that the MAIE frontstage is distinguished by shared -  identical -  
experience/unshared meaning situations. But contrary to avoid summarising -  
sharing out -  the shared experiences in fear of focusing upon unshared meaning 
constructs (Weick, ibid.), what is vocalised at MAIE frontstage is an espoused 
collective sensemaking process in which shared experience, unity and coherence are 
emphasised. Backstage, though, the unshared meaning constructs legitimately 
surface.
I have argued that the existing equilibrium between the two MAIE safety arenas is 
dependent upon an overall organisational situation which generally speaking is 
acceptable for organisational members. Without an interpretation of MAIE as an 
”OK” place to work, the equilibrium can easily be damaged, as has been 
exemplified in short periods due to specific organisational circumstances. With the 
equilibrium being out of balance for a longer period, it is reasonable to assume that 
the diversity of actors* sensemaking processes would reach frontstage arenas and its 
potential as a transformative force (Reed 1992) would surface.
Another way of analysing the MAIE safety sensemaking process is through the 
concept of cognitive schemas (Harris 1996; Isabella 1990; Stubbart and 
Ramaprasad 1990). The formal safety structure’s language of safety categories and 
concepts constitutes the mental map -  the schema -  through which MADE 
organisational members interpret and categorise safety events front stage. When 
MAIE managers and employees consider safety issues, their shared frame of 
reference is this language (Schein 1992).
But it is evident that there exists different cognitive safety schemas and different 
safety languages among MAIE organisational members, and it is similarly evident 
that the different schemas and languages become operationalised in different 
organisational situations. What becomes a question of importance is whether the 
MAIE safety sensemaking process can be characterised as one in which unified 
organisational diversity (Fiol 1996) exists. Is there at MADE a shared framework of 
safety thought -  a schema -  which is broad enough to encompass the cited 
differences in safety cognitions? Does there exist a set of core beliefs around which
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there openly can be found variations in perceptions of many issues (Porac et al. 
1989)? In other words: Is the espoused MAIE frontstage safety schema broad 
enough to allow inputs from the other MADE safety schemas while still keeping up 
its function as a unifying and identity creating force?
MAIE organisational unity is focussed around frontstage safety issues while a great 
safety diversity has been shown to exist in backstage arenas. But in spite of this, it 
is difficult to argue that a unified organisational diversity characterises MAIE. If 
such a unified diversity existed, it is reasonable to suggest that the diversity -  and 
not only the unity -  would have been allowed to surface in frontstage situations. I 
have repeatedly shown that this is not the case. The consequences of the existing 
partition is that organisational unity becomes a distinguished MAIE trait, while 
organisational diversity is hard to find without probing into the back quarters of the 
organisation. Diverse MAIE sensemaking processes most definitely do exist -  but 
they are not openly acknowledged.
8.4. Localised and situational sensemaking.
Although officially unrecognised, the diversity in MAIE safety sensemaking is rich. 
The question has to be asked why this diversity lives and blooms in spite of its 
unacknowledged organisational position. To answer this, it is necessary to focus 
upon the organisational circumstances in which the differing safety constructs are 
developed.
Silverman (1970) argues that organisational meaning constructions are in a constant 
flux and differ according to how organisational members interpret what is going on 
around them. MAIE organisational actors have different positions in the 
organisation, based in their location in the organisational hierarchy as well as their 
specific work tasks. Their daily interactions with the plant technology, the 
organisation of work tasks, their shift environment, and other aspects of MAIE 
work life thus initiate different interpretations of the MADE safety efforts. Chapter 
5 gives numerous examples of this divergence. What can be argued to be found at 
MADE is thus a safety construct diversity which is related to differences in
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organisational members* daily work situations. Gherardi and Nicolini (2000b) echo 
this view when emphasising that an organisations’s body of safety knowledge 
produces safety only when this knowledge is put to work in situated work practices, 
its meaning being interpreted and translated based in local conditions. Safety is 
thus a competence that is realised in practice (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a), and it 
is therefore by necessity localised and situated.
For example, organisational actors’ varying interpretations of the safety regulations 
regarding personal protective equipment have been commented on in chapter 5. 
Leidner (1993) states that people do not follow all rules obediently when they 
believe their interests are not well served by these rules, and according to Canter 
(1993), irregular work behaviour is sometimes quite intentional in the way that 
people know they are acting unsafely but nevertheless do so. Based on MAIE 
organisational members’ own explanations, it seems reasonable to suggest that they 
at times find the accident potential of their unsafe behaviour to be smaller than the 
perceived personal benefits of not applying to personal protective equipment 
regulations. In such circumstances, their own situational sensemaking is considered 
a better behavioural guide than an automatic adherence to the rules of the official 
safety organisation. When this is the case, they act ’’unsafely” seen from the MAIE 
frontstage point of view.
In order to understand people's organisational interpretations and their subsequent 
actions, it becomes essential to acknowledge organisational members’ subjective 
and situational sensemaking. I have built my research around the subjective 
rationalities of MAIE organisational members. This choice of mine has made me 
appreciate that MAIE safety interpretations and enactments can be productively 
comprehended only when work situations and organisational positions/locations are 
taken into account (Wright 1994; Czamiawska-Joerges 1993). Safety can be 
viewed as situated practice which is shaped in social and collective processes of 
interpretations and translations (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000b) and where safety 
knowledge is transmitted and stored within communities of practice (Gherardi et al. 
1998b).
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DeJoy (1994) discusses what he calls the pervasive tendency among managers and 
safety specialists to underestimate situational factors when they observe and 
evaluate safety events. As I have repeatedly shown, a plural and situational 
organisational safety reality is not acknowledged by MAIE management, their 
position thus being in line with DeJoy’s argument. Consequently, much safety 
sensemaking is channeled into arenas where it is considered legitimate in spite of 
official rejection. My suggestion that safety sensemaking by necessity is localised 
and situational explains why a safety diversity continues to flourish -  and will 
continue to flourish -  at MAIE. It is an impossibility that MAIE safety 
interpretations are not diverse due to their origin in different organisational 
circumstances.
8.5. Authoritative definitions of the organisational safety reality.
Isabella (1990) states that managers use their interpretations of organisational 
reality to frame meaning for organisational members. Many other researchers echo 
such a view regarding the centrality of managers as creators of organisational 
meaning. If this is accepted as a general assumption, then a main question will be 
to probe into the mechanisms that make this possible. Gherardi and Nicolini 
(2000a), Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Brown (1989; quoted in Czamiawska 
1997) point to organisational power relations in order to offer an answer.
The need to provide an organisation with a sense of controllability (Czamiawska 
1997) prompts managers to promote and defend managerial definitions of 
organisational reality. According to Pym (1990), they utilise sophisticated 
management and information systems to create acceptance for these definitions. At 
MAIE, managerial interpretations of the organisational safety reality emerge 
perpetually and stringently through the formal structure of MAIE safety. This 
streamlined and bureaucratically designed safety management system is constructed 
and implemented by MAIE managers with the support of corporate management. It 
is similar to many models of work accident prevention (e.g. Krause et al. 1990) in 
which rational action and thought and standardised conditions of knowledge 
production (Harvey 1992) are core issues. The formal safety structure illuminates
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and manifests the way MAIE managers think about safety and safety improvements, 
and employees often refer to the system as being ’’owned” by their managers, 
although employees participate in the system activities on a broad scale. This 
system of safety work thus acts as a main agent to promote managerially defined 
safety definitions in order to create and keep up a shared acceptance of the MAIE 
safety reality (Pym 1990).
By frequent involvement in safety system elements, MAIE employees become 
socialised into the managerially defined frontstage safety reality. As I have shown 
previously, they do this to such an extent that they incorporate the MAIE frontstage 
safety culture as one of their interpretative schemas and also base their shared 
organisational identity in it. Through this schema, organisational members are 
made aware of the boundaries for ’’proper” MAIE safety definitions and 
consequently which definitions that have the chance of becoming accepted as 
authoritative. Those definitions that are not coherent with the dominant safety 
world view represent threats to the espoused unity of the culture (Schon 1991; 
Argyris and Schon 1978) and become frontstage taboos. MAIE backstage cultures 
and identities are largely based on safety interpretations that are incompatible with 
the managerially promoted safety definitions of the MAIE frontstage.
MAIE management has for many years been active in maintenance and 
improvement of MAIE safety work. Their frequently vocalised good intentions of 
improved safety is generally taken for face value, and plant history shows many 
vital safety improvements that have been initiated by managerial efforts. MAIE 
safety records also indicate safety competence and success. Thus, MAIE 
management’s reputation as safety ’’winners” -  both internally and externally -  
carries with it prestige and safety acknowledgment. This perceived safety 
prominence can be seen as a vital tool in MAIE management’s efforts to convince 
organisational members that safety issues ’’are” the way they are managerially 
labelled (Czamiawska-Joerges and Joerges 1992). MAIE managers are to a great 
extent able to achieve meaning authority in the MADE frontstage safety culture, and 
this defining power of theirs can be suggested to be closely connected to their 
generally perceived safety competence.
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8.6. Authoritative and non-authoritative safety definitions.
The fate of the non-authoritative MAIE safety definitions is to become backstage 
phenomena (Goffman 1959). Here, a polyphony of safety definitions exist which 
are not organisationally acknowledged and can normally not be evidenced as part of 
the MAIE frontstage safety culture. This multiplicity of safety voices has been an 
important reservoir for me in my attempt to catch the complexity of MADE safety. 
Without such a backstage perspective, a MAIE safety analysis would have turned 
out very differently.
I have deliberately searched for non-authoritative safe constructs. This approach 
has enabled me to include safety sensemaking processes that would have been 
lacking in an analysis built upon the MAIE espoused safety world only. By 
utilising both authoritative and non-authoritative definitions of the MAIE safety 
reality, I have tried to avoid forcing MADE organisational life into commonly used 
pre-conceived analytical categories that according to Reed (1993) and Linstead
(1996) very often are governed by a world view of unity, rational order and 
integration while refusing to be open to organisational elements that do not ’’fit” 
into the ’’proper” framework of thought. The MADE non-authoritative safety 
definitions have made me acknowledge multiple interpretations and social 
constructions of the MAIE safety reality -  a research focus that according to Brooks
(1997) is where the only ’’truths” of organisational life can be found. Even if not 
following Brooks in his belief in organisational ’’truths”, I  find it plausible to state 
that this perspective of mine has brought both richness, multiplicity and 
comprehension to my work. It has resulted in an analysis filled with complexity 
and organisational paradoxes (Czamiawska 1997) in which simultaneously 
contradictory and ambiguous safety perceptions (Doray 1988; quoted in Brown 
1992) have been accepted as organisational ’’truths” alongside with the shared and 
espoused interpretations of MAIE safety.
Based on this theoretical approach of mine, I have not produced any ’’grand 
narrative” of the MADE safety reality. My objective in illuminating the vast amount 
of local and differentiated MAIE safety knowledge (Geertz 1993) has been to offer
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insight into a complex safety world rather than to give clear-cut answers (Brooks
1997) to essentially intricate organisational questions. Thus, the approach in itself 
becomes an aspect of my ’’local knowledge” constructions: My focus upon 
authoritative as well as non-authoritative safety constructs has proved to be 
productive for insight in and comprehension of the localised and situational MAIE 
safety reality.
8.7. Safety self-perception and safety identity.
Through their sensemaking processes, MAIE organisational members mould their 
individual and organisational safety self-perceptions. These perceptions are 
grounded in historical accounts of safety success and safety competence in 
combination with pride over present safety accomplishments. In my analysis, I 
have shown how MAIE organisational members share a construct of being a first- 
class safety organisation in which safety is emphasised and given priority under all 
organisational circumstances. In their view, MAIE is a distinguished safety 
organisation, and this perceived state of safety affairs sets MAIE apart from other 
organisations and is a source of high self-esteem and organisational pride.
The MAIE shared self-perception includes a tale of self-respect, efficiency and 
autonomy (Czamiawska 1997) as well as it imparts meaning and prescribe how to 
solve organisational concerns (Pettigrew 1979) -  all vital elements in the creation 
and sustainment of organisational identity. I have argued that a shared MAIE 
frontstage safety identity emerges from this self-perception. But I have also argued 
the existence of backstage safety identities, thus evidencing identity multiplicity and 
complexity (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000; Leidner 1993; Marcus 1992; Gergen 
1991). Normally, though, this identity plurality is kept away from organisational 
frontstage situations.
The shared frontstage safety identity of safety success is shown to have a very 
prominent place in the MALE organisational world in general. Based on the 
seeming lack of other identity promoting organisational themes, I have suggested 
that the MAIE frontstage safety identity constitutes the basic building bricks of
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MAIE’s organisational identity in general, and that the shared frontstage safety 
identity thus produces a collective framework of thought that promotes unity and 
consensus. The MAIE frontstage safety identity becomes a binding force of the 
organisation as a whole.
8.8. Safety ideology.
Starbuck and Milliken (quoted in Weick 1995) state that values and beliefs are 
important filters for people in their sensemaking processes. An espoused unity of 
safety ideology is frequently voiced at MAIE. In chapter 6, however, I have shown 
that MAIE organisational members both agree and differ in their basic safety values 
and beliefs. A main reason for these divergences is said to be caused by difference 
of perspectives due to dissimilar positions in the production process.
These MAIE ideological assumptions include shared as well as differentiated 
perceptions of what safety is all about, of who is primarily responsible for worker 
safety, of the relationship between production and safety issues and whether all 
accidents and injuries can be prevented. Both shared, group-based and individual 
ideological filters will influence organisational actors* sensemaking processes, and 
the simultaneously existing unity and diversity in safety ideology can be looked 
upon as vital elements in the unceasing interaction between unity, differentiation 
and ambiguity in MADE safety sensemaking. It seems rather unthinkable that the 
MAIE safety sensemaking processes would not be influenced by organisational 
members* assumptions -  shared and differentiated -  concerning fundamental safety 
issues.
8.9. Safety as cultural phenomena.
When analysing MAIE safety, I have utilised different cultural perspectives to 
illuminate the diversity as well as the unity of the safety culture. The analytical 
perspective of cultural integration (Trice and Beyer 1993; Martin 1992; Deal and 
Kennedy 1984) has helped me recognise the unity of the MAIE frontstage safety 
culture, while the differentiation perspective (Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991) has
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been important for my discovery of the MAIE backstage subcultural definitions of 
the organisational safety reality. And finally, a cultural fragmentation perspective 
(Martin 1992; Frost et al. 1991; Martin and Meyerson 1988) with its emphasis on 
doubt, fluctuation, multiplicity and ambiguity has provided me with an analytical 
tool with which to capture organisational members’ often fluctuating and 
ambiguous safety interpretations.
Martin’s (1992) discussion of the three perspectives on organisational culture has 
been an eye-opener for me in its argumentation that all perspectives may 
simultaneously be fruitfully utilised in a cultural analysis of any specific 
organisation. This analytical approach has helped me to appreciate that the MAIE 
safety culture at the same time can be viewed as a shared, a differentiated and a 
fragmented culture (Martin, ibid.). Due to this conceptual framework, I have 
discovered that the MAIE safety culture is far more complex than the shared 
frontstage safety culture that easily catches the eye. Backstage, I have found a 
flourishing multitude of safety interpretations, and I have found cultural 
differentiation and ambiguity here as opposed to the frontstage cultural simplicity.
The categorisation of the MAIE safety culture as a three-dimensional culture has 
been one important step in my analysis. Another one was reached as I found that 
the different cultures coexist and that the majority of MAIE organisational members 
participate in multicultural enactments due to their specific situational 
circumstances. The organisational dynamics that in this way is captured in my 
analysis is thus yet another result of a three-dimensional cultural approach (Martin, 
ibid.).
The essential question which next arises is how MADE organisational order can be 
maintained in spite of the dynamics of the cultural plurality. My analysis shows 
that organisational stability is dependent upon a clear separation of front- and 
backstage cultural enactments. This is something that also is commented upon by 
Gherardi and Nicolini (2000a) when they argue that organisational stability may be 
threatened by a change of balance in the organisational knowledge situation.
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The centrality of the MACE frontstage safety culture as a unifying organisational 
element makes it necessary that its main assumptions remain undisputed so that 
consensus is sustained (Schon 1991; Goffman 1959). The development of separate 
backstage arenas is argued to maintain MAIE safety unity in spite of a multiplicity 
of differentiated and ambiguous safety constructs: Backstage, organisational 
members can promote their ’’deviant” interpretations which normally are kept away 
from frontstage situations as a blur between the shared frontstage culture and the 
many backstage safety cultural enactments could have potentially ruinous effects 
for MACE as an organisation. Under ordinary circumstances, the different MACE 
safety cultures lead a peaceful coexistence as they are being enacted in their 
"designated” organisational situations. When circumstances occur in which this 
equilibrium is threatened, however, the fragile balance of the cultural system 
becomes apparent, and internal negotiations (Reed 1992; Morgan 1990) become 
necessary to restore the cultural order. Thus, the safety culture of the MAIE 
frontstage is kept intact and can play its role for unity and organisational 
sustainment.
8.10. A safety learning organisation.
I have argued MAIE to be an organisation where the organisational identity is built 
around the self-perception of being an excellent safety organisation, and I have 
shown how this is made possible due to the MADE separation between front- and 
backstage communities. What is thus promoted is a unitary organisation where 
consensus reigns in spite of internal safety differentiation and fragmentation.
Continuous safety learning is an espoused MAIE value, and the formal safety 
structure incorporates many events in which safety learning is emphasised. 
However, based on my data, I have raised doubts as to whether the safety learning 
potential of MAIE becomes fully utilised due to the organisational need to shield 
the MAIE frontstage from safety evaluations that collide with the officially 
espoused ones.
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The organisational safety learning that is intended to take place is supposed to be 
based in the formal safety system's feed-back routines along with managerial safety 
information to employees. To a large degree, this frontstage learning strategy 
seems to function as a learning situation which is dominated by managerial 
definitions of MAIE safety. It can be argued that the MAIE formal safety learning 
process focusses upon adherence to the regulations of the formal safety structure 
and that a persistent rules compliance is a main objective of organisational learning 
(Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a). With an apparent belief in learning as a delivery of 
information from a knowledgable source to a less knowledgable recipient (Eckert 
1993; quoted in Gherardi et al. 1998a), the MAIE learning process is distinguished 
by one-way communication which does not leave much room for safety comments 
and feedback from lower levels of the organisation. Turner (1992a) argues that such 
feedback is a prerequisite for safety improvement and learning.
According to Czamiawska-Joerges (1993), Wright (1994) and Garfinkel (1967), a 
mundane work-based focus is vital in order to comprehend organisational actors* 
meaning constructions. As I have shown in chapter 5, MAIE employees' backstage 
safety constructs are based in situational definitions of daily safety and a work- 
based evaluation of the implementation of the MAIE formal safety structure. These 
backstage safety perceptions may be concerned with issues such as the reasons for 
unsafe acts (Glendon and McKenna 1995; Leidner 1993), the adaptation of safety 
procedures to specific work situations, the perceived lack of feed-back from 
accidents and dangerous incidents, the reliability problems of safety statistics, the 
form of shift safety inspections and shift safety meetings, etc. And concurrent with 
these interpretations, .suggestions for safety improvements can frequently be found. 
Due to the separation of front- and backstages, though, this work-based safety 
knowledge mainly remains a backstage phenomena and very seldom reaches 
official consideration and recognition.
The result of this is that much of the MAIE safety learning takes place in secluded 
arenas, thus involving a limited selection of participants. There is no reason to 
believe this learning to be ineffective for those who take part, but what is missing in 
such a context is the organisation-wide learning situation that includes the majority
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of organisational members in the learning process. And what is similarly missing is 
the probability that creative backstage safety suggestions as a rule emerge in the 
MAIE official frontstage learning processes. In this way, it can be argued that 
MAIE safety learning suffers from the separation of organisational front- and 
backstages. What is observed is sub-cultural learning situations which maintain 
existing sub-cultural differences within the MADE safety culture (Schein 1992).
The MAIE backstage situated and localised safety knowledge -  the situated 
curriculums (Gherardi et al. 1998a) -  is varied and complex as it verbalises 
unshared meaning constructs (Weick 1995) that ordinarily are not found in MAIE 
frontstage settings. I have shown how this reservoire of safety knowledge is kept 
backstage and not utilised in the safety learning process, and I have raised the 
question whether such a strategy is a necessity in order to ’’protect” the MAIE 
organisational stability and identity (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000a).
This limited utilisation of the potential for safety learning may be an organisational 
cost of the espoused and shared MAIE frontstage safety culture. It can be suggested 
that if safety learning attempts based in backstage perceptions were allowed to enter 
the frontstage learning process, the possibilities for "cracks" in the frontstage 
culture would be rather strong (Schon 1991; Goffman 1963). It might therefore 
seem logical and rational from a unity point of view to pay the cost of diminished 
and less creative safety learning in order to maintain the officially shared safety 
culture of MAIE. Whether it is a rational long-term point of view considering 
safety improvement is another question.
8.11. What distinguishes MAIE as a safety organisation?
After having summed up what I consider to be my main discoveries of the MAIE 
local knowledge, I am able to come forward with an organisational image of MAIE 
which in my conception catches what are the most prominent characteristics of 
MAIE as a safety organisation. Five issues immediately leap to my mind:
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8.11.1. Safety as multiple interpretations.
MAIE safety constructs and MADE safety enactments include a large variety of 
interpretations which are based in organisational actors* divergent frames of 
reference and are closely connected to their organisational positions and work tasks. 
The officially espoused MAIE safety interpretations constitute only a part of the 
safety perceptions that exist in the organisation at large.
The multiple safety constructs contain differing interpretations of the formal 
structure of MAIE safety work as well as its implementation. These interpretations 
vary from the construct pointing to straightforward instrumentality for safety 
improvement to perceptions of the formal safety structure as symbolic 
manifestations of the MAIE safety culture as well as functioning as rituals in order 
to preserve organisational values and beliefs. Also, organisational members 
perceive the formal safety structure to have become focussed in its own right and 
thus may contribute to a distortion of organisational safety improvement.
Differing safety values and beliefs also emerge, and so do different views 
concerning particular safety issues. The variety of perceptions comprises large 
amounts of localised and situational safety experience and knowledge.
This multiplicity of safety interpretations is not officially recognised or welcomed 
as being of significance for MAIE as a safety conscious organisation. To the 
contrary, the plurality of perceptions is looked upon by MAIE managers as 
irrelevant or even deviant interpretations which may disturb the institutionalised and 
"proper” way of handling MAIE safety.
8.11.2. Frontstage and backstage safety.
A significant trait of MAIE safety is the way the varied safety interpretations exist 
in separate organisational arenas. In MAIE front- and backstage situations, 
different safety cultures and safety identities are performed, and these are both
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shared among a majority of organisational members and are the property of specific 
groups and individuals only.
Frontstage, the frequently espoused culture and identity are shared among most 
organisational members. Through this culture and identity consensus, a unified and 
self-conscious safety organisation stands forward in which safety is focussed in 
organisational rhetorics, structures and processes. Little if any differentiation or 
ambiguity in safety interpretations can be evidenced at the MAIE frontstage.
In secluded circumstances at MAIE backstage, though, employees* safety 
interpretations often differ from those of the organisational frontstage. Here, the 
espoused MADE frontstage interpretations are challenged by an abundance of 
situational and localised safety perceptions, depicting safety theories-in-use that are 
characterised by differentiation, ambiguity and fluctuation. Unshared meaning 
constructs regarding shared safety experiences flourish, and the backstage safety 
plurality contrasts very distinctly to the streamlined unity of the MAIE frontstage. 
Safety subcultures and multiple safety identities are developed and enacted in the 
backstage surroundings.
MAIE front- and backstages are separated from each other, thus enabling MAIE 
employees to participate in both arenas without the simultaneous unity and disunity 
of safety interpretations causing embarrassment and conflict. When employee 
backstage perceptions at times appear frontstage, it is usually the result of 
managerial safety conduct that employees consider to be in opposition to general 
rules of organisational decency. But such situations are rare, and the distinct 
separation of front- and backstages constitutes a significant MADE organisational 
characteristic.
8.113. Safety as a dominant organisational theme.
I have suggested that MAIE’s frontstage safety culture emerges as a major 
organisational schema or frame of reference through which many organisational 
events are being interpreted and ordered. I have also suggested that organisational 
members’ shared frontstage safety identity stands forward as a dominant part of the
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organisational identity. It can furthermore be argued that there exists a state of 
mutual reinforcement between the frontstage safety culture and the frontstage safety 
identity as each of them inevitably works to strengthen the other.
In this way, safety issues can be looked upon as having additional organisational 
significance than safety promotion only as safety becomes a main issue around 
which MAIE is ordered and unified and around which organisational pride and 
recognition is focussed. This situation works perpetually to reinforce even further 
safety’s dominant organisational role.
A prerequisite for the maintenance of this safety dominated organisational order is 
the existing separation between the MAIE front- and backstages. By means of this 
partition, threats to the cohesive and unifying agencies of the frontstage identity and 
culture are prevented. When seen in this perspective, the importance of the 
separation becomes emphasised as its purpose is seen to be more essential than 
merely avoiding organisational embarrassment and conflict. What is prevented by 
the strict partition of organisational front- and backstages is a possible break-down 
of organisational unity and a loss of organisational identity. Without a state of a 
generally accepted organisational feeling of unity and order and a common feeling 
of membership and identity, MAIE as an organisation could easily enter into a 
position of potential disorganisation and disintegration.
8.11.4. Safety learning and development.
MAIE official safety learning is said to be based in a philosophy of continuous 
improvement and is supposedly being achieved by the systematic utilisation of 
organisational members* safety experiences and safety suggestions. Safety learning 
efforts are formalised in the MAIE safety structure and is claimed to be an 
integrated part of all formal safety activities.
As I have shown, a multiplicity of safety interpretations exists at MAIE. A question 
of considerable interest has been to establish whether the full amount of these work 
related safety experiences and perceptions are being utilised as the basis for MAIE
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safety learning, or whether specific interpretations are being preferred at the cost of 
others.
My analysis has shown that due to the organisational importance of the MAIE 
frontstage safety unity, the larger part of backstage interpretations does not play any 
part in the formal organisational learning efforts. Only a fraction of the MAIE 
plural safety interpretations appears in the MADE frontstage learning efforts which 
can be looked upon as a one-way learning process where managerial definitions of 
MAIE safety are dominant. This situation causes a substantial narrowing of the 
MAIE basis for safety learning as potentially vitalising elements connected with 
organisational dissensus and ambiguity do not reach the MAIE frontstage learning 
spheres.
The limited focus of the official safety learning process counteracts the espoused 
MADE statements of a systematic utilisation of safety experiences and evaluations in 
safety learning and development efforts. The vital position of MAIE frontstage 
safety with its self-perception of being in the safety forefront thus can be suggested 
to function as a barrier for safety learning and to have unintended -  and 
unacknowledged -  consequences for MADE safety development.
8.11.5. A "strong” safety culture.
MADE is an organisation where safety is an issue of importance, both in the daily 
work tasks and as a main cohesive and identity building factor. Seen in this 
perspective, MADE can be characterised as an organisation with a distinguished and 
"strong” safety culture which influences organisational activities on a broad scale.
It is tempting to argue that MAIE ”is” its frontstage safety culture.
This situation is beneficial for the keeping of a continuous safety focus. MAIE 
worker safety has improved through the years, much due to safety’s central 
organisational position, and safety development work is continually being 
undertaken. At MAIE, it is not possible to ignore obvious safety challenges without 
running the risk of harming the organisational image and the identity building
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culture. Thus, organisational members find invaluable support for improved safety 
efforts in the MAIE organisational culture -  provided they keep themselves within 
the boundaries of the epoused and shared frontstage culture.
But other organisational consequences of a ’’strong” safety culture can also be seen. 
In spite of the positive self-evaluation of safety success, many MAIE organisational 
members -  managers and employees alike -  state that MADE safety work is not 
overly creative and that new approaches are difficult to come up with. The 
bureaucratic stability of the MAIE safety thinking and doing accounts for a lack of 
new initiatives, it is said. A way of mending this situation could be to open up for 
the many backstage safety interpretations and look for new angles of safety 
approaches in this reservoir of safety knowledge. But up till now, this has not been 
a management strategy, and I will argue that this choice can be looked upon as a 
result of MAIE* s "strong” safety culture.
The frontstage exclusion of backstage perceptions has been a recurring theme in my 
analysis. A question of importance is whether this situation is an inevitable effect 
of the safety culture’s dominance in organisational affairs. It is my suggestion that 
there exists a connection between the ’’strength” of the MAIE safety culture and the 
seeming necessity to keep backstage perceptions hidden from public view. This can 
be argued to be the case because of the image of consensus and unity that the 
’’strong” MADE culture presents as its trademark. It can also be assumed that the 
more the consensus image is emphasised, the more necessary it becomes to shield 
the espoused frontstage culture from ’’deviant” interpretations (Goffman 1963). At 
MADE, organisational identity is based in this culture -  a situation which further 
strengthens the necessity to keep the culture ’’clean”.
As a result, backstage interpretations are not acknowledged in the espoused MAIE 
safety culture, and organisational safety learning suffers from this state of affairs. It 
becomes an organisational paradox that the ’’strong” MADE safety culture can be 
argued to be a barrier for safety learning and improvement. This analysis is in total 
discord with the way that MAIE portrays itself as a learning safety organisation.
But it supports Gherardi et al.’s (1998b:211) conclusion that ’’strong” organisational
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cultures may compromise safety as they stress social control over individuals and 
organisational units.
8.12. Will any ’’recommendations” for safety or safety research originate from 
my findings?
It is time to ask whether this study has illuminated issues that are worthy of further 
attention concerning practical safety issues or future safety research. Has this work 
of mine contributed to the enlargement of the body of safety knowledge in a way 
that potentially can bring on safety improvements and lead to theoretical 
developments within the field of safety research?
The aim of this study has been to develop local knowledge, and I have utilised thick 
descriptions of the MAIE multiple organisational safety reality in order to take my 
audience and myself through the processes of research sensemaking and the 
establishment of local knowledge. But even though a goal of mine has been to 
avoid generalisations, I will propose tentative answers to the stated questions which 
are based in the local MAIE knowledge I have come up with and methodological 
and other experiences I have gained in the course of this research project.
But first of all I will turn my attention to MAIE in order to spell out my 
"recommendations” for this specific organisation based in my local knowledge of
the plant.
\
8.12.1. MAIE and further safety development -  or why it is imperative to 
understand MAIE from different angles.
The most obvious beneficiary of this work is the organisation I have chosen to study 
-  provided there exists an interest at MACE to spend time on an outsider’s view of 
the organisation. Through my work, MAIE organisational members will have the 
chance to get an extensive insight into their own organisation and safety culture. 
Whether or not MAIE will appreciate and take any notice of my study in their
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continued safety work is a question I will not speculate about. But the potential for 
this to take place is present.
Managerial ability to manage and develop an organisation is dependent upon 
thorough knowledge about the organisation in question. MAIE managers know 
their organisation and their employees from many years of coexistence, and there is 
no reason to believe their organisational knowledge to be lacking when compared to 
organisations in general. Rather, it seems reasonable to suggest that MAIE 
managerial knowledge can be assumed to be quite extensive, due to the modest size 
of the plant and the informal organisational atmosphere.
MAIE managers repeatedly claim they have a comprehensive overview of the 
MAIE safety situation, and that accordingly, they know what actions to take for the 
further development of MADE as a safe place to work. It has been difficult for me 
to establish precisely to what extent the MADE backstage safety interpretations are 
known to MADE managers. Irrespective of whether or not they are partially or even 
fully aware of the existing multiplicity of safety constructs, though, it can be seen 
that they do not observe this variety of constructs in their safety development efforts 
as MAIE safety work is built upon managerial and shared frontstage safety 
interpretations.
The MADE consensus hegemony works as a barrier for the acknowledgment of the 
positive aspects of the MAIE organisational heterogeneity. It can be argued that 
MAIE managers* repertoire for managing safety in a creative and innovative 
manner would expand if they encouraged backstage definitions to come forward 
and acknowledged these as valuable assets in their work for improved worker 
safety. Such an approach -  the recognition of plural safety cultures -  would 
enhance the probability for developing a comprehensive understanding of MADE as 
an organisation -  albeit a complex one as compared to the rather streamlined and 
unified picture that MAIE managers today construct their safety policies around. It 
cannot be considered too fanciful a speculation that the possibilities for new and 
productive safety initiatives lie inherent in a widening of the scope of safety 
knowledge to include differing perspectives.
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But -  as I have discussed previously -  such an inclusive managerial strategy is 
probably not possible without organisational alterations. By the ’’opening up” of 
the organisation in order to include ambiguous interpretations, it can easily be 
imagined that the shared frontstage safety culture and identity would become 
disrupted and cause organisational destabilisation. Such a situation is likely to 
bring about unintended organisational consequences as the present pattern of 
organisational authority becomes altered.
The question is whether it would be possible to combine the organising benefits of 
the shared safety identity and safety culture of today’s MADE with a more open and 
inclusive approach towards multiple safety interpretations. This would require 
major changes in organisational attitudes of what is the accepted range of safety 
’’truths”. Following this, a safety philosophy has to be developed in which the 
advantages and empowering strengths of a safety culture that is built upon diversity 
and multiplicity is emphasised. And finally, a multiple perspective has to be 
promoted as the shared and identifying image of MADE safety instead of the 
presently focussed unambiguous state of the frontstage safety culture. If this 
became the case, MAIE’s safety culture could be described as one in which unified 
organisational diversity is a distinguishing cultural trait.
Such a project includes nothing less than a major change in the MADE culture and is 
a very demanding task even if the will to attempt the change is present. When 
considering the importance of MADE managers in the construction of organisational 
safety meaning through their authoritative labelling, the managers would 
necessarily have to play an active role in such a transformation of the MAIE 
cultural reality. There is no indication that MADE managers contemplate or see the 
need for a change process like this. And from my position, it can never be anything 
else than pure speculations whether a transformation like the described one would 
be possible in the specific organisational circumstances of MADE. But for the sake 
of improved safety, it is my firm belief that it would be worth the attempt.
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8.12.2. My research and a genera] focus on ’’good” safety cultures.
Frequently, it can be heard or read that what is needed for organisational safety 
improvement is to change and improve an organisation’s safety culture -  and then 
safety problems will become easier to solve or almost cease to exist. In the first 
pages of this thesis, I spelled out how a main source of inspiration for this research 
work was what I felt to be a simultaneously tool-oriented, fuzzy and almost magical 
utilisation of the concept of "safety culture”. I said that I wanted to fill the concept 
with substance rather than with what I experienced as thin and mostly rhetorical air. 
Since I started this work, work accidents and disasters have continued to take place, 
both locally, nationally and on an international level. In my mind, the evening of 
November 26,1999 holds a specific position. This was the night when the 
fastgoing passenger vessel "Sleipner” sank -  close to my shores -  after having hit 
an underwater rock en route from Stavanger to Bergen on the western coast of 
Norway, resulting in the loss of 16 lives. Among those who lost their lives were 
people from my local community.
In the aftermath of this catastrophe a multitude of safety-related questions have 
been raised and numerous speculations have been offered why the "unthinkable” 
actually happened: Technical problems, navigation mistakes, construction defaults, 
improper training, bad weather conditions, insufficient lights to mark the 
underwater rock, low quality safety vests, nonusable rafts, incompetent behaviour 
from the ship’s crew -  and allegations of the poor state of the ship company’s 
"safety culture”. An improvement of this culture was said to be a main objective in 
order to prevent such a disaster ever to happen again.
As far as I was able to understand this "safety culture" improvement perspective as 
it came forward in the extensive media coverage that followed the accident, it was 
focussed around the development and implementation of new and better company 
procedures for the handling of ship safety and -  in my mind -  the almost mythical 
and rapid improvement of the ship company’s safety culture. The vital question of 
how to improve the safety culture was not touched upon — as usual. Not a word 
about the organisational options to reach down into the lower levels of the
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organisation in question -  to its backstages and doubtlessly existing polyphony of 
safety voices -  in order to grasp and utilise the localised and situated safety 
knowledge there for safety culture improvement came to the surface as an objective 
of any interest. The belief in a rational, procedural and mythical safety cultural 
development still seems to be well and alive.
In the wake of the ’’Sleipner” disaster, some local ship companies* backstages have 
come to public attention by way of crew members* media appearances through 
which insufficient safety precautions have been illuminated and suggestions for 
improvements have been pointed to. Whether there has been a will or not inside 
these companies to include these crew perceptions as legitimate safety constructs 
lies outside the scope of my knowledge. I can only guess that, since organisational 
members have chosen to utilise media as their channel of communication, they 
might have found it difficult to get their definitions accepted internally. What these 
media-revealed safety constructs have shown a little glimpse of, though, is the stock 
of vital situated safety knowledge that can be found in close proximity to mundane 
and daily work chores.
A further "search” for a *’good” safety culture in my view must build upon the many 
and complex safety perceptions that are bound to be found in any organisation. As 
it incorporates safety knowledge that is developed in the daily work process, such a 
perspective on safety improvement and learning will cultivate a company safety 
culture that blends safety procedures and regulations with **bottom-up** feedback in 
a cultural mix that has the potential of becoming a productive and innovative -  
although complex and not easily managed -  safety culture which is "owned” by all 
organisational members. If managers in addition are aware of and capable of the 
utilisation of symbolic leadership as one of the means of building and strengthening 
such a collective although complex culture, then the chances of developing a 
"good” safety culture might be present.
It is a managerial task of no small measure, though, to promote and sustain an 
organisational culture in which a genuine interest in organisational actors’ safety 
perceptions lies at the core of safety development. In such a setting, managers will
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have to abandon the traditionally dominant position of their own safety constructs in 
favour of a philosophy in which all perceptions -  regardless of their origin in the 
organisational hierarchy -  is considered of equal value.
These safety improvement suggestions of mine will probably be incompatible with 
the general distribution of power in most organisations. Whether a wish for 
improved worker safety is a strong enough managerial incentive to be allowed to 
interfere with organisational power relations is a question of no small importance.
In spite of all legitimate doubts that can be mustered to contradict the possibilities 
of a managerial "resignation” of their defining authorities concerning safety, I 
choose to believe that if the wish for improved safety is a genuine managerial aim, 
then managers will dare to let their definition supremacy go.
With this optimistic background setting, my general "recommendations” turn out to 
be quite similar to the ones I proposed for MAIE: It seems to me that it is only by a 
truthful organisational effort to include both differentiated and ambiguous safety 
perceptions from all levels of the organisation that a company is able to develop a 
genuinely "good” safety culture which is filled with more substance than 
bureaucratic procedures and thin rhetorical air only. This task involves the 
acknowledgment of organisational backstage knowledge as well as developing 
procedures to bring this knowledge into the open in order to utilise a multiplicity of 
safety definitions in the organisational learning process. Such an effort is not a 
particularly small job. But it may be a worthwhile organisational strategy for the 
improvement of organisational safety learning -  and for minimising the probability 
of new "Sleipner” events.
8.123. The significance of my study within the field of safety 
research.
Finally, it is time to establish -  at least in my own mind -  the significance of this 
research project of mine and the "results” I have come up with in the context of 
safety research in general and as a possible contribution to the further development
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of this field of research. Have essential new insights and issues that are worthy of 
further considerations emerged from my work?
When citing the purpose of my study, I said that my intention was to do an 
exploratory study of worker safety which focussed around organisational actors* 
own perceptions and sensemaking of their safety reality. I also established that it 
was a goal of mine to utilise my chosen theoretical framework in order to illuminate 
issues concerning safety and safety organising that infrequently are being 
considered in safety research literature. And finally, I emphasised that my purpose 
was to produce local knowledge and not generic theory since I do not believe that it 
is possible to come up with **the essence” of safety and safety development in 
general based in any localised safety study. But even so, I could hope that my 
chosen approach would prove beneficial for the development of new aspects of 
safety knowledge and improvement of worker safety in general.
In order to gain insight into my chosen research objectives, I spent three fieldwork 
periods at my chosen place of study. In the course of this time, I observed, I 
participated in the work process, I attended shift safety inspections, shift safety 
meetings and a local safety conference, I read offical safety documents, I 
participated in the daily life of the plant in all imaginable ways and I was also given 
access to employee backstage regions. And I interviewed organisational actors: 
nine managers and 92 production employees sat down with me for talks about 
safety and their interpretations of the MAIE safety reality. My main goal was to 
collect safety perceptions and safety knowledge from all these sources in order to be 
able to analyse the MADE safety culture from all possible angles.
I will argue that I have reached my objective of doing a study like the one I 
intended to do. My completed thesis hopefully evidences this statement of mine. It 
has been a long and at times strenous journey to try my best to be true to the 
theoretical and methodological choices I made -  choices that kept sitting in my 
spine throughout all phases of this work. To base an organisational study in an 
approach which emphasises mundanity and multiple perspectives and utilises
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ethnography as a methodology to grasp these perspectives is not any easy way of 
doing a study. Lack of time, waning persistence and the feeling of being 
overwhelmed by the abundant data material has been major obstacles to combat 
during my long-lasting research odyssey. But in retrospect I am convinced that I in 
fact did not have much choice regarding theoretical perspectives or methodology if 
I wanted to ”do a safety analysis which focusses around organisational actors* own 
perceptions of their safety reality” as I spelled out to be the purpose of my study on 
p. 13 in this thesis.
It has been necessary to abandon research perspectives which look upon work 
safety as a result of what is considered rational, logical and management-based 
problem solving methods and systems. Rather, it has been vital for me to 
investigate the MAIE safety culture within a broad perspective since part of my 
theoretical luggage throughout this research venture has been a scepticism to what I 
perceive as superficial and instrumental approaches to organisational culture in 
some research traditions. A multiperspective paradigm has been my overall guide 
in my effort to focus upon the subjetive safety sensemaking processes of MAIE 
organisational actors, and as a result of this paradigmatic choice, I have been able to 
”catch” the multiplicity and complexity of organisational voices in a way that a 
more ’’rationally” based safety research approach doubtfully would have been able 
to achieve. The ”ant heap” perspective (Geertz 1993a) has shown to be productive 
in the illumination of local MAIE safety culture knowledge.
In order to come to grips with this local knowledge, it has furthermore been 
necessary to abandon methodological tools that would not enable me to illuminate 
different levels and aspects of the safety culture I wanted to study. An ethnographic 
method of research seemed to me to be exempt from methodological competition as 
my research objective was to explore into the polyphony of an organisation without 
the ’’help” of pre-conceived research categories. ”To be an ethnographer” thus 
became an inevitable methodological decision due to ethnography’s all-embracing 
and exploring research approach, and I have found my choice of methodology as 
well as my preferred theoretical perspectives to be highly profitable in order to 
analyse safety as complex, fragmented and ambiguous organisational processes.
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As a result of my research findings which are based in these cited choices of mine, 
it has been necessary for me to write an ethnographic tale about MAIE which 
focusses upon the multiple and mundane affairs of MAIE safety, consisting of thick 
descriptions (Geertz 1993b) of the organisational sensemaking processes. My work 
is thus an ’’answer” to what I consider to be an oversimplification of the dynamics 
of organisatonal culture in general: The notion that it is a somewhat straightforward 
and instrumental task to create, to change and to analyse an organisational culture -  
as is not seldom implied in culture literature -  has to me never seemed to be in 
accordance with organisational reality. My research work has fully made me realise 
the point made by Bate (1994) when he talks about cultural matters and argues that 
one never seems to get to the bottom of things. ”The greater the island of 
knowledge grows, the greater becomes the shoreline of the unknown” says Wheeler 
(1980: quoted in Bate 1994:4). I have not reached to the bottom of the MADE safety 
culture, and I can clearly see the shoreline of the unknown. But even so, I am 
confident that my approach has taken me further down the road of cultural 
comprehension and found more turtles (Geertz 1993b) than a more instrumental 
cultural approach would have been able to.
My research has shown that MAIE’s safety culture has emerged as the result of 
organisational processes over a long period of time. I have also shown that the 
safety culture is complex, comprising different safety cultures and a multitude of 
differentiated, ambiguous and fluctuating safety perspectives in spite of being 
portrayed as homogeneous and streamlined. In order to comprehend the MAIE 
safety culture, it has been vital to include all these different cultural aspects into my 
analysis. Without such an approach, I could easily have ended up with an analysis 
that overlooked imperative elements in the dynamic life of the MAIE safety culture.
Thus, a call for methodological and paradigmatic consensus in organisation studies 
scares me, as is promoted for instance by Pfeffer (1995). He argues that in order to 
acquire a position ”in the marketplace of ideas” (p. 684), organisation researchers 
should strive towards a consensus on approaches, ideas, and perhaps most 
importantly, methods. Pfeffer argues that what he perceives as a laissez-faire and 
let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom spirit currently pervades organisation studies (p.
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685), and this multitude of perspectives bears the cost of a lessened influence for 
the field as a whole in the world of research.
I am not overly concerned about my work’s position ”in the marketplace of ideas”, 
but I am concerned that a methodological and paradigmatic multiplicity in 
organisational studies -  and specifically safety studies -  becomes a norm, and to a 
greater extent that what I perceive it to be today. Contrary to Pfeffer’s suggestions, 
the field of organisational safety research seems to me to lack methodological and 
paradigmatic diversity.
In his replies to Pfeffer, Van Maanen (1995a; 1995b) argues against the call for a 
consensus paradigm and characterises the effort as ”... the industrialization of 
scholarship, not its advancement” (1995a, p. 689). Van Maanen uses Karl Weick 
and the widespread influence of his work in organisational studies as an example of 
how paradigmatic -  and stylistic -  diversity has been vital for the development of 
the field. He praises Weick* s ability -  as well as courage -  to leave interpretations 
to his readers, and he also emphasises Weick*s ’’dialectic reconstruction” in which 
opposites are shown to be ’’true” at the same time (Van Maanen 1995b, p. 137). In 
this way, Van Maanen argues that Weick is able to”... depict an organizational 
world that is in continual flux, a world that is always becoming” (ibid., p. 138).
It has been essential for me throughout this work to leave interpretations open in the 
way that organisational actors* own and multiple interpretations are being presented 
to my audience in great numbers. In this way, my readers are able to form their 
own interpretations and conclusions which might or might not coincide with those 
that I myself have come up with in my discussions of MAIE local theory. I have 
also frequently shown the MADE safety reality to be apparently contradictional in 
the way that organisational members -  in different situational settings frontstage 
and backstage -  have multiple and at times oppositional interpretations of the same 
safety affairs. Thus, an organisation which is based in dialectic dynamics is 
presented, and I have argued that this diversity and this ambiguity are main traits of 
MADE as a safety organisation.
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I believe that future safety research can gain insight from my study by giving 
attention to mundane and multiple safety perceptions. I suspect that a similar safety 
multiplicity as the one at MADE can be found in any organisation irrespective of the 
organisational safety image that is being offered to the outside world. There is bttle 
reason to assume that MAIE’s safety cultural complexity is unique, and I suspect 
that a similar safety heterogeneity would be found in many organisatons -  if looked 
for. I am convinced that safety research -  and organisations -  will benefit from 
becoming aware of such a complexity and from the simultaneous valuing of 
authoritative and non-authoritative definitions of the organisational safety reality. If 
a search for multiple safety perspectives became included in safety culture research 
and cultural multiplicity became acknowledged as ’’part of the game”, hitherto 
’’hidden” organisational cultures would become visible and much situated and 
localised safety knowledge would surface. Instead of ignoring them or even 
denying their existence, an acknowledgment of multiple safety interpretations 
would broaden the analytical approach and improve the research potential of being 
able to provide ”... knowledge foundations for a comprehensive and perceptive 
understanding of conditions, situations and mechanisms which influence and can 
influence actors in organisations” (Alvesson and Berg 1992:177). Such an 
approach could prevent too narrow a strategy in safety culture research and thus 
have the potential of enhancing the practical utility of such research.
It is true that safety research in this way would appear less streamlined than it often 
seems to be at present and that the research results and proposals for actions would 
become less predictable and appear to be less smooth when it comes to 
implementation. But when differing aspects of the organisational safety reality is 
illuminated, then the chances for increased safety learning in general would be 
improved and practical and applicable safety solutions easier to find. When being 
based in a comprehensive safety culture approach, change efforts would stand a 
chance in having substantial effects on the organisational safety situation -  which 
normally is the objective when trying to transform and improve a safety culture.
Pfeffer (1995) states ”... that for writing to be influential, it must suggest not only 
what to do in general terms but how to go about doing it in very specific terms” (p.
245
685). I do not find this statement to be a sound advice for the further development 
of organisational safety research. As Van Maanen (1995a; 1995b), I have argued 
that organisations are not "objective worlds” that can be represented and analysed 
through an "authoritative” set of methodological and analytical prescriptions and 
thereafter be presented to an audience by way of clear-cut and general research 
"results”. Pfeffer’s (ibid.) certainty and his promotion of a consensual state of 
affairs in organisational studies is in full contradiction to my point of view. In my 
opinion, safety research has a strong need for a paradigmatic diversity that 
encourages multiple perspectives and comes up with fewer non-ambiguous 
suggestions both in general and specific terms. Only through such a paradigmatic 
diversity will safety research be able to catch the dynamics of safety in complex 
organisations.
It is my belief that my research approach thus is my main contribution to the field of 
safety research. I hope that future research will take on the task to investigate 
worker safety from many organisational angles and perspectives in order to uncover 
more and more layers of turtles (Geertz 1993b). Whether this by necessity involves 
the task of becoming a longitudinal ethnographer is doubtful. There are surely less 
time-consuming methodologies that can take care of this research objective, 
although notably in a less thorough manner than a "full-scale" ethnographic 
approach. It is therefore a challenge for future safety research to come up with 
methodological and analytical propositions which have the potential to include and 
focus upon subjective safety rationalities. By a recognition of the mundane, 
situated and multiple safety knowledge that will come to the surface when looked 
for, both researchers and practitioners will be able to come up with a work-based 
and innovative repertoire for theory building and safety improvements that has the 
potential for strengthening worker safety. And that is what this is all about, my 
MAIE informants tell me. I hope they are right.
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1. Standardised form -  accidents, damages.
2. Reports -  shift safety inspections -  five examples.
3. Accident reports -  three examples.
4. Monthly summary of accidents -  two examples.
5. Monthly safety statistics -  three examples.
6. Statistical graph -  accidents and H-value.
7. Safety statistics 1993 -  1995.
8. Safety report -  accidents and accident causes.
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f t P F . H
Hendelser i februar
0 skader m/favser
1 skade u/fravaar 
1 materiell skade 
3 tillop
Skims har fait fra krane den 6/2 og 7/2.
Q
Arsak: Boltene pa girkassen var losnet og skimsene losnet og 
fait ned.
Tiltak: Det innfores ukentlig kontroll, sjekklise utarbeides i 
sammarbeid med kranverksted.
Operator fikk stov/skitt i oyne ved nedforingsfeste. dato: 17/2
ArsakzNedforingsfestet. ble flyttet.Det drysset ned stev.(Det var 
ikke pabud om briller).
Tiltak: Ved flytting av nedforingsfester ma det brukes 
briller.! .
2 1 b -
Hendelser i mars




Dordelen av e t H-verktoy fait i gulv
Arsak:Det var ubalanse i dor-delen og den fait ut av skrustikken 
Tiltak: Alt arbeid p& 510 mm dor-deler skal gjores i sveise/ frese bu
Nar operator skulle ta ut verktoy fra ovn,fa!t backer ut av 
verktoyringen
Arsak: Det manglet kile i ring.
Tiltak: Ringer ma sjekkes nar de monteres
ProvebK fait ned fra korg under transport
Arsak:Provebit var rorformet og trillet av
Tiltak: Provene legges pa langs i korg og stemples av
Stro fait ned fra korg under transport med krane 
Arsak: Lose stro la i bunn p& korg 
Tiltak: Stro m§ festes i korgene
-
A  p p . S  •
VSr dato/Our date VSr referanse/Our reference
Deres datc/Your da tP ^ ®  referanse/Your reference
HMS - rapport
Maned / At : 03  /  94 .
Til : Verksdirektor .
Kopi: M.& S .-seksjon
• • a
Siste maned Hittil i ar
Skader m / fravser 0 1
Skader u /  fravser 2 4
Materielle skader 4 7
Tillop til skader 0 5
H - verdi 0 20 ,7
F - verdi 0
NB. En skade reg. uten fravser i februar er omgjort til 
skade med fravser som det fremgar i akkumlert 
hitill i ar.
A f P . S .
Dato 040594.
HMS - rapport - v , •
Maned / Ar : 0 4  / 94.
Til : Verksdirektor *
Kopi: M.& S.- seksjon *
*
Skader m / fravaer
Siste maned 
0
Hittil i ar 
1 V
Skader u /  fravaer 2 6
Materielle skader 0 7
Tilhap til skader 1 6 t
H - verdi 0 15,3
F - verdi 0
HMS - rapport
Mined /  Ar : 10.95.
Til: Verksdirekter 
Direkter. > V u
Plassjef
Kopi: M&S - seksjon v/ Vernesjef 
Siste maned Hitill i Sr
Skader m/fravaer 
" u/ fravaer 
Materielle skader 







Dato for siste skade m/fravaer 21 .08 .95
-  3 . 1 1 "
A - P P . t -
-  2 / 7 ?  ~
*
I
• • " v. ^SMSk s,..
A P P . i
■V '.V-'?- -V, X; 1 •
Acc. 1993  
H-verdi 10,5
F-verdi 165






Skader m/fravaer Skader u/fravaer Tillep/Farlige handlinger
Sept. 1. I 4Okt. ■6 f
Nov. 3 4
Des. 0 0 4
-A cc, -94 , 2 T 7 . : “  \ 2 2
1995
Jan. 0 2 •
Feb. 0 • 1 5
Mars 0 ■ 1 6
April 0 3
Mai 0 '= 4  • •
Juni O'. 1 , •/" 2
Juii 0 0 1
aug. 1 3 ' 1
sept. 0 2 4
okt. 0 1 2
Matriell 14
Sum 1
• f 'V f 
13 31 Materiell 9




Etse skade i an$ikt,eye 2
Skrubbs&r p& leggen 1
BrannsSr pS underarm 1
Lite kutt I " , 1
Stev i ayne 1
Pekefinger I klemme 2
Langfinger i klemme 1
Tommelfinger i klemme 2
Kutt I venstre ISr 1




Verktay i gulv 2
Profil fait p£ vrist 2
Stra fait fra korg under transport 1
Praver fait ut av korg under transport 2  .
Skimms fra kran-motor funnet p£ gulv i ; . • -.1.'
Kolll fait av UK trailer under lasting f  ^ j\- 1 ’
Hjul fait av tralle / :V;- •  jT-
Lett slag i ansiktet I- Y:
wire defekt p5 kran i anod.
Plater fait fra tak utvendi
Backer fait ut av verktayring (manglet kile.i ring)
Puller 2 i retur med profil
Kjetting slittnet under oppkjaring av verktkorg.
Under lasting av trailer sneiet kolliet bortl operator
som pakket
Sagspon fra puller naer aye 
Nitrogen ut i rommet 
Slag p& pekefinger
Grabben var ikke i inngrep p§ l&sekant I korg 
Stabel av profilskrap fait av krakkerie 
Sylinderfeste for klamp p3 puller 2 brekt av 
Plast strappeband rak 
Bryter p5 fjernkontroll hengte seg opp 
Sykkel tippet med pravebiter til Lab. '
A f > p . 8
r - i  ;V
Snubblet p.g.a. rot p5 gulv >  1
Snubblet i korg og fait i gulvet 1
Operator traff kolli med skulder . 1
sum ’ • 31
A* U -0
Materielle skader
Avtrekkshette fait ned fra tak I anodl&erif1£l c  y  £ 1
Palle fait av truck  ^ " 1
Hull I stoyvegg * 1
Beyd lysbjelke og knust refleks p§ traileriu.k.) 1
Boyd stag p§ kranbomm " T- 1
Puller 2 I retur(sikkringskap odelagt) ; 1
Tabla for kran smeltet 1
Profiler fait I gulv 1
Kjetting p§ skrev ble slitt av 1
sum 9
APPENDIX 9 -  EXTRACTS OF FIELD DIARY
Monday September 4, 1995:
”1 talked to x who has injured his ankle, and he is now on crutches, working in the 
drawing room. X says the injury was worse than first believed. He takes off his sock 
and shows me the ankle which still is swollen. He has been told to try avoiding using 
his foot.
While I sat writing, x arrived and invited me to his shift’s celebration of seven years 
without injuries. That was nice and suited me well since I was very tired in my head 
of listening to tapes. The whole shift was present and some of the managers as well. 
We were served good sandwiches, fruit, coffee and soft drinks. It was almost 
embarrassing, as manager x talked a lot, while most of the workers said next to 
nothing.
The managers gave small speeches and flowers were given to all workers -  x 
congratulated them of the good safety results and said he appreciated the firm hand of 
the shift safety representative who stopped the work process a couple of weeks ago 
due to an oil leak -  which immediately after that was taken care of. X also said that 
everyone should be proud to work at this shift -  and that he believed that most people 
were.
Then x said a few words. He wished all the best for the future, and hoped the shift 
will continue to go on without injuries. He said that even though he ought not to say 
so, he believes that all injuries cannot be avoided, and that it is permitted to be on sich 
leave stay if one becomes injured. I think this is an important signal to the workers, 
and x looks like he appreciates to hear it. X is as always more humanly oriented in 
his words than x. He says he is proud that the situation is different han in the 1980s, 
that the equipment is much the same, but the workers are much more competent now, 
both regarding their safety attitudes and their general work competence.
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There is a lot of food left over, and we put it into the refrigerator for tomorrow. X’s 
injury in 1988/89 is mentioned, and x says this was a ’’border case” -  an injured foot 
and he was not on sick leave due to his upcoming vacation -  that was why it was not 
registered in the reports as it perhaps should have been.
X says that management does not want to hear so much about this episode -  he found 
it okay himself that it was not properly reported since he was due for vacation. He 
also says that there is a hysterical trend concerning the statistics -  it has become the 
most important issue, it has become too much, he says.
Outside the shift room, x says that he expected x to bring up the H- and F-values. He 
told the story of when x was at a meeting and had said: ”1 am not the smartest guy in 
the world, but neither am I a complete idiot -  but I do not have a clue about these H- 
values or what you call them”. X said today that the H-values previously had been 
around 70, and that seemed to amuse people. They say they do not understand what 
this is about, and they do not care hearing about them.”
Tuesday October 3,1995:
”1 was picked up by x this morning -  he had looked for me yesterday morning as well. 
X came with the key -  they are so considerate.
Lunch break with x and x. We talked about a lot of things -  alcohol problems at work 
-  safety statistics -  dangerous medication, the union has brought up the issue with 
management -  the fact that people are different and have to be treated differently -  
the labels of the bicycle helmets that had to be removed because of x’s injury.
X says once again that work here is very monotonous and that social relations are 
important in order to make it bearable. And maybe to be in the packing department is 
the most monotonous work of all? They mention x who is a very smart guy and is not 
willing to do anything else than this job, and that there are people who are satisfied 
with such a situation.
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X says he has become much more safety conscious at home as well due to his work 
here.”
Thursday November 9,1995:
”1 have got appointments for next week with all members of the x-shift except for two 
of them who had a break. I have just counted -  so far I have interviewed 64 workers. 
Shift supervisor x is very accomodating as I had believed he would be.
Small talk with x and x -  they talk about how many new and young employees which 
have come here during the last couple of years.
I can see the end of my field work now -  which is good, although I will miss bitterly 
the social atmosphere which I have found here. I do not find so much of that at my 
own place of work. It is rather curious that I had to go to an industrial site to find the 
"human touch”.
I met x, he has been on a trip with one of the shifts. They were interviewed by the 
plant newsletter, and he was surprised that they talked so nicely about their place of 
work. But things are rolling now, he says, good bonuses and good profits.”
Tuesday December 5,1995.
"Quarrel at x-shift in the coffee break -  a person had stored profiles irregularly -  if 
there had been a safety inspection, they would have been in trouble, some say.
They complain about the maintenance department -  something about a saw that needs 
repairing and nothing happens -  this seems to be the day when everybody complains 
and quarrels.
I caught a glimpse of the plant safety representative here today -  it is the first time I 
have seen him here.
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X from maintenance has been here and due to a leakage, both he and x got some 
dangerous liquid on their hands. ’’Good luck that it didn’t got into our eyes”, they 
say. I doubt if it is reported.
X tells me about some instances of writing on the toilet walls where named persons 
have been commented upon.
Talked with x and x and they were occupied with how fine things are productionwise 
and safetywise. X says that even though things are more speeded up now then 
previously, people are more safety conscious. X talks about x’s injury -  that other 
injured people have been given new job tasks -  that MAIE management is too honest, 
they produce too honest safety statistics. Safety statistics are difficult to compare with 
each other, he says.”
285
APPENDIX 10 -  TAPES
The interviews are recorded on 61 tapes, all in Norwegian.
When I have quoted directly from them in my text, I have translated the quotations 
into English.
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